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ABSTRACT 
A theological doctrine of eternal life raises certain qualitative and existential questions. 
Considering the unfathomable duration, one may rightly ask, what will that experience be like 
and will it meet the experiential needs of human beings so that there are no intimations of 
boredom. Eternity, then, creates a potential existential problem for humanity. The problem is 
potential because eternity creates a certain need, a need which can concisely be stated in this 
way: quality must overcome quantity. Both Christianity and Islam teach human beings are 
intended to live forever so both religions must overcome this problem if eternal life within that 
religion is something to be desired. In this study, the problems of eternity are divided into two 
distinct classifications: the Qualitative Gap Problem (QGP) and the Teleological Gap Problem 
(TGP). The QGP is an objective problem and considers the relation of the divine to humanity as 
a solution to eternity. The TGP is a subjective problem and considers how the ultimate good of 
the afterlife aligns with human telos and consequently, human flourishing. This study argues that 
the Islamic afterlife does not have the theological and philosophical resources to meet both gap 
problems simultaneously and must compromise on one in order to meet the other. Subsequently, 
the study submits that the Christian view of afterlife overcomes both gaps because of the 
God/man relationship in Heaven focused supremely on, in, and through the God-man Jesus 
Christ. It is it our holistic relationship to the Triune God that grants eternal joy for all of 
redeemed humanity. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, THESIS, RATIONALE 
Introduction 
British moral philosopher Bernard Williams once stated, “nothing less will do for eternity 
than something that makes boredom unthinkable.”1 A simple yet profound statement, Williams 
elucidates a fundamental assertion about eternity that follows from thorough reflection 
concerning said reality. This statement emphasizes the cause of existential angst some people 
have towards an eternal afterlife. For many people, the idea of living forever is a blessed reality 
met with welcome arms. It is welcomed because the opposite – death and non-existence – is a 
sobering and even terrifying thought. Human beings naturally seek to preserve their existence 
and typically do not will or wish their own non-existence. On the other hand, however, for some, 
the prospect of never ceasing to exist can likewise be haunting. Because that future life is not 
empirically accessible there is uncertainty about what it will be like. What are we going to do for 
an eternity? What will it be like to have an infinite amount of time ever and always before us? 
How will that impact the decisions we make or how we choose to spend our time? Will it have 
an adverse effect on the quality of life? Almost every aspect of our earthly human experiences is 
rooted in finitude and thus our cognitive capacity is limited in the sense that we cannot grasp the 
expansive nature of eternity. Furthermore, our empirical access is also limited because we cannot 
at once say that we have experienced eternity. There is no point on the continuum where one 
reaches his destination if eternity is the journey, for we will only ever be on the journey. 
 
 
                                                      
1 Bernard Williams, “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality,” in Problems of the 
Self, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1973), 95. 
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Rationale and Need for this Study 
These thoughts on eternity highlight the impetus for this study. Thinking about eternity 
leads to questions about what it would be like to experience it. If the hereafter is desirable, then it 
must be of the kind and quality to satisfy human beings for an incomprehensible duration. 
Williams succinctly captures the human sentiment that an eternal existence, if it is to be good 
and desirable, would have to be of a certain kind and quality so as to eradicate boredom from 
human experience entirely. Another way to conceptualize this is the relation of the subject to the 
pleasure. That is, are the pleasures of afterlife, whatever they may be, of such a quality that they 
could fully and forever satisfy the human qua human? This is no small consideration as the 
eternal plane of existence is just that – eternal – and if there is eternal life after death the reality 
of its duration is unfathomable. In this life things satisfy us for a while, and then when we 
become bored, we desire something else. Will the afterlife be the same? Are our desires satisfied 
for a while and then we become bored, or does the qualitative nature of a particular afterlife 
render boredom unthinkable? What will existence be like a billion-trillion years from now when, 
at that future moment, there will still be the same amount of duration remaining in eternity as 
when it first started? 
A salient feature of the three great monotheistic faiths – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
– is the belief in an embodied afterlife. Jews, Christians, and Muslims all believe that at some 
eschatological moment, God will gather the living and resurrect the dead, exact judgment, and 
usher the righteous into an eternal paradise prepared by God himself. Those who are there, those 
who have been counted among the faithful, will enjoy a life of unending bliss in the presence of 
God. When we consider, however, the many different religious faiths that have a doctrine of 
afterlife, the comparative question naturally arises, is there one view of the afterlife that is more 
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desirable than the others? The idea of desirability may seem a subjective criterion upon which to 
judge a system. What one person deems desirable may not seem so to the other and vice-a-versa. 
Here, however, the level of desirability is not reducible to individual wants of individual human 
beings; instead, the kind of satisfaction in mind is holistic, one that encompasses not only the 
whole human person but all of humanity. What is it that brings pleasure, fullness, and completion 
to human creatures? Will the afterlife possess the necessary resources to achieve these ends? 
Both Christian and Islamic doctrines have historically affirmed that part of man’s 
intended telos is immortality, and as such, the desire to live eternally is woven into human 
nature. At a basic human level, a conversation about the afterlife will engage that longing and 
encourages people to think deeply about it. An eternal life means that human beings will spend 
the incomprehensible majority of their existence in a reality quite different from the one 
experienced now. It would seem then that our attention, reflection, and motivations should be 
drawn to this life to come. This life is but a mere vapor, a wisp in the wind, yet so much of 
humanity’s thoughts and efforts are focused immanently on this present world. 
Reframing one’s perspective to include a present awareness of afterlife is an important 
feature within Islam. Among the list of fundamental doctrines, William Chittick writes that the 
return to Allah is “the third of the three major principles of Islamic theology, after Tawḥīd and 
prophecy.”2 One of the things to appreciate about Islam is the emphasis on living this life in light 
of eternity. Classical Islam and Christianity both teach that the choices we make have eternal 
significance; but the significance is demonstrated even more so in Islam where the level of 
spiritual development in this life subsequently influences one’s proximity to Allah in Paradise. 
                                                      
2 William Chittick, “The Ambiguity of the Qur’anic Command,” in Between Heaven and Hell: Islam, 
Salvation, and the Fate of Others, ed. by Mohammad Hassan Khalil, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
68. 
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The importance of Paradise and its attainment cannot be understated. Furthermore, a robust view 
of Heaven/Paradise provides answers to deeply felt needs.3 Human purpose, human identity, the 
problem of evil are all issues that find answers and resolution from this doctrine. On the 
Christian view of Heaven Walls writes, “To recover heaven as a positive moral source is to 
recover our very humanity.”4 This too can apply to Muslims as human telos in classical Islam is 
intimately linked to the afterlife. The doctrine of the afterlife – Heaven or Paradise – deserves 
one’s utmost attention and people should strive for thorough and sound understanding of it. 
Broadly speaking, my hope is that both Christians and Muslims will benefit from this 
study by first challenging them to think about the doctrines of Heaven and Paradise coupled with 
the concept of eternal duration. More specifically, however, this study is apologetic in nature and 
as such I wish to equip the Christian reader with resources that help him/her to engage their 
Muslim neighbor in fruitful dialogue concerning the nature of the afterlife. This is done by 
showing the qualitative good that results from personal relationship with the Triune God 
consummated in the final abode contrasted to the seemingly restrictive relationality of the 
Muslim believer and tawḥīdic Allah. For the Muslim reader, this study is polemical in nature but 
is not meant to turn the reader away. Applying the doctrine of tawḥīd faithfully generates certain 
commitments which Islam’s own scholars have wrestled with for centuries and my intent is to 
apply that conversation towards thoughts and implications about Paradise. 
 
 
                                                      
3 Our desire for something to be true does not necessarily add veracity to a thing nor does it give good 
reason to believe it is true, but, as Walls rightly notes, “…at the same time I would insist that we should not dismiss 
it out of hand because it does so.” Jerry Walls, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 200. 
4 Ibid., 200. 
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Research Problem 
The quantitative nature of eternity is incomprehensible, unfathomable to the human mind. 
What humans can project into eternity, however, is the impression that eternal existence, while 
initially garnishing existential appeal, could quickly become a hellish reality.5 To provide some 
perspective about the sheer quantity of time, think about the adverb quickly relative to eternity. 
Take any amount of time that is comprehensible to the human mind, or, for our purposes, even 
an amount of time that is not, then imagine that once you reach that designated point of existence 
the pleasure of paradise has diminished. This sequence happens quickly relative to eternity for 
there is still an infinite amount of existence remaining for one to experience. What is left then for 
human beings for the rest of eternity? Would we still desire to exist, to go on in a reality of 
diminishing return? 
Eternity, then, creates a potential existential problem for humanity. The problem is 
potential because eternity creates a certain need, a need which can concisely be stated in this 
way: quality must overcome quantity. Both Islam and Christianity teach that mankind is intended 
to live forever and so both religions must overcome this problem if eternal life within that 
religion is something to be desired. Furthermore, in both Islam and Christianity, God is revealed 
                                                      
5 The first intimation of trouble would likely be boredom, but as human beings experience the temporal 
succession of paradise, boredom could conceivably give way to a more dark and demented existence. Boredom is 
not the only concern that some philosophers and theologians have towards immortality. Matters of the self, the 
mind/body distinction, personality, the soul, etc., and their relation to immortality are all questions which give rise to 
concerns about a future existence. For more on this subject see: Brian Ribeiro, “The Problem of Heaven,” Ratio 24, 
no. 1 (March 2011): 46-64, accessed January 25, 2018, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/10.1111/j.1467-
9329.2010.00482.x; Erland Ehnmark, “The Problem of Immortality,” The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 44, 
No. 1 (Jan., 1951), 1-23, accessed January 25, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1508414. Michael Martin, 
“Problems with Heaven,” in The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case Against Life After Death, ed. by Michael Martin and 
Keith Augustine, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 427-439. A popular level source: Valerie Tarico, “10 
Reasons Christian Heaven Would Actually Be Hell,” Alternet, accessed January 25, 2018, 
https://www.alternet.org/10-reasons-christian-heaven-would-actually-be-hell. For responses to the purported 
problems and or positive cases for immortality see: John Martin Fischer, “Why Immortality is Not So Bad,” 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2 (1993): 257-270; Charles Taliaferro, “Why we need immortality,” 
Modern Theology 6, no. 4 (July 1, 1990): 367-377. 
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as a merciful and beneficial deity who provides and sustains the well-being of his human 
creations. God as provider is a common motif and this trait carries into the afterlife. Since God is 
good, and he is an all-loving provider then we are justified in assuming that the Afterlife will be 
good. It would seem then that if eternality was a good thing and immortality worth possessing 
there must be, to quote Anselm, “something which nothing greater can be conceived,” that can 
overcome infinite duration. To meet the qualitative need posed by the quantitative demand 
nothing less will do than a maximally great being – i.e. God. 
The solution to the problem of eternity rests in the Divine because He is the Ultimate 
Good, and possesses infinite resource, virtue, power, knowledge, etc.6 I would submit even 
further that part of the solution (at least) rests in our capacity to have knowledge of and be able 
to relate to the ultimate Good. A significant feature of creaturely goodness is relationality which 
consists in knowing and being knowing by others. Knowledge of another leads to love. When 
directed towards Allah, knowledge of Him leads the Muslim to love Allah above all else and so 
love is the condition for proper belief;7 and when that belief obtains, Allah, in return, will love 
those who love Him and do good (Q. 2:222). Similarly, we see in the gospel of John that 
knowing the Father and the Son is eternal life (John 17:3). Knowing the Triune God is eternal 
life but in Christianity, knowing is much more robust than knowledge of propositional attribute-
statements about God. Here, knowledge is relationality, of knowing a person and being known in 
                                                      
6 Immanuel Kant writes, “The end of all things which go through the hands of human beings, even when 
their purposes are good, is folly…Wisdom, that is, practical reasons using means commensurate to the final end of all 
things – the highest good – in full accord with the corresponding rules of measure, dwells in God alone; and the only 
thing which could perhaps be called human wisdom is acting in a way not visibly contrary to the idea of that [divine] 
wisdom.” Here Kant purports that God is the grounding of the highest good. The virtue of wisdom comes from the 
divine wisdom and insofar as humans as wise directly corresponds not to a human end but to the divine. Immanuel 
Kant, “The End of All Things,” in Religion and Rational Philosophy, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George Di 
Giovanni, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 228.  
 7 Sahih Muslim Book 1 (The Book of Faith), Hadith 67, 68 https://sunnah.com/muslim/1 
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return. This emphasis on relational knowing (and by virtue, a certain kind of love) is non-existent 
in Islam and this is, by necessity, due to the ontology of Allah. Allah and the Triune God share in 
benefaction, mercy, justice, and in these ways, they both display similar loves. However, the 
very ontology of God in these respective religions necessitates a very distinct foundational kind 
of love that differentiates Ultimate Goodness. The Islamic doctrine of Tawḥīd teaches that Allah 
is unitarily undifferentiated, one, without distinction or comparison. Allah’s love is 
fundamentally reflexive, directed back onto itself in singularity. Ultimate goodness in the context 
of love is thus self-love. The Trinity, however, is both unity and plurality, a singular essence 
(ὁμοουσια) yet three distinct asymmetrical persons. Trinitarian love is fundamentally other-
centered, seeking the good of the other, in an eternal perichoretic fashion.8 Here, ultimate 
goodness in the context of love is other-centered love. 
Contrasted in this way, we have two fundamental statements about Ultimate Goodness. 
Thus, we have two distinct ways God relates to man and man to God in the Afterlife. I will argue 
that only a Trinitarian God, as described in Christianity, can provide humanity with the most 
robust version of eternal life, one that will better satisfy human beings for eternity. Furthermore, 
I submit that the Christian view of afterlife meets the demand of eternity because of the God/man 
relationship in Heaven focused supremely on, in, and through the God-man Jesus Christ. It is it 
our holistic relationship to the Triune God that grants eternal joy for all of redeemed humanity. 
Sub-Questions 
The sub-questions laid out in this section reflect the remaining chapters in this study and 
are presented sequentially. 
                                                      
8 Peter Leithart’s book on the relational considerations of the Trinity in comparison to human relationship 
and interaction is helpful for a greater understanding of the perichoretic relation within the Trinity. See Peter J. 
Leithart, Traces of the Trinity: Signs of God in Creation and Human Experience, (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 
2015). 
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1. What is the nature of Paradise in Islam? 
A robust understanding of Islamic Paradise is needed if Christians are to engage with 
Muslims in fruitful apologetic dialogue. Christians must be able to move beyond sexual 
caricatures of Paradise and address its most salient features. In many ways, Paradise and Heaven 
share similar physical characteristics although the former described in much more detail than the 
latter. Because of the need for greater understanding, Chapter 2 will unpack certain motifs of 
Islamic paradise integral to the study. 
2. What is the nature of the relationship between God and man in Islam? 
If one speaks of union, experience, and love of Allah, a particular set of questions arise. 
As mentioned before, the primary teaching of Islam is that Allah is one (Tawḥīd), that He is 
wholly other than creation. However, the Qur’an also teaches that Allah is closer to man than his 
jugular vein (Surah 50:16). On the one hand Allah is radically transcendent and on the other he is 
intimately immanent, and so Chapter 3 develops the Islamic conceptions of divine knowledge, 
love and relationality. 
The 11th Century Medieval Muslim scholar Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-
Ghazālī (1058-1111),9 a prominent and influential philosopher, theologian, jurists, and Sunni 
mystic, will serve as a middle ground between the majority Sunni tradition and the Christian 
view of Heaven.10 He was a reformer of Islam in his time and suggested that central to the 
eternal joy of Paradise is the Vision of Allah rather than its physical pleasures. Within the 
highest levels of Paradise is a spiritual encounter with Allah which far surpasses the physical 
                                                      
 9 Hereafter al-Ghazālī 
 10 Quasem notes that Al-Ghazālī has sometimes been acclaimed in both the East and the West as the “the 
greatest religious authority of Islam after the prophet Muhammad,” and Muslims have given him the title of the 
“Proof of Islam” (ḥujjat al-Islām) and the “Ornament of Religion” (zayn ad-dīn). Muhammad Abul Quasem, The 
Jewels of the Qur’ān: Al-Ghazālī’s Theory: A Translation, with an Introduction and Annotation, of al-Ghazālī’s 
Kitāb Jawāhir al-Qur’ān, (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1977), 10. 
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bliss of the Garden. The highest levels of Paradise, however, are reserved for those whom in this 
life attain a certain level of spiritual illumination and practice. 
Al- Ghazālī was influenced by the spiritual and mystical experiences of the Sufi 
traditions. His writings help to move the pendulum back towards a theocentric view of Heaven. 
Thus, it would seem that discussions about God’s love become of paramount import. Of the 
Islamic theologians who stressed the centrality of love in the human-divine relationship, as al- 
Ghazālī did, Chittick writes, “the fact that they focused on loves show that they were writing 
with the goal of bringing humans and God together…”.11 Sufi scholars stress the human side of 
the divine-human relationship and seek to demonstrate how one can partake in the Beatific 
Vision. Al-Ghazālī moves in the right direction suggesting that the highest form of Paradise is 
the experience of Allah. But as his view develops two critical points (at least) arise: first, 
considering the doctrine of Tawḥīd, relation to Allah is at best mystical and impersonal; and 
second, how then does Allah love humanity if he only loves Himself as ultimate? One of the 99 
divine names of Allah is love but what is the nature and essence of this love and to whom is the 
referent? Does, in fact, Allah demonstrate agape love towards creation as some suggest? Is it, in 
this way analogous to the agape love of the Trinity or is it merely an equivocation of terms? 
3. What is the nature of the relationship between God and man in Christianity? 
As was done with Islam, Chapter 4 will address Christian conceptions of divine 
knowledge, love, and relationality as it relates to the God/Man relationship. First John 4:7-8 is 
such a profound theological passage for it is one of the few passages in Scripture in Scripture 
where God essence is revealed. At the end of verse 8 the copulative verb applies the predicate of 
                                                      
11 William Chittick, Divine Love: Islamic Literature and the Path to God, (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2013), 4. 
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love to God. These verses go on to say that if you do not know love you do not know God. 
Furthermore, in John 15:9-17, Jesus tells his followers that he loves them and that they are to 
abide in his love. They can abide in the love of Christ by keeping his commandments. Jesus tells 
these things to his disciples so that “my joy may be in you, and that your joy may be full.” There 
is a connection here between love, obedience, and joy. Having fullness of joy is found in abiding 
in the love of God. This applies to the Afterlife as well. Eternal joy will derive from abiding and 
partaking in the love of God in Heaven where human beings will know and be known, love and 
be loved by the Triune God. 
Limitations 
1. Perspectives about afterlife 
For some, death brings an existential quality to current life because every choice, every 
decision, every action is given a significant weightiness. Because we have only one life to live, 
what we chose to do with our limited time gives a heightened value to that decision. Conversely, 
the more the ability to choose and decide in a finite context is infringed upon or removed 
entirely, the more tragic the circumstance. Thus, if the possibility of non-existence is taken away 
and human beings are to life forever, life becomes meaningless to some degree. This perspective 
of immortality has been discussed in academic writings and popularized in a number of literary 
works as well as movies. Quite often, immortality is seen as a curse rather than a blessing and 
death and finitude provide a romanticized emphasis on human decisions. The negative 
relationship between immortality and meaning is misunderstood and I would submit that an 
eternal afterlife is a positive thing even something to be desired. Eternal life does not limit the 
existential quality of this current life for if humans are to live forever, then this ‘existential crisis 
of sorts’ misses the point. If, from a Christian perspective, part of mankind’s telos is immortality 
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then existence is woven into the very essence of humanity. Decisions in this life are important 
because they will have a significant impact on the life to come. The same can be said in Islamic 
theology. From an Islamic perspective, man’s telos includes immortality, an eternal existence 
either enjoying the pleasures in Paradise or experiencing torment in Hell. Thus, this study will 
proceed under the supposition that eternal life is a good to be desired because it is part of our 
telos as human beings. 
2. Variation within the Christian Tradition 
Christian eschatology is broad and diverse. There are many camps within the broader 
tradition each beholden to various doctrines concerning the time of Christ’s return, the nature of 
His coming, the role of the Church, the Tribulation period, the Millennial reign, etc. Variations in 
Christianity regarding the nature of heaven exist as well though commitment to them are 
seemingly less dogmatically held than the doctrines just mentioned. Throughout the history of 
Christianity there has traditionally been two ends of the spectrum concerning the foci of 
heavenly pleasure.12 On the one end of the spectrum is a theocentric view of heaven. In its most 
extreme form, heaven consists of eternal contemplation of the infinite reality of God (i.e. 
Aquinas). Eternal joy then, as Walls writes, “consists entirely of the beatific vision, requiring no 
dimension of human fellowship to be complete.”13 On the other end of the spectrum is the 
anthropocentric view of heaven. Heaven, on this end, resembles life here on earth yet in a 
glorified sense, void of pain and suffering. We would be reunited with our loved ones and 
“Heaven thus construed,” as Walls again writes, “would include poetry, pianos, poppies, and sex, 
                                                      
12 Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang, Heaven: A History, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2001), 177ff.; 302ff. 
13 Walls, Heaven, 7. 
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all at their best.”14 Down through the ages, theologians, church confessions, writers and poets 
have fallen along the spectrum in one degree or another often like the swing of a pendulum 
through time. 
Considering the array of belief regarding heaven, it is difficult to establish one position as 
orthodox. As with any spectrum, however, the poles are typically to be avoided as they tend to 
traverse too far in one direction. I would submit that the middle of the spectrum is where we 
should reside. It is the place where heaven and earth come together, where God and Man meet, 
where lover and beloved are united in perfect love and relationality. The middle is found where 
God (θεός) became Man (ἀνθρωπος) – Jesus Christ. That Jesus Christ is the middle ground in the 
spectrum provides a balanced view of Heaven. Following the resurrection, Jesus possessed a 
spiritual body which means that the second person in the trinity remains incarnated in space and 
time. Thus, if Jesus was fully human, then it suggests that human telos includes, but is not 
limited, to a physical spacio-temporal existence in eternity. To be human is to possess a physical 
body albeit one that has put on immortality.15 This would further suggest that the eternal joys of 
afterlife are analogous in some respects to this life. Chiefly among the correspondence is the 
human need of and satisfaction in love and relationality. Yes, Heaven will consist of 
contemplation of the Divine and yes it quite likely possesses physical pleasures brought on by 
food, drink, nature, etc., but of central importance is the intimate relation to God, where we will 
love and be loved, know and be known, where all persons – Divine and Human – are not mere 
means to pleasure but are end in themselves where pleasure ultimately and perfectly derives. 
3. Variation with the Islamic Tradition 
                                                      
14 Ibid., 7. 
15 1 Cor. 15:42ff. 
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Just as there is variation of doctrine and belief in Christianity, so too is there in Islam. 
There are of course fundamental dogmas in Islam where if one were to deny them, they would 
not be Muslim. The doctrine of Tawḥīd and the creedal Shahada represent two such dogmas. 
Moving out from that foundation, however, variation and distinction begin to form in all manners 
of Islamic doctrine (i.e. Sharia Law, Jurisprudence, succession from the Prophet, philosophy of 
religion, etc.). The same can be said of Paradise, that is, there is both commonality and 
distinction within Islam concerning the eschaton.16 Because of the broad range of eschatological 
views in Islam the scope will inevitably need narrowing. There are the same two traditional 
camps in Islam as there were in Christianity – a theocentric and anthropocentric view. The 
theocentric view, like Christianity, emphasizes the Beatific Vision – contemplation of the Divine 
– as the source of unending joy. A literal reading of the Qur’an and Hadiths support a more 
anthropocentric view and it is the view arguably held by a greater number of Muslims 
throughout the history of Islam. 
The second chapter will present a basic understanding of Paradise in Islam, addressing its 
salient features. This survey will tend towards a Sufi (mystical) tradition of Paradise. I do not 
wish to trivialize or misrepresent the literalist reading of the Qur’an in relation to Paradise but 
nonetheless, it appears more susceptible to critical analyses than does the more mystical 
theocentric traditions due to the latter’s emphasis on Divine encounter. As such, the overall 
dialogue will be directed toward the Sufi perspective. 
4. The degree of speculative theology. 
                                                      
16 For further study of Islamic Eschatology, one can reference these sources: Christian Lange, Paradise and 
Hell in Islamic Traditions, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016); The Islamic Understanding of 
Death and Resurrection by Jane Idleman Smith and Yvonne Haddad (Oxford Scholarship Online); Jerry Walls, Ed., 
The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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 Admittingly, our epistemic access to things concerning the eschaton delimits what can be 
known about every aspect of the afterlife. This study takes seriously the revelatory comments 
alluding to the idea that a heavenly afterlife will be beyond human imagination. Throughout any 
critical point of the study, a Muslim may claim that Allah or YHWH has prepared a place that is 
beyond our imagination (Surah 32:17) and by this resort to mystery and trust. I would certainly 
hope this is the case and agree that God’s creative capacities are more elaborate, powerful, and 
complex than human capacities. The Afterlife would not be a place to long for if its design were 
left up to creaturely imaginations. However, even though humanity is limited in what can be 
known, it does not necessarily follow that nothing is known. Beyond our imagination is not the 
same as beyond our comprehension. We may not be able to imagine the richness of Paradise but 
if the reward of the afterlife is to be enjoyed forever shouldn’t it be within our capacity to 
comprehend on some level now especially since this world is teeming with God’s goodness? In 
both the Christian and Islamic holy texts, the revelatory disclosure includes content concerning at 
least some aspects of the nature of afterlife. People can at least know some things about it 
however limited it may be. But, if, at the conclusion of this inquiry into Islamic Paradise, 
someone responds with “we do not fully know what Allah has prepared for us but we trust that it 
will be eternally satisfactory” then it will be difficult to continue a fruitful discussion on this 
specific topic.17 At some level the statement has merit, yes our understanding of Paradise is 
limited – by location, knowledge, perception, etc. – but based on what we do know through 
                                                      
17 This sentiment of mystery is not to be dismissed but affirmed. In Sahih Muslim there is a hadith which 
says “Never mind what God has told you; what He has not told you is even greater.” As it has already been 
mentioned, mystery should be expected regarding the nature of the Afterlife. However, the argument is, given what 
is known about God and the Afterlife, an analysis and comparative judgment can be made that is not depended or 
does not change based on what is not yet known. 
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revelation, not only about Paradise but Allah’s nature and thus relation to it, I believe one can 
form sound opinions and beliefs concerning it. 
Full-disclosure and ultimate comprehension of what Paradise is like would not be 
expected nor could it be achieved in this life. If we faithfully apply revelations concerning its 
nature, then we must admit that parts of its reality are beyond our current ability to understand 
both in comprehension and experience. At the same time, the Qur’an and Hadiths strive to great 
lengths to describe the Gardens as a reality that seemingly corresponds to this one. Thus, I am 
asserting that it is possible within that correspondence to evaluate and make certain judgments 
about the nature of the blessed afterlife prepared for the faithful followers of Allah. 
5. Paradise on its own merits 
 In Islam, the eternal fate of mankind subsists in two contrasting realities – Jannah (the 
Garden or Paradise) and Hell. Paradise is for those who are faithful followers of Allah and upon 
whom He has desired to show mercy and reward. Hell, on the other hand, is for those who have 
denied the oneness of Allah, have rejected his prophet Muhammed, and have not heeded the 
revelation of the Qur’an. The same dichotomy exists in Christianity. Heaven is the abode of God 
and where those who are called His “sons and daughters” will spend an eternity in His presence. 
Hell is reserved for the Devil, the fallen angels, and those who have rejected the Father’s Son – 
Jesus Christ. For this study, Paradise and Heaven will not be considered in comparison to Hell. 
Given the option of Paradise/Heaven or Hell, the only sane and rational choice is the former. 
Thus, Paradise and Heaven will be analyzed in themselves and then compared to one another and 
not in comparison to Hell. 
 
 
   
 
 
16
Key Terms 
 This section will present a number of key terms in the study. Most of the terms presented 
are Islamic terms and they highlight central theological aspects of Islam18: 
islām, īmān, iḥsān 
 These three words represent a threefold attitude adopted by Sufis. The Qur’ān speaks of 
the first two terms: islām and īmān. Obviously, islām is familiar as it is the name of the religion 
and it means “the complete and exclusive surrender of the faithful to God’s will and his perfect 
acceptance of the injunctions as preached in the Qur’ān.”19 A Muslim who practices sharīʿah has 
the attitude of islām which is the externalizing of the religious form. Īmān, “faith,” in contrast, 
constitutes the internal aspect of Islam. Thus, as Schimmel notes, “a muslim need not be a 
muʾmin “one who has faith,” but the muʾmin is definitely muslim.”20 The last term, iḥsān, was 
added – according to most traditions by the Prophet himself – with the meaning that you have 
continual contemplation of God and worship Him as if you see Him. Of course, man cannot see 
Allah, but the Qur’ān teaches that Allah sees everything – all the particulars of reality21 – and so 
man, as Schimmel writes, “must never fall back into the “sleep of heedlessness,” never forget the 
all-embracing divine presence.”22 Iḥsān is the completion of the internalizing of Islam and is the 
goal of every Sufi disciple. 
                                                      
18 I have chosen to focus on Sufi terminology in this section assuming that most readers will be the least 
familiar with their theology and terminology. More Islamic and Christian terms could have been included but the 
ones listed here serve the purpose of acclimating the reader to terms pertinent to Sufi theologies of divine love, 
salvation, and the beatific vision. 
19 Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 
2011), 29. 
20 Ibid., 29. 
21 That the Divine knowledge does not encompass individual objects (the particulars of the universe) is one 
of the three complaints al-Ghazālī has towards the Islamic philosophers of his time. He affirmed that Allah’s 
knowledge consists also of the particulars. 
22 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 29. 
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“Going back” ma‘ād 
Islam teaches that human creatures were pre-existing souls prior to the creation of the 
world. Following the creation of the world, human beings were sent to the earth but most of them 
forgot about Allah because they were separated by the “veil of createdness.”23 Thus, part of the 
Muslim journey is remembrance, remembrance of Allah and subsequently the immanence of the 
return. Islam views the whole of human history as moving towards the “going back” or ma‘ād. 
This concept of returning is a fundamental principle and it concern the manner in which a person 
returns. As Chittick notes, “The issue of salvation and its opposite, damnation, arises in 
discussions of this third principle [ma‘ād ]…In the texts, the contrast between salvation and 
damnation is frequently expressed in terms of “felicity” and “wretchedness,” a pairing derived 
from a verse about the resurrection” (Q. 11:105).24 Every person will return to Allah, but the 
manner in which they return – salvation or damnation – depends on remembrance. 
“The Path” ṭarīqah 
This is the term for the Sufi path to God as well as to denote a Sufi brotherhood.25 
Ṭarīqah or “path” is the doctrines and methods of “the foremost”. Regarding the method of “the 
path” they are practiced in addition to what the sharīʿah, the sacred Law, prescribed for every 
                                                      
23 This time prior to creation is known as the Day of the Primordial Covenant. It was a time when man 
became “existentialized, endowed with individual existence by God.” Man’s existence, however, became separated 
by the veil of createdness so that he could not directly perceive Allah. It is not until death that the veil is lifted, and 
man and God are reunited. Or for the mystic of Islam, at death he is “completely and substantially annihilated in 
God.” The “going back” is the stage between the Primordial Covenant and the lifting of the veil. Ibid., 143. 
24 Chittick, “The ambiguity of the Qur’anic Command,” 68. 
25 Lings goes on to note that “This does not of course mean that every member of a Sufi brotherhood can be 
called one of ‘the foremost’. In order to have the possibility of being among these one must first of all be following 
the path, and today the vast majority of the members do not actually move along the ṭarīqah but remain stationary.” 
Martin Lings (Abū Bakr Sirāj ad-Dīn), The Book of Certainty: The Sufi Doctrine of Faith, Vision and Gnosis, 
(Cambridge, U.K.: The Islamic Texts Society, 1992), x. Nasr notes that ṭarīqah "spiritual path" is usually known as 
"taṣawwuf or Sufism" itself so that ṭarīqah is equivalent to Sufism. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ideals and Realities of 
Islam, (Chicago, IL: ABC International Group, Inc., 2000), 115. This seems to be in agreement with Lang's point 
that this term can also denote a Sufi Brotherhood.  
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believer. In some ways ṭarīqah is the internalization of sharīʿah – the essence and the form 
respectively. The sharīʿah is and outward form of an inner dimension of meaning, disposition, 
and spirituality. Carrying out the commands of sharīʿah are necessary for all Muslims and it 
directs those who follow it precepts to right living. “The Path” leads Sufi adherents from right 
living to the way to approach God.26 
“Gnosis/Cognition” maʿrifa 
Gnosis or Cognition here refers to knowledge of the Divine. It is not to be confused with 
Christian Gnosticism prevalent in 1st and 2nd century which purported to have a secret knowledge 
of salvation, reserved only for its adherents. In Islam, gnosis is related to the telos of the human 
soul. A properly functioning rational soul pursues its end and loves the pursuance of its activities 
– knowledge of God.27 On the nature of the rational soul, Abrahamov writes:  
The perfect state of the rational soul is to be always existent perceiving things as they 
really are, knowing them, and taking pleasure in this knowledge. The rational soul is 
delighted with knowledge because knowledge, by virtue of itself makes the rational soul 
perfect and brings it to its goal. Since the rational soul knows its beginning and its end, it 
longs for its Creator as a lover longs for his beloved.28 
Seeing Allah is not a seeing of form or matter; rather, it is a spiritual seeing that is achieved 
through knowledge of the Divine Attributes (the 99 beautiful names). Pleasure in the afterlife 
will coincide with this gnosis as the rational soul will fulfill its telos contemplating the Divine. 
“Love” ḥubb and ‘ishq 
                                                      
26 Ibid., x. 
27 Alexander Treiger notes the distinction between maʿrifa and ʿilm (as used in the writings of al-Ghazālī). 
Trieger admits that they are often used interchangeably by al-Ghazālī the former is only used to designate the 
specific type of religious knowledge that will “lead to felicity in the afterlife.” Alexander Treiger, “The Science of 
Divine Disclosure: Ghazālī’s Higher Theology and its Philosophical Underpinnings,” (PhD diss., Yale University, 
2008), 229. 
28 Binyamin Abrahamov, Divine Love in Islamic Mysticism: The Teachings of Al-Ghazali and Al-Dabbagh, 
(Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 20. 
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As with most languages other than English, the concept of love is linguistically diverse 
with multiple terms employed to capture the robust nature of love. For the purposes of this study, 
we must delineate between two terms for love used by Arabic speaking Muslims – ḥubb and 
‘ishq. The former, ḥubb (or maḥabba) is the wording used in the Qur’ān to describe God’s love 
for man and vice-a-versa as seen in Surah 5:54 “He loves them, and they love Him.” In early 
Islam, ḥubb was the accepted term for talk of God’s love even though His love and man’s love 
were not to be understood univocally as the term referred to love as a type of longing. Over time, 
certain Sufis began to use ‘ishq in reference to God’s love. This was initially controversial 
because of its connotation of the kind of love expressed between two passionate lovers. Used in 
relation to man’s love for God however, ‘ishq need not denote a sexual connotation but can refer 
to the awakening of man’s soul to deeper passions and the ascension to the spiritual realm.29 Al-
Ghazālī referred to ‘ishq as the last stage of love this side of Paradise and that few would attain 
this level of love for Allah.30 A Muslim who has ‘ishq for his Lord will experience the highest 
realms of pleasure in Paradise, the Beatific Vision of Allah. 
 
Literature Review 
In the chapter entitled “A Christian Approach to Eternal Life,” Peter Vardy seeks to 
reframe a prominent aspect of Thomistic theology concerning the Beatific Vision in the Christian 
Afterlife (i.e. Heaven). This chapter is pertinent because the conclusion Vardy puts forth is much 
in line with the argument proposed in this comparative study. In Summa Contra Gentiles, 
                                                      
29 Abrahamov defines ‘ishq thus, “to awaken man’s soul from the slumber of negligence and folly and 
make the soul ascend from the material to the rational things, from the sensual to the spiritual entities which are its 
source.” Abrahamov, Divine Love in Islamic Mysticism, 20. 
 30 Joseph E. B. Lumbard, “From Ḥubb to ʿIshq: The Development of Love in Early Sufism,” in Journal of 
Islamic Studies, 18:3 (2007), 384. (accessed May 29, 2018) doi:10.1093/jis/etm030 
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Aquinas writes on the Beatific Vision of God that awaits Christians in the afterlife. Throughout 
this portion of the Summa, Aquinas builds his cases chapter-by-chapter and point-by-point, 
towards the conclusion that the highest level of happiness for humanity is achieved in the 
Beatific Vision.31 Aquinas contends that the highest good of human function is the contemplative 
life demonstrating his commitments to Aristotelian philosophy.32 Not only is Aquinas committed 
to an Aristotelian anthropology, he also demonstrates his commitments to a Platonic view of 
God. Aquinas rightly identifies God as the summum bonum but is also overly committed to other 
Greek influences regarding the attributes of God: “literally timeless, utterly immutability, 
bodiless, spaceless and without parts.”33 Thus, in relation to the Beatific Vision, man’s relation to 
God is the Afterlife is understood within the bounds of these essential attributes. Aquinas’s view 
helps the believer to see that his only end is in God “yet”, as Vardy notes, “a God identified with 
the supreme Platonic values.”34 The subsequent development of the Beatific Vision in the 
Summa is fraught with theological and philosophical difficulties. Vardy discusses a few of the 
challenging implications of this Thomistic theology and proposes a new way forward that is 
seemingly more consistent with Scripture and avoids many of the problems of the Thomist view. 
His conclusions elevate the relational components of Afterlife, a heavenly society where “the 
wolf and the lamb shall lie down together, and a little child shall lead them” (Isa. 11:6). This 
                                                      
31 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. by Vernon J. Bourke, ed. by Joseph Kenny, III.63. 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm Accessed, Sept. 14, 2017. 
32 In III.37 of the Summa, Aquinas quotes Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics 10.7 in establishing that man’s 
ultimate happiness is found in contemplation of the highest level of speculation (See Aristotle, Nichomachean 
Ethics, trans. by David Ross, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 194 (10.7.11-18). It should be noted that 
Aristotle does not make the theological move that Aquinas will in resting the highest human good in the 
contemplation of God in the Afterlife.  
33 Peter Vardy, “A Christian Approach to Eternal Life,” in Beyond Death: Theological and Philosophical 
Reflections of Life After Death, edit. by Dan Cohn-Sherbok and Christopher Lewis, (London: MacMillan Press: 
1995), 19. 
34 Ibid., 20. 
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picture of heaven depicts a social environment that has been transformed in a spiritual sense, that 
is, “a spirit of individuals who have put self into second place and have devoted their lives to 
love of others and of God. They have become, literally, transformed by love.”35 
 Lastly, yet equally relevant to the study, is the analogous relationship of Aquinas’s 
Beatific Vision with the Islamic equivalence in the Sufi traditions.36 In Ch. 51 of SCG Aquinas 
writes, “For God Himself understands His own substance through His own essence; and this is 
His felicity…And so, may they who enjoy the same felicity whereby God is happy to eat and 
drink at God’s table, seeing Him in the way that He sees Himself.”37 This description of the 
Beatific Vision is remarkably similar to the Sufi tradition on a number of fronts. First, it places 
the highest good in God. This placement is obviously consistent with general theocentric view of 
Heaven. However, second, and more unique, both conceptions of God in the Afterlife are 
committed to an utterly immutable, transcendent and bodiless deity. Here is where the two views 
distinguish themselves from the evangelical view. Evangelical theology emphasizes the bodily 
resurrection of Jesus and understands this resurrection state as extending into the present. Jesus, 
the second person of the Trinity, remains in bodily form and as such, experiences temporal 
succession. 
 Building on the first and second points, human pleasure and enjoyment in the afterlife, 
being found in the highest good, i.e. God, is consistently derived from the same manner God 
experiences delight – in Himself. Thus, for both Aquinas and al-Ghazali, humans enjoy God in 
the same manner that God enjoys Himself, namely, God enjoys Himself by reflecting on His 
                                                      
35 Ibid., 25 
36 Vardy himself does not make this connection in the chapter. It is not that the similarities do not exist or 
that they are superficial; rather, these ideas were beyond scope of the essay. I am drawing that conclusions of 
similarity after having read Vardy’s essay and the views of the Beatific Vision of both Aquinas and al-Ghazali. 
37 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III.51.5-6. 
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essence. God enjoys Himself and humans can enjoy God – the summum bonum – in the Afterlife 
by enjoying his attributes and contemplating His thoughts.38 The problem with both of these 
conceptions is not that humanity finds their end in God nor that that end correlates to the manner 
in which God enjoys or loves Himself; rather, it is the conception of God in relation to Himself 
and others. Al-Ghazālī’s God is radically unitary and Aquinas’s God, while retaining an 
orthodox trinitarianism, is utterly immutable thus diminishing the capacity of God to truly and 
genuinely love humanity and vice-a-versa. It is only the Tri-unity of Persons, i.e. the Trinitarian 
God of Christianity, free from Platonic bonds of immutability, that can meaningfully display 
love. The essence of the Trinitarian God is love and not merely a self-absorbed, equivocal love, 
but a dynamic, other-focused love existing eternally in the Tri-unity of persons of the Godhead. 
 Brian Scalise’s dissertation, Tawḥīdic Allah or the Trinity In View of Inherent Human 
Relatedness, adds to the corpus of theological comparison between Islam and Christianity, 
chiefly focusing on the nature of deity in each respective religion. Beginning with the 
assumption of the inherent relatedness between human beings, Scalise works out abductively 
seeking to “inquire into the nature of Deity in view of human relationships.”39 Human 
relationships exist and are a definite part of human existence, which Deity best accounts for 
and/or has greater explanatory depth to offer the best explanation for the kinds of human 
relationships we have? Is it the Tawḥīdic nature of Allah or the Trinitarian nature of the God of 
Christianity? Chapters 2-4 of the dissertation develop the prolegomena and theological content 
necessary to conclude with what is Scalise’s most significant contribution to the field, the 
                                                      
38 Al-Ghazali and Aquinas respectively.  
39 Brian T. Scalise, (2014) “Tawḥīdic Allah or the Trinity in View of Inherent Human Relatedness.” PhD 
diss., Liberty University, 2014, Scholars Crossing, 922., 3. 
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implications of Tawḥīdic Allah in relation to the concepts of otherness, relationality, distinction 
and, most importantly, love.40 
The concluding chapter is both intuitive and profound as a summation and confluence of 
his in-depth theology study.41 Before beginning his “paratactic comparison,”42 Scalise first 
readdresses the issue of Islam’s affirmation that humans are not made in the image of Allah. This 
has significant impact not only on Scalise’s conclusions but the arguments of this study as well. 
Claiming that Allah does not have similarity to human creatures means that He is utterly 
dissimilar in all manner of comparison and knowledge. Regarding Scalise’s purposes, Allah’s 
dissimilarity would “affirm that Allah does not explain human reality and relating,” implying, at 
least prima facie, that God as Trinity has greater explanatory depth for human reality. 
Furthermore, the consequence of such dissimilarity reaches far beyond explanatory scope for it 
would a priori suspend any possibility of theological knowledge altogether. The Muslim would 
seemingly not want to hold such a commitment considering all the theological language and 
content purportedly revealed in the Qur’an. At risk would be the very names/attributes of Allah, 
the 99 beautiful pronouncements of His character. Thus, it must be assumed, if human creatures 
can possess any meaningful understanding of Allah’s attributes, there must be, as Scalise rightly 
notes, “human realities to give a basis by which to understand those names applied to Allah – 
                                                      
40 Chapter 5 of this dissertation is a comparative study that demonstrates the supremacy of Trinitarian 
theology and its capacity to best account for otherness, distinction, relationality and love over and above Tawhīdic 
Allah. 
41 In this conclusion, Scalise summarizes the salient points from the previous chapters and concisely 
analyzes Tawḥīdic Allah and Trinity in paratactic fashion. Among the salient points are the concepts of Oneness, 
Distinctness, Relatedness, Dissimilarity, etc. In each case, the difficulties of Tawḥīdic Allah in relation to creaturely 
realities are brought to the fore and each time the Trinity proves to be the best explanation offering better 
explanations for each of the salient points. 
42 Ibid., 139. 
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analogically of course.”43 To what extent, then, is Allah wholly other if He can meaningfully be 
known through human realities? 
 Lastly, Scalise also addresses the ethics of love in concert with Tawḥīdic Allah and 
Trinity. Love for the other is one of the highest forms of love along with the love one has for 
God. If we are to hold this kind of love is such high regard, as such a great good, it would be 
problematic if we could not attribute this type of goodness to God. Once again Islam is plagued 
by the notion of otherness because the nature of Allah provides no ontological grounding for the 
concept of otherness.44 Unlike Trinitarian love, there is no basis for Allah to love the other which 
means that Allah’s love is purely self-absorbed, ever reflexing in upon itself. This poses both 
ethical and relational challenges for Muslims; how do we account for such a great good apart 
from Allah when His own nature does not allow for it and, what are the implications for Afterlife 
if humans are not the recipients of Divine love? To the former, Scalise rightly argues that only 
God as Trinity best explains love for the other and to the latter, it is part of the goal of this study 
to demonstrate that Tawḥīdic Allah does not overcome its singularity and thus has profoundly 
negatives effects on the human experience of the Afterlife. 
Miroslav Volf’s Allah: A Christian Response is significant in a general sense in that 
Volf’s expressed purpose for writing the book is to encourage fruitful dialogue and improve 
understanding between Muslims and Christians something this work aims to do as well.45 More 
                                                      
43 Ibid., 140. 
44 Ibid., 141. 
45 Miroslav Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, (New York: Harper Collins, 2011), see especially pp. 11-13. 
It should be noted that Volf believes that Christians and Muslims worship the same God and that this belief has been 
a point of much controversy in the Evangelical world over the past couple of years. The question “Do Christians and 
Muslims worship the same God?” is a very important question to ask but one that can also be shrouded in much 
ambiguity. Central to the question of sameness is the further philosophical question of what it means to refer to 
something. Could it be the case that Muslims and Christians are referring to the same referent? Furthermore, could it 
be the case that Muslims and Christians are referring to the same deity although one group is doing so under a false 
description? Perhaps the more fruitful and pertinent question to ask is, “Do Muslims and Christians believe the same 
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specifically, Volf focuses on the doctrine of God throughout for his interest is, as he states, “the 
proper Christian stance toward the God of the Qur’an,” which will hopefully help both Christians 
and Muslims “live together well in a single endangered world.”46 Volf’s study is partly 
dialogical, and in chapters 8 and 9 – “God’s Mercy” and “Eternal and Unconditional Love” – 
this methodology is beneficial as he focuses on the character of God as love. In both Christianity 
and Islam, one of the concrete theological doctrines is: God loves. But this proposition ‘God 
loves’ is quite ambiguous both because the word ‘love’ itself has a broad scope of meaning and it 
can be unclear how love stands in relation to God (i.e., as part of his nature and regarding His 
relationship to creation). Volf dispels many misconceptions Christians have towards Islam, most 
importantly are those in relation to love. He notes, with regard to God’s love, that Muslims and 
Christians share similar convictions: “God loves, God is Just, God’s love encompasses God’s 
justice and human beings should love their neighbors as themselves.”47  
But this, however, does not tell the whole story for these similarities do not cover the full 
range and aspects of love nor does it address the more fundamental claim of Christianity that 
God is love. Volf notes that both faiths agree that God loves in a compassionate, giving manner 
but to say that God is love makes a more fundamental statement about God’s eternal being. 
Muslim scholars are divided on this issue and have debated ascribing love to God in any 
essential manner. Those who do ascribe love to God prior to creation are committing themselves 
to a particular set of consequences. Tawḥīdic Allah is not internally differentiated (unlike the 
Trinitarian God of Christianity) and so the proposition God is love means there is a unitary self 
                                                      
things about God and His nature?”. The answer to this question is clearly both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ as we will see in Volf’s 
work, this study, and elsewhere. There are clear lines of demarcation between the revealed nature and character of 
Yahweh and Allah. 
46 Ibid., 1. 
47 Ibid., 158-9.  
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who loves himself as the ultimate object of that love. This means that God’s love for creatures 
and the creature’s love for God and one another is intimately linked to this kind of self-love 
originating from Allah.48 Thus, we have, as Volf rightly indicates, a comparison of loves – self-
love and love for the other – in Islam and Christianity respectively.49 Which love is ultimate? 
The implications of the two loves are profound and directly impact the divine-creature 
relationship, moreover, the profundity extends even to the very foundational fabric of reality.50 
Volf’s contribution to the Muslim-Christian dialogue is profoundly beneficial in this 
book especially as he elucidates the affinities Muslims and Christians share in their conceptions 
of divine love. I would agree with Volf that there is more affinity than many Christians would 
typically assume and that this is cause for improve relations; however, I would disagree with his 
claim that the differences that exist are not as “deep” as many think.51 Furthermore, the 
implications of divine love and divine-creaturely love extends into the Afterlife and impacts both 
the metaphysical and experiential components of the life to come. If God is the highest good in 
Paradise (and the Christian Heaven) as Muslim theologians suggest, then how the creature stands 
in relation to the divine will be significant.  
Jerry Wall’s, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy, contributes rich theological and 
philosophical conceptions of Heaven and the goodness of God. One of the major themes of 
                                                      
48 Ibid., 169. 
49 Ibid., 168-9. 
50 This point will be discussed at length in chapter 3 but here is the essential thought. Al-Ghazali suggests 
that creaturely love is merely an extension of the divine, and extension of Allah’s love for Himself given to creatures 
so that in the creaturely love for God, Allah is merely loving himself. This generates a quite significant metaphysical 
conclusion for al-Ghazali, namely, that all reality is an extension of Allah, an emanation from the divine. Revival of 
the Religious Sciences, Book 36.  
51 I think Volf’s overall goal may be influencing this language and, in an attempt to build unity he 
minimizes the profoundness of the impact the doctrine of Tawḥīd has on the concept of love, especially if love is an 
essential characteristic of Allah. Volf, Allah, 162 (last paragraph), see also 184 (last paragraph). 
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Heaven is the centrality of heaven to Christianity and the interrelation of this doctrine to most of 
the core doctrines of the faith (i.e. the doctrine of the Trinity, incarnation, atonement, 
resurrection, etc.).52 The Afterlife impacts many aspects of theology and, as Walls notes, it 
(heaven) “is not a mere appendage on the main body of Christian doctrine.”53 The doctrine of 
heaven also has significant philosophical implications on morality, theodicy, and overall 
meaning of life. 
 The first chapter of Walls’s book is the most significant for this study. His stated thesis 
was to “show that any meaningful account of God’s goodness implies some notion of heaven.”54 
Walls dialogues with Hume’s desire not to live forever and the impetus for such a seemingly 
nihilistic desire. At the end of his life, Hume stated in an interview that he did not want to live 
forever because he did not know what kind of life it would be and did not want to risk that life 
being worse than the life he had already lived. The uncertainty of the life to come, for Hume, 
was linked to his belief that God was an amoral being. Being neither good or bad, God would 
have no moral commitments to securing a certain kind of afterlife for his creation. Through his 
analysis of Hume’s dialogue partners in Dialogues, Walls argues, agreeing with Demea, that it is 
implausible to believe that God is amoral and more reasonable to believe in the goodness of God 
based on the way we have been created.55 
                                                      
52 Walls, Heaven, see p.5 but especially pp. 32-3. 
53 Ibid., 33. 
54 Ibid., 33. 
55 Walls arrives at this conclusion through abduction and logical inference. Beginning with the way God 
has created human beings, with certain longings and commitments – humans desire a meaningful life, the promotion 
of human happiness, and hold moral commitments – it seems, then, either these commitments line up with God’s 
character and intention in some way or they do not. Either way, there is no neutral, amoral position, either God is 
good or evil for giving human beings these longings and commitments. Ibid., see pp. 23-26. 
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The notion of heaven is a foundational doctrine in the Christian faith and Walls is to be 
praised for his rigorous theological and philosophical defense of the afterlife and prayerfully, a 
faithful renaissance of this doctrine is to follow. Furthermore, his work is fundamental in 
drawing the connection between God’s goodness and what we might expect heaven to be like. 
Thus, analysis and conclusions about what God is like in both Islam and Christianity and God’s 
relationship to his creation profoundly impacts what one can expect of the quality of the life to 
come. 
 Another significant text is Heaven: A History by Bernhard Lang and Colleen McDannell. 
This text is essential because it supplements the study with a very thorough history of the 
development of the doctrine of heaven in Church history. Beginning with the early church 
fathers, the authors trace how the doctrine of heaven has developed within a spectrum that has 
vacillated through the ages from one end to the other. The two poles of the spectrum are a 
theocentric and anthropocentric view of heaven. On the one end, the theocentric view places God 
at the center and emphasizes a heaven in which the highest good is the beatific vision – 
contemplation of the divine. This view tended to be more static and was not dependent on 
human-to-human relationships. Life in heaven was contrasted to life on earth as life in heaven 
will have little to do with life on earth.56 Concerning the theocentric view, McDannell and Lang 
write, “The saints do not have to do anything, they merely experience the fullness of their being 
by existing with God.”57 On the other end is the anthropocentric view of heaven. If the 
theocentric view of heaven stands in contradistinction to life on earth, the anthropocentric view 
depicts a heaven that is much like life on earth although to a magnified degree. In its extreme 
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version, the goodness of heaven lies in reuniting with lost loved ones and being together again 
with one’s spouse. The landscape of heaven is as a lush garden with houses and tents for people 
to live. On this view the authors write, “In the anthropocentric heaven, where all attention was 
directed toward the saints – and not to God – motion, variety, and endless diversity supplied the 
keys to eternal happiness.”58 
As the authors move through history and discuss the development of doctrine concerning 
heaven, it becomes apparent that the particular developments, the paradigm shifts, are intimately 
connected to the context of the time. This book reveals that the doctrine of heaven is relatively 
malleable and has been shaped by various cultural, theological and philosophical factors and 
commitments. From at least the time of Augustine and moving forward, however, there is a 
common motif that is prevalent throughout the doctrinal development of heaven – love. Whether 
love was connected to contemplation of the divine, as Aquinas suggested, or love existed in a 
sensual way in the paintings of the Renaissance, it is pervasive, to one degree or another, along 
the theocentric-anthropomorphic spectrum. That love is a central motif in the historical 
development of the Christian heaven supports the thesis of the study; love is a central component 
in thinking about the goodness of heaven. 
Timothy Tennent’s Christianity at the Roundtable provides further theological discourse on 
challenging topics through his dialogical project with Muslim interlocutors.59 Tennent’s 
methodological approach is encouraging because he builds conceptual relationship with other 
religious backgrounds by engaging in cordial theological correspondence. In his treatment of 
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59 Timothy Tennent, Christianity at the Religious Roundtable: Evangelicalism in Conversation with 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), ProQuest Ebook Central, 
https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/lib/liberty/detail.action?docID=3425709. 
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Islam, Tennent discusses the theology of Allah’s oneness or tawḥīd, that Allah is an “absolute 
unity, with no distinctions or associations.”60 To add to Allah’s unicity or to associate any 
partner with Him is to commit shirk which is an unpardonable sin in Islam. He points out that 
from a Muslim’s perspective, this is exactly what Christians do when they speak of God as 
Trinity and teaching of the divinity of Christ, they are committing shirk by adding to Allah a 
partner. In this section, Tennent also notes the tension and conceptual difficulty which exists for 
any serious student of Islam between talk of Allah’s essence and His many attributes.61 
Navigating the relationship between Allah’s essence and attributes is a delicate endeavor. 
Affirming both tawḥīd and the predication of attributes seemingly implies that there is distinction 
within Allah’s nature. The two main schools of theology in Islam – the Muʿtazila and Ashʿarite – 
differ in their resolution, the former purports that Allah’s essence and attributes are the same, the 
latter that the attributes are not to be identified with His essence.62 Tennent is correct to assert 
that any serious discussion about Allah and relationality must take seriously the relation between 
His essence and attributes. 
 Furthermore, as part of the section on Islam, Tennent defends God qua Trinity in a 
dialogue with Sunni, Shiʿite, and Sufi interlocutors. He eloquently and astutely discusses the 
deeper aspects of Trinitarian theology as well as both the internal relationality of God and the 
divine/man relationship. His correspondence with the Sunni and Shiʿite Muslim will be useful 
throughout this study but it was his specific discussion with the Sufi that interests us here. From 
the Sufi discussion two things become clear: first, Sufism is not as concerned with the 
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62 The Ashʿarite school of theology predominates the Muslim world as it is the theological school of Sunni 
Muslims which makes up around 86% of the Islamic population. Ibid., 149. 
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ontological nature of Allah as a mere mental abstraction. In response the Ṣūfī writes, “Tawḥīd 
refers to the experience or tasting (dhawq) of God’s being by becoming one with Allah in a way 
that supersedes all discussion or debate about him.”63 Second, Sufism makes a distinction 
between Allah’s essence and Allah’s acts. Again, the Sufi author writes, “In our view, his acts 
are the extension of the eternal light of his being.”64 Sufism seeks union with that light which 
transcends the mind and debate, leading ultimately to complete union with Allah. 
 This chapter’s primary focus is not the afterlife; rather, it is a chapter on the nature of 
God and his relationality and knowability. However, because any notion of relationality in both 
Islam and Christian has its ultimate end in the Beatific Vision, Tennent’s work is beneficial to 
the study. His explication of the difficulties in Islamic theology concerning the nature of Allah, 
are the same difficulties that arise when one thinks about Paradise and its bliss, that is, assuming 
that Allah is the ultimate good. 
Christian Lange's Paradise and Hell in Islamic Traditions is a necessary source for anyone 
wishing to study the features of Paradise in Islam. His is a very thorough study covering the 
doctrinal development of Paradise in Islam as well as the points of disagreement between the 
various sects. Diversity within Islam led to diversity of eschatological doctrines. Various 
theological and metaphysical commitments about Allah and the world influenced hermeneutical 
approaches to the texts creating differing views of Paradise. While there is much diversity of 
thought, there remains, however, a strong traditionalist view that emphasizes a more literal 
reading and thus a tangible Paradise which emphasizes embodied sensuous reward.65 
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It is important to note that it was in Lange’s book where first was discovered any internal 
criticism of a material emphasis view of Paradise (i.e. overly sensual view). Lange notes that the 
Muʿtazilites were skeptical of a purely corporeal paradise (which included such phenomena as 
Allah’s physical throne) but never went so far as to fully spiritualize it either although they 
tended toward a more metaphysical reading of the text. In several passages, there is some 
occasion of sarcasm in which they react against such sensuous views. Nonetheless, a thorough 
spiritualization of paradise did not occur in early Muslim theology and Lange suggests this was 
because the language of the Qur’ān and the Hadiths did not allow it.66 
The pinnacle of the spiritualization of paradise coincided with the influence of peripatetic 
philosophy of whom Avicenna was the most noted adherent. It was al-Ghazālī who took issue 
with such non-corporeal spiritualization but in his writings, he did not fully reverse the spiritual 
elements. He argued, in contrast to Avicenna, that paradise is an embodied reality but at the same 
time affirmed that the highest dimension of paradise – and thus the highest manner of pleasure – 
is an embodied yet spiritualized experience with Allah. Al-Ghazālī holds a somewhat median 
view of paradise that incorporates both physical and spiritual dimensions. On the one hand he 
keeps with traditional views and preserves the embodied existence; on the other, he maintains a 
distinction in levels of pleasure, that is, a lower level of sensual pleasure and the higher spiritual 
level reserved for the prophets, saints, and all “pure Muslims.”67 
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67 On al-Ghazālī’s view Lange writes, “Therefore, in The Alchemy of Happiness, al-Ghazālī can affirm that 
in the afterlife, prophets, saints, and all “pure Muslims” will be able to dispense of the imagination; not unlike 
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Fadlou Shehadi’s book Ghazālī’s Unique Unknowable God is an essential philosophical 
analysis of Ghazālī’s theology concerning Allah as utterly unique and unknowable.68 At once the 
problems discussed in Shehadi’s book are revealed in the title itself, if Allah is utterly unique and 
truly unknowable, then how does one know anything about Allah, including the positive 
attribute-statements made in the Qur’ān. The problem is elaborated more fully in relation to al-
Ghazālī’s pursuit of knowledge and union. Shehadi notes that in Ghazālī’s thought the mystical 
goal or union is threefold: qurb (likeness), subjective tawḥīd, and objective tawḥīd. Qurb or 
‘likeness’ refers to the goal of enriching one’s character, to reach a level of spiritual development 
where “nothing remains in the character of the mystic which is not God-like.”69 Subjective 
tawḥīd denotes a disposition where the human subject shuts off all other attention to anything 
that is not-God. Man’s thoughts are attuned solely on God so that it is Allah alone who occupies 
his thought. Lastly, objective tawḥīd, what Ghazālī views as the highest attainment, is the 
realization that God is the only being that is necessarily existent and that everything else in 
creation derives its existence from Allah. From this realization, Shehadi writes, “the mystic 
attains an intuitive perspective from which he sees that there is naught in existence except 
Allah,”70 that is, if mystical union is fully achieved only Allah remains because He is the only 
one of whom the predicate “objectively real” can be applied. 
With each aspect of the mystical union, some measure of knowability of Allah is 
affirmed whether in likeness, knowledge, or of essence (that He is objectively real). This 
highlights the more fundamental issue at hand and Shehadi demonstrates how al-Ghazālī 
                                                      
68 Fadlou Shehadi, Ghazālī’s Unique Unknowable God: A Philosophical Critical Analysis of Some of the 
Problems Raised by Ghazālī’s View of God as Utterly Unique and Unknowable, (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 
1964). https://www.ghazali.org/books/fad-guuG.pdf  
69 Ibid., 32. 
70 Ibid., 33. 
   
 
 
34
reconciles the seemingly logical discrepancy between Allah’s uniqueness and unknowability and 
positive attribute-statements made of Allah. Shehadi labors to show how Ghazālī’s thought does 
not lead to logical inconsistency by developing the nature of religious language. He points out 
that insofar as Allah is the objective subject of a positive attribute-statement, that statement is 
non-descriptive and patently false. However, this religious language, while not having a 
descriptive function, has a “practical directing function” in relation to man’s religious life.71 
This language about God is functioning in two different ways and so cannot be 
contradictory according to Shehadi, but while that problem may have been avoided another set of 
difficulties arise. If Ghazālī is correct, it implies at best a Muslim is ultimately relegated to be 
agnostic about God. Descriptive statements about God are meant merely for religious living but 
what value do those statements really possess if they do not in any way correspond to what Allah 
is like? They may elicit praise but what or who is the referent of that praise? Ghazālī would 
affirm that Allah is that referent because the creedal formulas in the Qur’ān are authoritatively 
given and divinely inspired. This last statement shifts the locus of the problem to be 
fundamentally about revelation, that is, the possibility of divine revelation from a unique and 
unknowable divine being.72 
 While Shehadi does not discuss the relation or application of Ghazālī’s thought to the 
afterlife, the questions about Paradise naturally arise. Since Ghazālī and others affirm that 
humans derive the highest pleasure in Paradise from the beatific vision of the Ultimate Good (i.e. 
Allah), in light of the agnostic reductionism one cannot help but ask what this beatific vision 
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72 Shehadi discusses Ghazālī resolution to the problem (and perhaps compromise) and although this is one 
of the fundamental difficulties in Islam it goes beyond the scope of this study. For more on this resolution see pp. 
120ff. 
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may be like qualitatively or, the more extreme consequence, of its possibility. If Allah is utterly 
unique and unknowable, from whence comes satisfaction? Objective Goodness is unknowable 
and thus, it seems, must be essentially derivative of something other than God – psychological 
and subjective, finite and limited. 
 Another significant source regarding al-Ghazālī’s thought is Kenneth Garden’s The First 
Islamic Reviver: Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī and his Revival of the Religious Sciences.73 One of 
Garden’s primary tasks throughout the book was to properly frame Ghazālī’s thought in the 
Revival. He states that reading of al-Ghazālī among Western scholars has been dominated by “an 
image more in keeping with modern Western notions of religion as a thing properly understood 
as a matter of personal conscience”, furthermore, “Among the desires of his modern Western 
readers has been to find a Muslim intellectual with an interiorized, mystical spirituality rather 
than a ‘scholastic’ or legal one…”.74 The Revival or Iḥyāʾ is a move away from the extreme 
exoteric form of Islam which had come to dominate the Caliphs whom Ghazālī served. Seeking 
to revive what he believed was the true form of Islam, Ghazālī does not go to the other end of the 
spectrum, the overly esoteric practice of Sufism. Ghazālī appreciated Sufism but he found 
balance in religious practice by incorporating other disciplines such as philosophy and guidance 
found in prophecy. That Ghazālī’s approach is balanced is consistent with his goal in Revival of 
guiding the whole Islamic community in the science of the hereafter. Thus, as Garden notes, we 
should understand Ghazālī’s Science of the Hereafter “not as Sufism by another name, but as a 
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discipline of al-Ghazālī’s creation, a new synthesis of Sufism and philosophy that is reducible to 
neither.”75 
 More specifically, Garden discusses a number of specific Ghazālī thoughts concerning 
the attainment of felicity in general and its specific relation to salvation. On the latter, we see that 
Ghazālī clearly taught there was gradation in Paradise based on one’s religious attainment in this 
life. While felicity was not attainable in this life, reaching felicity in the hereafter was predicated 
upon the actions in this life. Felicity is also different than salvation and Ghazālī taught that most 
will not attain felicity. This felicity is achieved through knowledge of the Divine and achieved 
when one attains a “monistic vision of Him”76 or as Shehadi labeled it “objective tawḥīd.” It is in 
the earthly process of seeking knowledge of Allah where Ghazālī combines theoretical, 
philosophical training with Sufism. He sees the former as necessary for proper guidance through 
the spiritual experiences of the latter. Without proper rational investigation, however, one can 
easily be lead astray in the practice of Sufism. 
Love plays a central role in this study, not only because it is intimately linked to the 
concept of the Beatific Vision, but also because the types of love to be considered will prove a 
comparative tool to evaluate both the Trinitarian God of Christianity and the Tawḥīdic God of 
Islam. Binyamin Abrahamov’s work entitled Divine Love in Islamic Mysticism helps to develop 
an understanding of divine love in a Sufi context in general and in the theology of al-Ghazali 
more specifically. In the introduction, Abrahamov provides a cursory yet extremely beneficial 
synopsis of the categories of love as they are found in Greek philosophy, Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam. Using the Greek categories established in Plato’s infamous Symposium, Abrahamov 
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purports two interesting assertions about divine love in Islam. First is the category of eros or 
desire. Love as eros is desire for something that is lacking and in this manner, it cannot be a love 
displayed by Allah because He does not lack anything, He is unitary perfection. Abrahamov cites 
the Ashʿarite theologian al-Juwaynī who said, “God is too exalted to incline to man or to be the 
object of man’s inclinations.”77 Man’s inclination to God or God’s inclination to man would 
infringe on Tawḥīd, on God’s radical transcendence. Second, Abrahamov asserts Allah’s love is 
more akin to the agape motif. Allah’s love for man is to be understood in terms of a two-fold 
benefaction towards man, of giving man the ability to come near to Allah and the removal of the 
“partition from man’s heart” so that he can see God (in his heart).78 
 Perhaps the most crucial point of Abrahamov’s work is the conclusion brought to the fore 
from al-Ghazālī’s work on love. The majority of Book XXXVI from the Ihya focuses on man’s 
love for God and the causes of that love. There is relatively little discussion of God’s love for 
man and this is consistent with the Qur’an and other Sufi theologians. Human beings cannot 
apply a creaturely definition of love to God because all perfections are present in him eternally.79 
Abrahamov writes, “Since the existence of everything except God derives from the existence of 
God, which means that there is nothing but his essence and acts, God does not look at anything 
except at his essence and acts. Consequently, he loves only himself in which all creation is 
included.”80 This statement is made passively but has profound metaphysical and theological 
implications. Allah’s love is self-contained. He loves Himself and contained in that love for the 
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Self is, by extension, love for the world which happens to be a reciprocal loving of an extension 
of Allah himself. It is evident that Abrahamov, and by extension al-Ghazali, is committing Islam 
to a form of panentheism in which Allah is in all and all is Allah. Any discussion of love in Islam 
will inevitably highlight the problem of Tawḥīd and the other and there is seemingly only two 
ways to reconcile it, either God does not love us or, we have to commit, as al-Ghazali and 
Abrahamov do, to the illusion of otherness, a commitment few are naturally willing to make. 
 Continuing with the theme of love in Islam, Annemarie Schimmel’s Mystical Dimensions 
of Islam, develops some of the implications of mystical love. Schimmel is widely known as an 
expert in Sufism and her section on love and annihilation in this text delves into the nuances of 
the concept of mystical love as well as discusses the development of this doctrine within the Sufi 
tradition. Schimmel begins this section affirming that love and gnosis are the last stations of the 
mystical path. The two are complimentary to one another but fluctuation exists in which is 
considered superior. This section however focuses on the mystical currents of which love is the 
highest state. 
Love is a topic of divergence in Islam. Orthodox Muslims tended to understand love as 
obedience to Allah but for Sufis the term was too complex to be bound into one conception. To 
them, love was a personal and existential commitment, an experience of the divine that went 
beyond obedience.81 Love for Allah is a process of purification wherein the self is completely 
submersed in the divine attributes. As one plunges the depths of the divine, s/he becomes more 
enraptured with Allah and experiences intimacy, proximity, longing, and desire.82 It is in this 
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82 Ibid., 132ff. 
   
 
 
39
state that the self is slowly annihilated as all creaturely distinctions fade out of view and only the 
divine attributes remain. 
 Schimmel’s development of love from and love of the divine in Sufi thought shows that 
the doctrine of Love in Islam is complex, diverse, and ultimately mystical. Furthermore, it shows 
that Sufi philosophical thought is highly subjective, focusing on the experience of the believer in 
connection to Allah. Not much is said of Allah’s love for man beyond his merciful bounty and 
the removing of the veil and this is because there is not much that can be said. Allah is self-
contained unity and as such the Sufi believer experiences Allah in some mystical, existential yet 
impersonal way in Paradise. In this state the Sufi attempts to always and forever achieve closer 
proximity to his Lord by drawing near to His divine attributes. 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s work, The Garden of Truth, provides further understanding 
Islam’s mystical tradition – Sufism. Dr. Nasr is a world renown Islamic philosopher and himself 
a practicing Sufi. Sufism is the mystical tradition within Islam and as such, the philosophers, 
theologians, and poets of this tradition have written and developed far more, both in material and 
doctrine, on man’s relation to the divine. This book is meant to serve the serious Western seeker 
in the ways of Sufism and as such it discusses deep universal truths and questions about 
existence, telos, and the path to the Truth (i.e. the Divine, Allah).83 Many of the topics in this 
book will supplement the study overall but two particular topics are of significant import: the 
centrality of gnosis (knowledge) to Sufism and the role of love and beauty in the spiritual life. 
The book itself unfolds like a journey which is seemingly intentional because of the journey or 
path motif in Islam. Islamic anthropology begins with man’s descent into the world (the “arc of 
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descent”), the metaphysical separation from the Source of all being (i.e. Allah). This life, as 
humans experience it, is part of the journey back to the Source, the “arc of ascent”. The 
adherents of Sufism believe that theirs is the correct path within Islam, as it is both an outward 
and inward journey back to the Source.84 
 The journey or the return to the Source is the telos of humanity and achieved both 
through gnosis (knowledge) and praxis (i.e. spiritual practice). Achieving the human telos first 
began with the Prophet who was given the power by Allah to awaken from, as Nasr notes, “our 
earthly daydreaming” which subsequently led to the fulfilling of ultimate human purpose, 
“loving and knowing God.”85 One successfully completes the return when he reaches the Garden 
of Truth (i.e. Paradise) and it is there where love and knowledge are manifested in their fullness 
in the Beatific Vision. These two themes of knowledge and love are of central concern in this 
study because of the impact they have in the life to come. The goodness of Paradise and 
consequently the goodness of Allah, depend, in my estimation, on the manifestation and 
experience of love and knowledge as they relate to and emanate from the Divine in the Afterlife. 
Nasr’s work helps the seeker chart the course to Divine by thoroughly explaining and developing 
both themes from within the Sufi tradition. 
 Joseph Lumbard’s “From Ḥubb to ʿIshq: The Development of Love in Early Sufism” 
provides useful insight into the relationship between these two kinds of love as well as the 
development and implementation of the oft controversial use of ʿishq in early Sufism. This 
development is significant because the notion of ʿishq became the predominant use of love and a 
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central theme in the Persian Sufi tradition in the 7th/13th Century, most notably in Rūmī (d. 
627/1273), who was both a significant Persian Sufi and contributor to the notion of love.86 
 Lumbard’s goal in this work is to connect the later developments of ʿishq in Sufism to the 
earlier traditions. He notes that the concept of ʿishq did not take on a robust metaphysic until the 
work Sawāniḥ (508/1114) by Aḥmed al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid’s brother. In the Sawāniḥ, Aḥmed 
makes the strongest metaphysical claim of love to date in Islam by linking love to the divine 
essence of Allah. He further suggests that all of reality is the “unfolding of love (ʿishq) through 
complex interrelations of loverness and belovedness…” which will eventually culminate in the 
return to the origin of said love.87 Furthermore, Lumbard’s work demonstrates the specific uses 
of ḥubb and ʿishq in Abū Ḥāmid’s Book 36 of the Iḥyā. There, Lumbard points out that al-
Ghazālī employs ḥubb while discussing the five ways in which man love which correspond to 
the ways in which God is loved. But when al-Ghazālī discusses the highest form of love, and 
thus the highest level of delight, he switches to ʿishq, a degree of passionate longing for Allah 
akin to infatuation, where love for everything other-than God fades away, the goal for all but one 
that few will attain. Another important insight from Lumbard is highlighting the connection 
between love and gnosis. Al-Ghazālī identifies love with gnosis, a move, according to Lumbard, 
first seen in the Sufi and poet al-Daylamī (d. late fourth/tenth century) but was not repeated in 
the extant literature (and often reject) until the publishing of the Iḥyā.88 
Literature Survey Summary 
 The survey has shown a number of things which will be summarized here. First, it has 
shown that both the doctrine of Heaven and Paradise in Christianity and Islam respectively is 
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diverse and robust. Second, the sources in this survey were selected because they each add pieces 
that will be used to construct the argument in the remainder of the paper. Themes such as a 
theocentric Afterlife, God’s oneness or Trinity, the love of God and love for God, all play 
significant parts in our understanding of the qualitative nature of eternal existence. Lastly, this 
survey has demonstrated support for a study of this kind – support through absence. With the 
increase of religious intersection there has also been a subsequent increase in religious dialogue. 
In the literature, there have been comparative studies done between Christianity and Islam, Allah 
and Trinity, etc. The most cordial of these studies and/or conversations strive for further 
clarification and mutual understanding while, at the same time, offering respectful critique. What 
is lacking, however, is a study of this kind that extends the focus of comparative research – 
between Christianity and Islam – into questions about the afterlife and its quality. The extant 
literature has laid the groundwork for asking such questions, especially with regard to the Divine 
nature and the God-man relationship, but it is here in this study where those comparative and 
qualitative questions will be brought to the fore. 
 
Methodology 
There are number of direct fields of relevance in this study – philosophy of religion, 
theology and apologetics. The goal of the study is to ultimately make a positive case for 
Christianity and so the methodology is both comparative and apologetic. This section will 
discuss the methodologies – both apologetic and abductive – that will be applied throughout. 
Firstly, a discussion about the overall disposition of the apologetic endeavor is in order. Human 
creatures are a certain kind of being and if Paradise is to satisfy us for an eternity, it would entail 
pleasures that engage the whole person. The same can be said of Christian persuasion. Because 
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humans are complex beings, Christian persuasion should be holistic in nature. In this Late-
Modern era, the effects of Modernism are still felt even in apologetic method.89 Christian 
apologetics must caution against reductionist methodologies which make limited appeals. James 
K. A. Smith writes that human beings are more than thinking things reducible to mere “brains on 
a stick,” we are “desiring beings” beings who have longings and desires at a gut (visceral) 
level.90 A Christian apologetic should avoid a reductionist “thinking thingism”91 and instead 
appeal to the whole person (i.e. mind, body, soul). Therefore, a Christian apologetic, if it is to 
truly engage the whole person must move beyond the rigidity of intellectual arguments aimed 
solely at logically dismantling another’s worldview and plausibility structure. The apologetic 
method employed in this study appeals to both the head and the heart, both at an intellectual and 
visceral level. It makes an appeal to our most basic, yet consistently one of the strongest, 
experiences of our humanity – love and relationality. 
One aspect of comparative methodology entails conclusions made through abduction.92 
Abductive reasoning begins with a set of facts in need of explanation. From there one or more 
hypotheses are considered and an inference is made to the best possible explanation, that is, the 
explanation that best fits and accounts for all the data. Here then are the facts in need of 
explanation. First, the quality of the experience must match the demand of the quantity, that is, if 
the afterlife is to be desired, the qualitative nature of the Afterlife must be such that it meets and 
                                                      
 89 The term “Late-Modernism” is favored over “Post-Modern.” This usage is influenced by Chatraw and 
Allen in Apologetics at the Cross: An Introduction for Christian Witness, (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 
esp. ch. 11. 
90 James K. A. Smith, You are What You Love: The Spiritual Power of Habit, (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos 
Press, 2016), 3ff.  
91 Ibid., 3. 
92 For more on abductive reasoning see Douglas Walton, Abductive Reasoning, (Tuscaloosa, AL: 
University of Alabama Press, 2014), Ch. 1 
   
 
 
44
surpasses the quantitative demand of eternity.93 Let us call this the Qualitative Gap Problem 
(QGP). In light of this problem it would seem then that the qualitative nature of the afterlife 
would have need to be derived from and sourced in a maximally great being (i.e. God). Only a 
being of that magnitude and greatness could overcome such a great expanse. That God is the 
Ultimate Good in the afterlife is agreed upon by both Muslims and Christians and thus this fact is 
not in need of thorough development insofar as the divine is understood as the source of 
goodness. The QGP is an objective, ontological consideration and it seems reasonable to assume 
that if the demand of eternity is matched and the problem overcome, it will be matched in and 
through the Divine. 
The next three facts are both subjective and teleological in nature. They consider human 
experience, design and basic intuitions which form the Teleological Gap Problem (TGP) of the 
afterlife. The TGP is identified by these two questions: “Will the end of afterlife match the end 
of man?” “How well does the theology of either religion explain and account for the teleology?” 
Both faith traditions teach that the afterlife will be an embodied existence and human beings will 
retain their physicality to some extent. If we assume that the afterlife is a bodily, physical reality, 
then human creatures will possess the same essential properties as they do in this life pre-
mortem. It is necessary, then, to consider those essential elements of human existence. Based on 
human experience and observation, it seems there are a number of human dimensions which 
constitute the human good and the conditions for human flourishing. First, human beings are 
physical embodied creatures who have both longings and desires. The goodness of human 
existence is linked to physical pleasures enjoyed in creation. Unlike prevailing Greek 
                                                      
93 This is an intuitive assumption made in light of those who would view immortal life as a curse rather 
than blessing (those articles have been referenced earlier in the chapter). If immortal life is something to be desired 
then it would seem that the qualitative nature of the afterlife would outweigh and/or overcome the quantitatively 
infinite duration. 
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philosophies which have traditionally viewed the physical realm as lesser-than and a shadow of 
the metaphysical realm, the natural world in these traditions has been created by the Divine and 
is thus inherently good. Both orthodox Islam and orthodox Christianity also affirm a physical, 
embodied afterlife, although one that is renewed and redeemed. It is plausible to suggest then 
that the goodness of the afterlife is connected, to some degree, to physical pleasures Second, 
human beings have a mental/spiritual dimension. Unique to all other created things, human 
beings have individual agency, capacity for choices, creativity, introspection and deliberation. 
They are able to make plans for the future and reflect on and analyze the decisions of the past. 
For all human creatures there is a unique self which persists through time, and, we could assume 
eternity. Thus, the teleological goodness of the afterlife intuitively includes the retention of 
individual agency and function. Third, human beings have a very strong social dimension. 
Human beings are inherently relational creatures and live in community with one another. They 
form relationally intentional groups and intimately unite their individual lives into larger familial 
units. Individual human lives become uniquely bound to and derive meaning from these 
relationships. 
In relation to the afterlife, the significance of the social dimension is two-fold. First, the 
goodness of the afterlife would seemingly need to entail some level of relationality towards or 
with the divine. In this life, specifically, one of the great goods of human experience is self-
giving love and relationships shared between human creatures. How much more would the 
goodness of heaven be heightened if there was a loving, relational correspondence between God 
and man? Second, is the desire for our loved ones to be with us in the afterlife. As the 
philosopher Luc Ferry notes, “What we would like above all is to be reunited with our loved 
   
 
 
46
ones, and, if possible, with their voices, their faces.”94 Himself an atheist, Ferry highlights this 
strong human intuition and also recognizes that, in the history of thought, this is one of the great 
strengths of the Christian tradition of salvation.95 
It would seem then, that an afterlife worth desiring, an afterlife wherein eternal joy is 
experienced, will provide holistic satisfaction to human creatures. A reality which meets the 
multi-dimensionality of human creatures. It can also be assumed that there can be some 
comparison of pleasures and experiences drawn between this life and the next; especially of 
those virtues which are so fundamental to human existence (i.e., love, peace, justice, mercy, 
etc.). If the Qualitative and Subjective Gap Problems are met it would seem they would be met in 
and through the Divine. If, then, the eternal happiness of the afterlife is found in and derives 
from the Divine and the human experience of the good consists of the virtues, especially of self-
giving love and relationship, it would seem that eternal happiness would consist of that same 
experience of the good experienced in and through the divine in the afterlife. From this point, the 
comparative question naturally arises: which theology best meets the objective and subjective 
needs as expressed in the argument? As stated in the thesis earlier, the Triune God of Christian 
better meets these problems and it will be argued that the Christian view of Heaven better 
accounts for human flourishing in the afterlife. 
Not only do I want to demonstrate that Christianity is true, I also want to make an 
apologetic appeal to Muslims regarding Christianity’s truthfulness. Therefore, interwoven into 
                                                      
94 Luc Ferry, A Brief History of Thought: A Philosophical Guide to Living, trans. by Theo Cuffe, (New 
York: Harper Perennial, 2011), 52-3. 
95 He writes, “It [Christianity] promises us no less than everything we would wish for: personal immortality 
and the salvation of our loved ones.” Ibid., 53. 
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the study is an apologetic methodology called the Inside/Out method.96 Islam, and more 
specifically the Sufi tradition following al-Ghazālī, is not entirely devoid of truth. Their tradition 
possesses elements of truth, but it is not the full truth. A proper and effective apologetic method 
does not strip the opposing view of every true belief; rather, it appeals to those beliefs which are 
true and challenges the ones that are not.97 The first part of the Inside/Out method – the Inside 
portion – entails entering into the worldview of the opposing view and assimilating their 
plausibility structures. Alasdair MacIntyre suggests this approach (not specifically by name but 
in methodology) whenever one hopes to defeat the claims of a rival position. He writes, “A 
necessary first step would be for them [the Protagonist] to come to understand what it is to think 
in the terms prescribed by that particular rival tradition, to learn how to think as if one were a 
convinced adherent of that rival tradition.”98 From this position two things must be assessed; 
first, it must be determined what can be affirmed and what needs to be challenged; and second, is 
to trace out their assumptions and see where they would lead if applied consistently. In this 
Inside portion, MacIntyre’s methodology is useful; he instructs the rival, from within the 
viewpoint of the other tradition to, “identify, from the standpoint of the adherents of that rival 
tradition, its crucially important unresolved issues and unsolved problems – unresolved and 
unsolved by the standards of that tradition – which now confront those adherents and to enquire 
                                                      
96 The Inside/Out method was named and developed by Dr.’s Chatraw and Allen in Apologetics at the 
Cross, 213-21. This methodology will be specifically applied in Ch. 5. 
97 If Christianity is true, it means that this world is teeming with truths, God’s truths, and humanity is 
bound to experience and discover truths even within other religions.  This is not to suggest that there are multiple 
ways to God or to endorse an inclusivism soteriology. The Gospel remains the only way to God. I am merely 
suggesting that from Romans 1 we see that creation reveals God because it is full of His truth. This truth extends 
into the human experience and where those truths manifest in life and discussion, they should be built upon in 
Christian persuasion. 
98 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rdEdit., (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame 
Press, 2007), xiii. 
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how progress might be made in moving towards their resolution and solution.”99 This is what 
takes place in Chapters 2 and 3 of the study – the nature of Paradise and the doctrine of Love in 
Islam – and concludes with final analysis in Chapter 5. Through this I will highlight some 
problems that remain unresolved yet are crucial to the overall explanatory scope. We can 
naturally ask why these problems remain unresolved and it is perhaps that the tradition lacks the 
resources to address the issues. Because Islam does not possess the full truth, this step will, as Os 
Guinness notes, “press them to the logic of their assumptions and their faith will prove neither 
true nor adequate.”100  
On the other hand, Sufi Islam possesses some truths and so, as Guinness continues, 
“Equally, the experience of those who listen to the real truth in what they believe, even when it 
runs counter or goes beyond the rest of their beliefs, will be in touch with desires and longings 
that point them beyond what they believe and toward the full truth.”101 Taking the beliefs and 
doctrines which can and ought to be preserved, the transition can naturally be made to the 
Outside portion. This portion of the method asks the question “How does Christianity better 
address our experiences, observations, and history?”102 In this way, the Outside portion of the 
method is similar to the final steps of the abductive method. Because Christianity possesses the 
full truth, it will naturally tell a better story about this life, or in the words of Charles Taylor, 
“capture the rich texture of this life and history.”103 The truths of Islam which point to the fuller 
                                                      
99 Ibid., xiii. 
100 Os Guinness, Fool’s Talk: Recovering the Art of Christian Persuasion, (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2015), 138. 
101 Ibid., 139. 
102 Allen and Chatraw, Apologetics at the Cross, 218-21. 
103 Charles Taylor, The Language Animal: The Full Shape of Human Linguistic Capacity (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2016), 219. 
   
 
 
49
truth of Christianity must be built upon and used as a mean to persuade Muslims of the Truth. 
Chapter 4 of the study serves the dual role of both part of building the abductive case and the 
Outside portion of the method. Through discussing the nature of love in Christianity, the nature 
of Trinitarian love concurrently aligns with the deep desires and longings which point beyond 
and towards the full truth. Finally, in Chapter 5, the comparisons will be made and the 
conclusions drawn – that Christian theism is the best explanation for human flourishing in the 
Afterlife. 
Criteria 
 As a comparative study, an effective set of criteria is needed upon which to judge the 
merits of one particular religion over the other. Given that each person approaches any research 
question with a set of presuppositions, it is challenging to remain as objective as possible. It is 
still possible nonetheless to make value judgments. Specifically, with abductive reasoning there 
are criteria from which to assess the competing hypotheses. Three criteria will be used here: 
explanatory scope, explanatory depth, and simplicity.104 Explanatory scope considers the ability 
of the hypothesis to explain as wide a range of the data as possible. This criterion refers to the 
hypothesis’ capacity in terms of breadth. Of all the facts in need of explanation, which 
competing hypothesis can account for more of the facts in itself with fewer ad hoc components. 
Explanatory depth considers the ability of the hypothesis to explain in as much detail as possible 
the facts in the range of consideration. Does a hypothesis explain part of the individual fact but 
not all? The better inference will be the hypothesis that has a more robust explanatory depth of 
each of the facts as they are presented. Lastly, there is the criteria of simplicity. Simplicity, or the 
                                                      
104 For the criterion of explanatory power see Atocha Aliseda, Abductive Reasoning: Logical Investigations 
Into Discovery and Explanation, (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2006), 36. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), 
(accessed January 19, 2018). On the criterion of simplicity see Charles S. Peirce. Philosophical Writings of Peirce. 
Ed. by Justus Buchler, (New York: Dover Publications, 2012), 156. 
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simpler explanation, is often misunderstood to mean the logically simpler hypothesis, that is, as 
Charles Peirce notes, “the one that adds the least to what has been observed.”105 This was the 
assumption of Peirce, that simplicity meant the hypothesis which adds the least, but as he further 
notes, this assumption was misguided.106 The simpler hypothesis is the one that is more “facile 
and natural, the one that instinct suggests.”107 Here, Peirce suggests that in making an inference 
to the best explanation we must be able to see what is a better fit or else we have no opportunity 
of making evaluative judgments at all. His is a basic assumption about reality that must be true if 
any abductive argument is to get off the ground. Furthermore, being able to determine what is a 
better fit is assumed to be recognized by its aesthetic qualities. It seems that one could not make 
an intuitive appeal without also appealing to its aesthetic qualities for simplicity is itself an 
aesthetic quality. Abduction, then, is an inference to an inherently aesthetic explanation about 
reality. Thus, the task is to highlight the aesthetic quality of love and relationality that we 
humans experience in this life, focus on that good, and demonstrate the locus of that good as 
being found in the Triune God of Christianity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
105 Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, 156. 
106 He writes, “It was not until long experience forced me to realize that subsequent discoveries were every 
time showing I had been wrong, while those who understood the maxim as Galileo had done, early unlocked the 
secret, that the scales fell from my eyes and my mind awoke to the broad and flaming daylight that it is the simpler 
Hypothesis in the sense of the more facile and natural, the one that instinct suggests, that must be preferred; for the 
reason that, unless man have a natural bent in accordance with nature’s, he has no chance of understanding nature at 
all.” Ibid., 156. 
107 Ibid., 156. 
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Chapter Breakdown 
Chapter 2 – Paradise Explored 
 Following the present introductory chapter, chapter 2 is dedicated to the Islamic view of 
Paradise. There are a number of reasons why I have chosen to only discuss the Islamic view at 
length. First, in my experience there is a general agnosticism on behalf of Christians where 
Islamic eschatology is concerned. Popular views tend to be reductionist in scope and become 
caricatures of Islam’s eschatological tradition. Second, from within the various Islamic traditions 
we see a number of key emphases and distinctions which, I would submit, have significant 
implications towards this study. There is, on the one hand a literalist hermeneutical tradition that 
reads Qur’ānic depictions of Paradise more literally and thus physical, while, on the other, 
certain traditions read them as metaphorical and thus through a more spiritualized lens. The 
hermeneutic applied to these eschatological readings is significant because it can influence 
whether one has an anthropocentric or theocentric view of Paradise. Lastly, the themes discussed 
in this chapter have an underlying relationality to them. Paradise is a place where one 
experiences Allah, whether through the blessing of the Garden or directly in the Beatific Vision. 
The sections of this chapter discuss the various pleasures of Paradise and how man relates to 
both the physical and the spiritual pleasures therein. 
Chapter 3 – The Islamic Beatific Vision: God’s Love for Man and Man’s Love for God 
 That the Beatific Vision is the highest level of Paradise is affirmed by many Muslim 
philosophers and mystics. As was mentioned earlier, proximity to God in the afterlife directly 
corresponds to the level of spiritual attainment in this life. Thus, the ṭarīqah or “path” is the 
spiritual journey one must follow in order to reach the level of iḥsān, the level that leads to the 
fullness of the beatific vision. Directly involved in the path to iḥsān is gnosis or knowledge about 
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Allah. Knowledge of Allah leads to a love for Him and the more one loves Allah the more one 
wants to know about Him. The relationship of knowledge and love is cyclical but also an upward 
moving spiral. Belief in Islam is measured by the love for God and His Prophet. This love is 
achieved through knowledge. Once a person comes to love God above all else, then, the Qur’ān 
states, does Allah love that person.108  
 As one of the greatest revivers of Islam, al-Ghazālī’s efforts are of central import to this 
study. Reconciling the doctrine of tawḥīd with the positive attribution to Allah is an ongoing 
challenging for faithful Muslims. This chapter will focus largely on al-Ghazālī’s attempt to 
reconcile the tension and thus provide a way forward for attaining the beatific vision. Ghazālī’s 
works are an amalgam of Sufī and philosophical thought and provide robust insight into the 
attainment of eternal felicity. 
Chapter 4 – The Christian Beatific Vision: God’s Love for Man and Man’s Love for God 
 There are many Christians conceptions of heaven in the theological traditions, academic 
and popular level circles. Space does not allow for a thorough treatment of the spectrum of 
beliefs concerning heaven in the Christian tradition. The central focus in this chapter is the view 
which is consistent to the corresponding theocentric Islamic view – the beatific vision of God. 
That the vision of God is the ultimate end and thus source of eternal felicity is, like Islam, an 
orthodox eschatological tradition within Christianity. In Christianity, the Triune God is the Good 
and so ultimate goodness (eternal felicity) is found in God. 
 Furthermore, in keeping with correspondence to the previous chapter, this chapter will 
discuss the conceptions of God’s love for man and man’s love for God as well as the relation to 
knowledge and love. Christianity teaches that God is love and this love is conceived in terms of 
                                                      
 108 Q 2:222; 9:108; 2:195; 3:31; 3:76; 5:54 
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action and doing and is thus other-focused love – the Godhead eternally engaged in self-giving, 
other-centered relationship. The love of the Trinity is the foundation for the love humanity 
experiences, not only in terms of the God-man relationship but love between human persons. As 
the Scriptures teach, the ultimate revelation of God’s love is displayed on the cross when the Son 
willingly gave his life for the sake of all humanity. The kind of love displayed on the cross is the 
lens through which we try to interpret and comprehend not only God’s love for humanity but His 
intent to be in communion with mankind. 
Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
 This study will conclude with the task of making comparative analyses and assessments 
of both the Islamic and Christian views of the paradisal afterlife. Christian apologists in previous 
centuries have written against an Islamic afterlife full of sensuous pleasures and indulgences. To 
this, I only wish to add to the criticism that an overly sensuous view is reductionistic of human 
creatures and is inherently limited by its relation to eternity. The main task of the study thus far 
has been centered on the theocentric view of the afterlife in the respective religions. Chapters 3 
and 4 provided an analysis of the salient features of a theocentric position and in this chapter, we 
turn now to apply the specified method of abduction to our qualitative and comparative 
assessments of both views. 
 Returning to the facts in need of explanation, I present the argument that Christianity 
offers a more robust and satisfactory view of the afterlife because of its ability to offer more 
explanatory scope and depth, as well as the simpler explanation for a satisfactory afterlife. 
Christianity, and more importantly the Trinitarian God, better accounts for the facts and avoids 
the problems that arise from a tawḥīdic Allah. 
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CHAPTER 2: PARADISE EXPLORED 
Introduction 
 This chapter focuses specifically on Islamic Paradise and will explore the salient features 
of Islamic afterlife as revealed in the Qur’an, Hadiths, and various influential traditions. After the 
theological doctrines of tawḥīd and prophecy, Paradise, is third in level of importance in Islam. 
In the Qur’ān there is an abundance of revelation concerning Paradise; so much so that Mahan 
notes, “It is not possible to find a single page in any conventional printing of the Qur’ān without 
some sort of reference to the life hereafter.”109 Attaining Paradise is the eschatological goal for 
all Muslims. The felicity of Paradise and the proximity to Allah are that which form the deepest 
longings of the soul for, as the Qur’ān states, “They abide in that which their souls desired, 
eternally.”110 
 The chapter follows a certain thematic progression that begins with a brief discussion 
concerning Qur’ānic hermeneutical principles. Following that section, we will consider the 
dialectical eschatology of al-dunyā and al-ākhira, that is, the contrastive yet correlative 
relationship between this life and the life to come. This, however, is not the only dialectical 
eschatology in the Qur’ān; Paradise is almost always contrasted with Hell and the torments of 
Hell give rhetorical force to Muslims being command to obey their Lord.111 We can see this 
                                                      
 109 Mahan, Mirza. “Qur’ān Exegesis and Hermeneutics.” In The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics. 
Ed. by Emad Shahin, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.come.ezproxy.liberty.edu/article/opr/t342/e0391 (accessed April 4, 2018) 
 110 Q 21:102 
 111 In the majority of the Qur’ānic passages on Paradise, the blessed reality is contrasted to Hell. Typically, 
in eschatological passages of the Qur’ān, a description of Hell is given with an inclusion of who will go there follow 
by a vision of Paradise and a reminder that it is reserved only for believers in Allah. This dichotomy is intended as a 
warning to those who Allah and his Prophet are not the most beloved. Islam has a much more vivid and descriptive 
doctrine of Hell than does Christianity. The most extreme depictions of torture and suffering are elaborated in quite 
extensive detail, detail which makes Dante’s Inferno seem tame (even for Judas who is being perpetually gnawed at 
in one of Satan’s mouths). In just one example, the inhabitants of Hell are supernaturally preserved in their physical 
bodies so that their skin, which is the largest organ, can endure more torture and maximum pain. As the boiling 
liquid and fire burn through the body into the organs, the person is remade so as to endure this perpetual fate anew. 
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dialectic manifest in al-Ghazālī’s book on remembrance when he writes, “occupy your heart 
therefore with trepidation through long meditation upon the terrors of Hellfire, and with hope 
through long contemplation of the abiding bliss which is promised the indwellers of the 
Garden.”112 The phraseology here and the comparative pairing in the Qur’ān suggest that the joys 
of Paradise are heightened in relation to terrors of Hell. I would like to suggest this is why people 
do not typically consider Paradise on its own merits. What rational person would not instantly 
choose Paradise if faced with both options immediately present before them. But this is not the 
focus of the study as was mentioned in the limitations section, Paradise will be considered on its 
own merits (and later compared to the Christian heaven). What remains to be seen is if Paradise 
loses any of its appeal when not in contrast to Hell for as Reinhart notes, “The bliss of the 
Koranic Paradise derives partly from what it follows (the Judgement) and partly from what it is 
                                                      
With such a terrifying picture of the Hellfire, it is not surprising that Muslims place so much focus on attaining 
Paradise. 
The comparative contrast between heaven and hell seems to be an intentional rhetorical literative device to 
motivate people to seek the former and avoid the latter. Given the option between the torment of Hell and the 
pleasures of Paradise, the only logical choice is Paradise. Although, this does not necessarily solve the problem of 
eternity. Yes, in Paradise one avoids the unfathomable torments of Hellfire which afflict both body and soul in 
perpetual, eternal agony. This does not mean that Paradise could not also, in and of itself, become increasingly 
tormenting. While it would be difficult to imagine Paradise reflecting any physical torments, we cannot negate the 
psychological torment of eternal existence that has been suggested by various critics of eternity. 
The avoidance of Hell is not a motivation strictly reserved to Islam however. Often, Christian evangelists 
and preachers, craft their delivery with an emphasis on the fires of Hell that await the unrepentant sinner. Using Hell 
as a motivation for Heaven or Paradise can be an unhealthy way to encourage people to live committed, religious 
lives. It can lead to improper perspectives about the afterlife, especially in regard to the experience of the Divine 
presence, the Ultimate Good. Furthermore, in light of the hellfire tradition in Islam, it can spurn reflection about the 
overall qualitative nature of Paradise for any other reality apart from the other alternative seems infinitely better. As 
it pertains to this study, however, as it was mentioned earlier, Islamic paradise is not going to be compared to hell 
nor is Christian heaven to be compared to its own doctrine of hell either. We are asking the question about the nature 
of Islamic Paradise as it stands in comparison to Christian Heaven, and, more specifically, which view of Afterlife 
can meet the demands of eternity. 
 112 Al-Ghazālī, The Remembrance of Death and the Afterlife, 232. 
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not (the Fire).”113 Without the threat of Hellfire, is Paradise to be desired and does it meet the 
demands of eternity? 
 These considerations necessarily lead to sections covering the nature of Paradise and 
relevant paradisal themes. These sections will not be overly exhaustive but will, nonetheless, 
orient the reader to Paradise’s central features. The remaining themes to be covered are: 
abundance of the sensual, the sexual and the sacred, Paradise as theophany, and the Beatific 
Vision. The way these sections are presented corresponds to the overall nature of this study. 
Because Allah is the ultimate good and thus the source of pleasure in Paradise – both causally 
and existentially – there is a correlation between the experience of Paradise and the experience of 
the Divine. As we will see throughout, the blessings bestowed on the inhabitants of Paradise, will 
subsequently lead them to turn their praise to Allah. Also, the pleasures of Paradise are perhaps 
the point wherein one can experience Allah. This latter distinction is referring to a deeper 
metaphysical connection that, for some Muslims, purportedly occurs between Allah and the 
inhabitants as mediated through the pleasures, blessings, and rewards. This connection is distinct 
from the Beatific Vision which will be discussed in the last section. The Beatific Vision occurs 
in Firdaws, the highest level of Paradise, and is reserved for only the most faithful of the 
inhabitants of Paradise. As the Qur’ān and Hadith report, few will inhabit Firdaws. It will consist 
of many Muslims from the beginning period of the religion (Muhammad included of course) but 
few from the latter times. Firdaws is the garden wherein one’s proximity to Allah is nearest and 
is the highest aim of the religious life. 
                                                      
 113 Kevin Reinhart, “The Here and the Hereafter in Islamic Religious Thought,” in Images of Paradise in 
Islamic Art, ed. by Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom, (Hanover, NH: Trustees of Dartmouth College, 1991), 
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 Before delving into the nature of Paradise, there are a couple of points worthy of our 
attention. First, the Qur’ān is the supreme source of authority in Islam for it is the eternal word of 
God; therefore, it is, as Muhammad Abdel Haleem notes, “the starting point of everything 
Islamic.”114 Furthermore, Haleem states that the Qur’ān is considered by Muslims to be 
categorically and thoroughly authentic. But within the Islam faith, the hadith collections are also 
authoritative guides for knowledge, instruction, and practical theology. In general, they are not 
considered as divine revelation and their authority is subjected to the Qur’ān, but they are 
nonetheless the words of the Prophet, transmitted down through his Companions.115 Second, it is 
interesting to note, there are some who suggest that within the doctrines of the afterlife in Islam, 
the Qur’ān itself is not often the sole authority and does not, as Palacios states, “constitute the 
main source of its dogma.”116 This is because Palacios sees two antithetical views of Paradise 
flourishing at the same time in the later Muslim traditions – one coarse and sensual and the other 
                                                      
114 Muhammad Abdel Haleem, “Quranic Paradise: How to Get to Paradise and What to Expect There,” in 
Roads to Paradise: Eschatology and Concepts of the Hereafter in Islam, ed. by Sebastian Günther and Todd 
Lawson, (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 49. 
 115 Not all hadith are considered authoritative and are graded on their status of transmission, that is, whether 
or not the words can actually be ascribed to the Prophet. For the purposes of this chapter, the hadith which were 
selected mainly come from hadith which are generally accepted as authoritative and genuine words of the Prophet 
(Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim being the two most frequented but also cited are Jami’ at-Tirmidhi and 40 
Hadith Nawawi). 
 116 In the context of this quote Miguel Palacios in his famous work Islam and the Divine Comedy, is 
drawing a comparison between Dante’s spiritual and celestial paradise with that of the Muslim paradisal creeds. 
Palacios anticipates contention against such comparisons and notes that his assessment is based upon the creeds and 
not necessarily the Qur’ānic text itself. If such a comparison was made solely from the texts of the Qur’ān it would 
only serve to show the antagonism between the two conceptions. Palacios views the Qur’anic descriptions of 
Paradise as “coarse and sensual materialism.” Palacios goes on to write, “The early traditions attributed to Mahomet, 
the explanations of the commentators, and the speculations of theologians and mystics, played at least as great a part 
as the letter of the Koran in determining the essential points of the creed of the Moslem paradise. Of outstanding 
interest in this connection is the tradition of the ascension of Mahomet. This legend in its various forms, and 
particularly in Version C of Cycle 2, showed very clearly that paradise was by no means generally conceived on the 
crass and sensual lines described in the Koran; on the contrary, the picture drawn there was almost exclusively one 
of light, color and music…” Miguel Asin Palacios, Islam and the Divine Comedy, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 
265, Accessed May 1, 2018, https://rtraba.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/palacios-miguel-asin-islam-and-the-divine-
comedy-1968.pdf. 
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the spiritual.117 In his estimation, the coarse and sensual reading comes from Qur’ānic readings 
primarily while the deep spiritual depiction of the afterlife flows from external sources and 
traditions of the mystics and philosophers. Lange would agree with Palacios’s analysis 
concerning the paradisal emphases in the traditionalist readings of the Qur’ān and Hadiths. He 
purports that the traditionalists Sunni creeds from the third/ninth century onward consistently 
emphasized the material pleasures and that “a thorough spiritualization of paradise and hell did 
not occur in early Muslim theology.”118 On the traditionalist, materialist understanding of the 
afterlife, Lange goes on to write, “the otherworld sketched out by the Qur’ān and the hadith may 
have been too concrete to allow for this [a spiritualization of Paradise]…”119 As we will see later 
on in this chapter and into the next, Al-Ghazālī often serves as a middle ground between extreme 
philosophical/theological ends. Regarding Paradise, al-Ghazālī notes that the inhabitants of 
paradise enjoy “diverse pleasures” and “have all they desire” while at the same time “attending 
before the Throne and gazing upon the noble Countenance of God…unceasingly they move from 
one variety of blessing to the next, safe from ever suffering their loss.”120 On the one hand, al-
Ghazālī affirms an embodied existence in Paradise wherein the inhabitants enjoy Allah’s 
blessings but he also preserves a theocentric emphasis of the beatific vision establishing its 
centrality in the life to come. 
 The materialization of Paradise has often led to sharp criticisms of Islamic Paradise. J. B. 
Taylor responds to Palacios’s analysis and while Taylor is appreciative of Palacios’s fair 
                                                      
 117 Ibid., 270. 
 118 Lange, Paradise and Hell in Islamic Traditions, 182.  
 119 Ibid. 
 120 Al-Ghazālī, The Remembrance of Death and the Afterlife, Book XL of The Revival of the Religious 
Sciences, trans. by T. J. Winter, (Cambridge, U.K.: Islamic Texts Society, 1989), 234. 
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treatment of the Prophet, he believes that the analysis and conclusions of the paradisal traditions 
is incorrect. Taylor argues that it was precisely the Qur’ān and the life of the Prophet from 
whence the spiritualized readings derived. He notes that it was “the verses of the Qur’ān and the 
traditions concerning the Prophet upon which they meditated and which they took as the 
yardstick by which to judge any spontaneous or any second-hand ideas.”121 The materialists 
traditions are often critiqued as overly anthropocentric and neglecting to realize the ultimate 
good of Paradise – Allah. On the other hand, overly spiritualized traditions, wishing to correct 
the materialists and be theocentric in focus, have perhaps neglected the fundamentally physical 
descriptive language found in the Qur’ān. Surah 55 is a significant passage in this context for it 
does not allow a materialistic reading to forget their Lord for Muslims are reminded that the 
rewards of Paradise are permeated with Divine mercy.122 An emphatic materialism of Paradise 
does not faithfully follow the Qur’ān nor does a negation of such a material reality. Both the 
tensions and criticisms in the Islamic traditions concerning Paradise highlight certain 
hermeneutical and doctrinal issues. How is the Qur’ān to be interpreted? What hermeneutical 
principles are to be applied to the text? How was the Muslim community to understand the 
eschatological realities of which, according to the Qur’ān “No person knows what is kept hidden 
for them of joy, as a reward for what they used to do.”123 It is towards this we turn to briefly in 
the next section. 
Ta’wīl and Tafsīr: Hermeneutical Considerations 
                                                      
 121 J. B. Taylor, “Some Aspects of Islamic Eschatology,” Religious Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Oct. 1969), 61. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20000089. (Accessed January 5, 2018) 
 122 In Surah 55 the phrase “Which, then, of your Lord’s blessings do you both deny?” is repeated after each 
description of reward in Paradise. 
 123 Q 32:17 
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 That the Qur’an is the authoritative word from Allah is not a point of dispute for the sects 
of Islam. What is in question, however, is the meaning of the text and how one should interpret 
its content. It is necessary at this point in the study to consider briefly some hermeneutical 
practices and distinctions in Qur’ānic exegesis or ta’wīl. For if one wishes to know the attributes 
of Heaven they must, as al-Ghazālī states, “…read the Qur’ān, for there is no discourse higher 
than that of God”.124 On the lexical meaning of ta’wīl Dukake notes, “[it means] to bring 
something back to its origin, and thus refers to the effort to ascertain the full meaning of a 
Qur’ānic word, phrase, or story.”125 The goal then of ta’wīl is to arrive at the original intent of 
the divine author – Allah. Another common interpretive term in Islam is tafsīr, whose basic 
meaning is to “quote something in detail.”126 Scholars note that the two terms seemed to be 
interchangeable in early Islam but by the 10th Century a clear distinction existed between the 
two. The 10th Century scholar al-Mārturīdī made the distinction in the introduction of his 
Qur’ānic commentary. Claude Gilliot suggests the distinction goes back even further to the first 
half of the second/eight century and was attested in the “earliest rudimentary attempts to classify 
exegesis.”127 Gilliot further notes that the following hermeneutical classifications of Qur’ānic 
exegesis were attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās (d. 69/688): “The Qur’ān was [revealed] in four aspects: 
tafsīr [the literal meaning], which scholars know…; [and] ta’wīl [the deeper meaning] that only 
                                                      
 124 Al-Ghazālī, Remembrance, 234. 
 125 Maria Massi Dukake, “Hermeneutics and Allegorical Interpretation,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Science, and Technology in Islam, ed. by Ibrahim Kalin. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.come.ezproxy.liberty.edu/article/opr/t445/e77 (accessed March 29, 2018) 
 126 Ibid. 
 127 Claude Gilliot, “Exegesis of the Qur’ān: Classical and Medieval,” in Encyclopedia of the Qur’ān, ed. by 
Jane Dammen McAuliffe, (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2007), 
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God knows.”128 Thus, from the earliest accounts of Qur’ānic exegesis there has been diversity in 
hermeneutical methodology. As Islam grew, various groups began to emerge each with differing 
theological commitments (i.e., Sunnis, Shīʿites, Muʿtazilites, Ashʿarites, the Literalists, Sūfīs, 
etc.). These different commitments were, as Quasem suggests, the cause of differences in 
Qur’ānic understanding among the various groups.129 
 There are various hermeneutic approaches to the Qur’an each with varying 
methodologies for interpretation. Some approach the text with a literal lens and will interpret the 
Qur’an as literal as possible seeking to understand the text at face value. The Sunni tradition in 
Islam looks more to the letter of the Qur’an, to its more literal meaning in contrast to the spirit of 
the text. This hermeneutical distinction is referred to as ẓāhir (the literal) in contrast to bāṭin (the 
hidden) meaning of the Qur’an. The revelatory content of the Qur’an is to be understood as 
literal as possible. There will obviously be instances where the Qur’an itself is not meant to be 
taken literally such as in the descriptions of Allah and that is because human language is 
inherently limited, especially when describing such metaphysical realities. Surely Allah does not 
have a hand for his does not have a material body. This is a case of anthropomorphism and it 
helps the reader to understand through analogy an attribute/action of Allah. As it relates to the 
afterlife, the Sunni traditions tend to emphasize a physical afterlife with all of the physical 
pleasures entailed. This means that the language used to describe the realities of Paradise 
corresponds at some level to our current reality. It might be that Paradise is qualitatively different 
                                                      
 128 Gilliot suggests the possibility that these categories had their roots in Jewish and Patristic discussions on 
the four meanings of scripture: “Heb. peshat, “literal translation”; remez, “implied meaning”; derash, “homiletic 
comprehension”; sod, “mystical, allegorical meaning,” Gilliot, “Exegesis of the Qur’ān.” Gerhard Böwering 
suggests there is a connection to patristic and medieval conceptions of the four meanings in at least Tustarī’s 
definition of a fourfold Qur’ānic sense: literal/historical, allegorical/spiritual, tropological/moral and 
anagogical/eschatological. Gerhard Böwering, The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam: The Qur’ānic 
hermeneutics of the Sūfī Sahl At-Tustarī (d.283/896), (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), 135-142. 
 129 Quasem, Jewels, 10. 
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than the current physical world, but this difference does not negate correspondence for Muslims 
are called to imagine and anticipate all that their Lord has in store for them. 
 Much of the philosophical literature in Islam was generated within the Sufī tradition. This 
is due, in part, to their creative liberties directed towards the text which led to innovations and 
developments in Islamic philosophy and Mysticism. In this tradition, God is known both through 
his self-giving revelation and mystical experience. As such, the reading of the Qur’an and 
subsequent hadith are interpreted though the lens of the hidden meaning (bāṭin).130 This is seen 
as innovation by Sunnis and is not typically accepted based on the standard of orthodoxy. 
However, it would seem the Sufi traditions have elucidated a more holistic religious tradition in 
that one’s whole person (body and soul) is meant to experience the divine. In this sense, one 
might say that it is more spiritual than the Sunni tradition. This ‘spiritual’ bent carries over into 
afterlife and Paradise becomes primarily a spiritual affair rather than merely sensual. 
 Sufī hermeneutical methodology has always sought to glean the deeper meaning that 
exists in the text. For them there is a double-meaning within the text of the Qur’ān. The Sufi 
mystic and commentator Sahl at-Tustarī, for example, seems to have been influenced by Ibn 
ʿAbbas’s fourfold distinction, which is in keeping with the larger interpretive tradition, but in 
practice reduces his commentary of the Qur’ān to two levels of meaning – the literal and the 
spiritual/hidden – favoring the latter for interpretation, a consistent hermeneutic for Sufi tafsīr.131 
Being a Sufi as well, al-Ghazālī’s hermeneutical methods are similar to that of Tustarī’s. 
                                                      
 130 Mustansir Mir notes that Sūfī tafsīr is “notable first for the near absence in it of grammatical, rhetorical, 
legal, and theological discussions, and second for its attempt to go beyond the apparent meaning of the Quranic text 
in order to derive deeper, hidden meanings through intuitive perception.” Mir further suggests that Sufī tafsīr 
produces from the text interpretations that have a tenuous basis in the text and may even be “irrelevant in the context 
or incompatible with the text.” Mustansir Mir, “Tafsīr,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, ed. by 
John Esposito, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/articl/opr/t236/e0775 (accessed April 5, 2018) 
 131 Böwering, The Mystical Vision, 141. 
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According to Quasem, al-Ghazālī thought that the correct method of apprehending the Qur’ān 
was to “[penetrate] into the depth of the inner, hidden meanings of the Qur’ānic verses, without 
merely being content with their outward meanings.”132 For Ghazālī the Qur’ān is like a vast 
ocean in which the Muslim must immerse himself so to find the jewels and pearls which lie in its 
depths. In The Jewels of the Qur’ān (Jawāhir al-Qur’ān) we get a glimpse of al-Ghazālī’s 
hermeneutic commitments in the very first chapter where he writes,  
I then wish to rouse you from your sleep, O you who recite the Qur’ān to a great 
length, who take its study as an occupation, and who imbibe some of its outward 
meanings and sentences. How long will you ramble on the shore of the ocean, 
closing your eyes to the wonders of the meanings of the Qur’ān? Was it not your 
duty to sail to the midst of the fathomless ocean of these meanings in order to see 
their wonders, to travel to their islands in order to gather their best produce, and to 
dive into their depths so that you might become rich by obtaining their jewels? Do 
you not feel ashamed of being deprived of their pearls and jewels by your 
persistence in looking at their shores and outward appearances?133 
Clearly, al-Ghazālī is emphasizing a hermeneutic of depth and discovery, the search for the 
hidden meaning that lies within the pages of the holy text. His call for those on the shore to 
immerse themselves in the ocean is reminiscent of the mystical goal of immersion in the Divine. 
Stepping out into the ocean and moving away from the shore is the beginning stages of the path 
(ṭarīqah) to Allah. 
 The distinctions in hermeneutical methodology are as many as the Christian traditions 
and it makes speaking in certain doctrinal generalities difficult. Various philosophical and 
theological commitments about Allah and metaphysical realities impact Qur’ānic understanding. 
Among these understandings gleaned from this text is the specific nature of Paradise. How are 
the descriptions of Paradise to be read and understood? A literal reading of the text will produce 
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a certain eschatological tradition as will the readings in search of the hidden meaning behind the 
texts. There seems to be a general correlation between methodology and emphasis in the various 
Islamic traditions. For instance, the literal reading of the Qur’ān tends to produce a more 
anthropocentric view of Paradise, whereas, a more metaphorical reading tends towards a 
theocentric view. As we will see in this chapter, a theocentric view of Paradise is rightly focused 
on the Beatific Vision as the highest good in Paradise; however, the theocentric view should not 
reduce the sensuous reward to the spiritual. The Qur’ān teaches that the afterlife is an embodied 
existence and as such the experiences of Paradise are both sensual and spiritual. Al-Ghazālī 
supports this balance. As we see in the final pages of his Incoherence of the Philosophers, 
Ghazālī unequivocally rejects the notion of a disembodied resurrection and labels those who 
deny a bodily resurrection as infidels.134 At the same time, however, Ghazālī also writes that the 
Beatific Vision of Allah is the highest good of Paradise, the greatest of all delights, and “which 
shall cause one to be quite oblivious of the pleasures of the people of Heaven.”135 
 
The Nearer and the Further Life – al-dunyā and al-ākhira 
 In Islam, there is an intimate connection between this world and the next. This 
relationship is significant not only to the chapter but also the entire study as this dialectic bears 
significant influence on eternity. On the one hand, in Islam, Paradise, the further life, is thought 
of in contrast to this life, the nearer. Because there is such a close connection, Paradise is 
immanent in the minds of Muslims. The concepts of the hereafter are ever present in the daily 
religious life of Muslims for the religious life emphasizes the need for remembrance, return, and 
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nearness.136 On the other hand, this life and how one lives it in relation to their Lord has a 
profound impact on the nature of their return – their return to Allah. In the beginning, Allah gave 
the creative command “to be” and everything came into existence. This was not a command that 
could be disobeyed for all contingent creatures derive their existence from that which is non-
contingent and necessary. Mankind existed previously and enjoyed their Lord, but man was 
created weak, forgetful, and heedless and eventually forgot God and disobeyed the religious 
command. As a result, mankind was confined to this life (al-dunyā), a life where the religious 
command must be regained through struggle and perseverance. 
 Life in this world is not disconnect from the next and is as Abdel Haleem says “an 
inseparable part of a continuum, a unified whole which gives our life a context and relevance.”137 
This unified whole creates a linear connection of life-death-life that provides context and value 
to this life as it relates to the whole measure of human existence – including eternity. People are 
called to remember their Lord and this life is made more meaningful the more one’s life is full of 
good actions such as the remembrance. Life in this world will lead to the afterlife but the final 
destination in the afterlife is contingent upon the former. In fact, this life is a proving ground of 
sorts and one’s remembrance of Allah guarantees greater favor from Allah Himself. There is a 
reason for suffering and struggle in this life. Islam teaches that Allah loves those who love him 
through struggle – both inward and outward.138 Indeed, it is Allah who has power over all things 
                                                      
 136 “It is Allah who created you, then he provided sustenance for you, then he will cause you to die, then he 
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 137 Haleem, “Life and Beyond,” 66. 
 138 It is interesting to note that the Arabic word for struggle is jihad. Of course, this initially recalls to one’s 
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and as the Qur’ān states, “[it is Allah] who created death and life to test you [people] and reveal 
which of you does best.”139 Because Allah tests man, the hardships and struggles of life need to 
be placed into a proper perspective. Since Allah loves those who love him first, and love for him 
is manifested in the perseverance through and the overcoming of the struggle, these pains are 
endured for the sake of demonstrating one’s disposition of love and faithfulness to Allah. But 
demonstrating one’s love for Allah is only part of an upward cyclical process – love, testing, and 
reward – of the Islamic life. It was reported that the Prophet said, “Indeed greater reward comes 
with greater trial. And indeed, when Allah loves a people He subjects them to trials, so whoever 
is content, then for him is pleasure, and whoever is discontent, the for him is wrath.”140 
 Part of the general weakness of mankind is the allure of pleasurable things in this life. 
The Qur’ān states, “The love of desirable things is made alluring for men – women, children, 
gold and silver treasures piled up high, horses with fine marking, livestock, farmland” (Q 3:14a). 
The pleasurable things of this life are a temptation and a distraction and will influence one’s 
ability to remember his Lord. Yes, the desirable things may bring a temporary joy in this life, but 
they will only ever be temporal and finite pleasures, mere shadows of the joys of the life to 
come. Concerning this, Al-Ghazālī writes, “By God, were there to be [in Heaven] haleness of 
body alone, together with safekeeping from death, hunger, thirst, and the other varieties of 
misfortunes, it would be worth a man’s while to renounce the world solely on its account, and to 
prefer it to what must necessarily be spoilt and lost.”141 To the one who remembers Allah and 
sets his sights on the things above and not below, for him, Allah has a better place to return. In 
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this this same passage we see the promise of a future reward, “these may be the joys of this life, 
but God has the best place to return to. [Prophet], say, ‘Would you like me to tell you of things 
that are better than all of these? The Lord will give those who are mindful of God Gardens 
graced with flowing streams, where they will stay with pure spouses and God’s good pleasure – 
God is fully aware of His servants” (Q 3:14b-15).142 In order to receive Allah’s good pleasure, a 
Muslim must overcome human weakness through internal struggle (jihad), rejecting the temporal 
joys of this in favor of the infinite. Pursuing Allah in this life is of utmost importance. This is 
what the Sūfīs teach as they focus on following the path so that they can return to their Lord. Life 
on earth is a test and Allah loves those who love Him through struggle. 
 The Qur’ān, Allah’s eternal word, calls the people back to remembrance, back to their 
Lord. Chittick notes that there are two basic functions of prophecy in the Qur’ān: “First, prophets 
remind (dhikr) people of what they have forgotten, which is the universal and timeless truth of 
tawḥīd…the timeless reality of God Himself;” and second, “to guide people to employ their free 
will in trying to achieve conformity with God as the Truth, the Reality, the Right, the 
Appropriate – a conformity that results in nearness (qurb) and felicity.”143 The immanence of the 
afterlife is manifested in both the pages of the Qur’ān and the daily liturgical prayers and 
rituals.144 Every day, for those practicing Muslims who pray regularly, they will repeat at least 17 
                                                      
 142 Italics added for emphasis. 
 143 William Chittick, “The Ambiguity of the Qur’ānic Command,” in Between Heaven and Hell: Islam, 
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times a day their praise of Allah, “the master of the day of judgment” (Q 1:4).145 On the contrary, 
to be heedless of the of the life to come (Q 30:7) or to be forgetful of the coming judgment (Q 
32:14) are signs of the unbeliever. Haleem further emphases the significance of this 
interdependent relationship, stating, “In fact, the principles and details of religion are meant to be 
seen within the framework of the interdependence of this life and the afterlife in to color the 
Muslims conception of life in the universe and have a bearing on their actions in this life.”146 In 
Islam, the relationship between this life and the next cannot be overstated. Some may consider 
this immanence to be a source of constant angst as one is ever-reminded on their need and quest 
to return to Allah in a favorable manner. I would tend to agree that the nature of salvific 
uncertainty will definitely cause angst in this life but not the emphasis on the immanence and 
importance of the life to come as a whole. If this life is significant in relation to the next, we 
would do well to live in light of eternity every day, whether Muslim or Christian. 
 
Abundance of the Sensual 
 Paradise is depicted as a blessed reality wherein there is an abundance of pleasure and 
reward. The abundance of the sensual as I am calling it, is not overtly referencing the sexual 
although sexuality is essential to Paradise; rather, the sensual here refers to the whole person, the 
engaging of all the senses in pleasure.147 An analysis of this abundance entails both the contents 
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of the Garden as well as the renewal of the body. Paradise is typically referred to as “the Garden” 
or al-Jannah and is located in the heavens beyond the celestial spheres on a higher level.148 The 
symbolism of a garden in the afterlife is fitting for both the theme of abundance and for the 
Arabian culture of the sixth century. In a dry and arid landscape where natural resources are 
limited, visions of a garden with flowing streams and rich with vegetation, trees and shade 
garnishes appeal and excites the imagination. Reinhart states that “the garden as an ideal is as 
much a part of Near Eastern religion as the Judgment or the Wrath of a god.”149 Paradise’s 
connection to Near Eastern religion is found even in the name al-Jannah as it a Persian word in 
origin. 
 According to the Qur’ān and Hadith, Paradise and the contents within are immense. 
Consider some of these passages describing the vastness of the Garden. In the Qur’ān Allah 
states, “Race one with another for forgiveness from your Lord and for Paradise, whose width is 
as the width of the heavens and the earth…”150 There are levels in the Garden and between each 
level is “(the distance of) a hundred years.”151 On the trees in the Garden, the Prophet is reported 
to say, “Verily, in Paradise there is a tree, a rider will travel in its shade for a hundred years.”152 
The dwelling places of the inhabitants will be grand, “Indeed in Paradise there is a great tent of 
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hollowed pearl, its breadth is sixty miles, in every corner of it is a family, they do not see the 
others, and the believer goes around to them."153 There is no need to worry about Paradise filling 
up or becoming crowded, “Paradise will remain spacious enough to accommodate more people 
until Allah will create some more people and let them dwell in the superfluous space of 
Paradise.”154 The immensity of Paradise is depicted on such a scale that it challenges man’s 
imaginative capacity. But this is to be expected because the Qur’ān also states, “No person 
knows what is kept hidden for them of joy, as a reward for what they used to do.”155 Concerning 
this passage, Ibn Kathīr states that this means “no one knows the vastness of what Allah has 
concealed for them of everlasting joy in Paradise and delights such as no one has ever seen. 
Because they conceal their good deeds, Allah conceals the reward for them, a fitting reward 
which will suit their deeds.”156 Allah has created a Paradise that exceeds the expectations of man. 
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Tirmidhi (Sahih), Book 38 Chapters on the Descriptions of Paradise, Arabic Reference, Book 38, Hadith 2721, 
English Reference: Vol. 4, Book 12, hadith 2529, https://sunnah.com/tirmidhi/38  
 154 Narrated by Anas in Sahih al-Bukhari, Book 93 Book of Oneness, Uniqueness of Allah (Tawheed), Ch. 7 
“And He is the All-Mighty, the All-Wise,” In-book reference: Book 97, Hadith 14. 
 155 Q 32:17 
 156 Tafsīr of Ibn Kathīr, on Q 32:17, 
http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1802&Itemid=88 (Accessed March 27, 
2018). Al-Tustarī in his Tafsir also comments on this passage saying, “Their eyes delight at the outward and inward 
realities that they witness, which are revealed to them in the way of ⸢ knowledge (ʿulūm) of unveiling (mukāshafa). 
So they behold them and hold on to them such that their eyes delight and their hearts find tranquil repose in them. 
Others, however are unaware of what is hidden [in reserve] for them. But God, Glorified and Exalted is He, knows 
best.” Tafsir al-Tustarī on Q 32:17, http://www.altafsir.com/Books/Tustari.pdf. Hadith Sahih Muslim adds another 
layer of distinction “Allah the Exalted and Glorious, said: I have prepared for My pious servants which no eye has 
ever seen, and no ear has ever heard, and no human heart has ever perceived but it is testified by the Book of 
Allah.” (italics added) Sahih Muslim, Book 53, Chapter 2, “Chapter: Bestowal of Divine Pleasure on the People of 
Paradise, and Allah Will Never be Angry with them,” In-book reference: Book 53, Hadith 3. 
https://sunnah.com/muslim/53. Lastly, this passage from the Qur’ān is also supported by a Hadith Qudsi. “This is a 
hadith qudsi “Allah said: I have prepared for My righteous servants what no eye has seen and no ear has heard, not 
has it occurred to human heart. Thus recite if you wish (1): And no soul knows what joy for them (the inhabitants of 
Paradise) has been kept hidden. (1) The words "Thus recite if you wish" are those of Abu Harayrah. It was related 
by al-Bukhari, Muslim, at-Tirmidhi and Ibn Majah. Hadith 37 of Hadith Qudsi. https://www.sunnah.com/qudsi40. 
Hadith Qudsi (divine hadith) differ in qualification from Hadith Nabawi (prophetic hadith). Hadith Nabawi, while 
having authority for the Muslim community, follow a chain of transmission back to the Prophet. Hadith Qudsi, on 
the other hand, do not end the chain with the Prophet but are linked directly to Allah. Hadith Qudsi are not equal to 
the very words of the Qur’an but they nonetheless function as extra-Qur’ānic revelation. The classification of Qudsi 
is significant because it represents the belief that this has come from Allah Himself. That Allah would reveal this 
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Man cannot perceive some of the joys of Paradise because they are beyond his finite capacity to 
create and imagine. However, the paradisal language in the Qur’ān seemingly offers 
correspondence at some level between the objects and pleasures in this life to the life to come. 
 Along with being immense in size the Garden is full of abundant rivers and food. Surah 
47 gives a depiction of the Garden in which there are rivers of pure water, milk, wine, and honey. 
These rivers flow perpetually and there is no diminishing of their existence nor their purity.157 In 
the same Surah we also see that there will an abundance and diversity of food: “there they will 
find fruit of every kind.” Food will never not be accessible in Paradise, in fact, there is an 
immediacy to whatever one desires. Surah 38:15b states, “they will call for abundant fruit and 
drink” with the implication they will be granted what they desire. This notion is supported by al-
Ghazālī when he reports a transmission of Ibn Masʿūd, “‘The Emissary of God said, ‘You shall 
only have to behold a bird in Heaven and desire it for it to fall down before you roasted.’”158 
 Among the many things redeemed and renewed in the afterlife, human creatures are both 
physically and morally transformed. The Qur’ān states in several places that at the time of the 
general resurrection, Allah will resurrect all of humanity and they will have physical bodies. 
Even though the Qur’ān taught a physical embodied resurrection, the question of what happened 
after death was prevalent early on in the Muslim community. It is apparent that it was initially 
difficult for Muslims to comprehend Allah’s ability to remake the body after it had dissolved to 
dust in the grave. At the resurrection, every person will be remade into optimal form. Abdel 
                                                      
idea to Mohammad again suggests a high level of importance. For more on Hadith Qudsi see “Hadith Qudsi” in The 
Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, edit. by John L. Esposito, (originally published by Oxford University 
Press, 2009), Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780195305135.001.0001/acref-
9780195305135. (Accessed May 10, 2018) 
 157 Q 47:15; See also, Q 13:35 
 158 Al-Ghazālī, Remembrance, 243. 
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Haleem suggest that this is supported by the Qur’ān where it indicates that human beings will get 
new bodies, and they will not have the same ones they possessed in the previous life (e.g. 56:35, 
61).159 Because Paradise is an abundance of the sensual and the sensual experience is intimately 
linked to the body, human bodies are in need of transformation and renewal in order to maximize 
all Paradise has to offer. The inhabitants of Paradise will eternally feast on the sustenance of the 
Garden, but they will not have to worry about becoming fat or any of the negative side effects 
that come with overindulgence in this life. Specifically, in relation to food, there will no longer 
be any defecation or urination as human bodies will be relieved by means of a sweat that smells 
like musk and after they are relieved their stomachs will return once more to their slender 
form.160 According to Aziz al-Azmeh, man will have the “height of Adam (60 cubits), the age of 
Jesus (33 years), the beauty of Joseph, and he will have Muhammad’s language, for each of these 
descriptions is in itself consummate.161 It is said from at-Tirmidhi that “the first batch to enter 
Paradise will appear like the moon of a night that is full.” 162 Humanity will also be void of body 
hair and will not need to spit nor will have runny noses. 163 
 Lastly, the inhabitants of Paradise also go through a moral transformation. The Qur’ān 
states, “We shall remove all ill feeling from their hearts; streams will flow at their feet,”164 and 
                                                      
 159 For more on this see Abdel Haleem, “Life and Beyond,” pp. 72-3. 
 160 Ibid., 243. 
 161 Aziz Al-Azmeh, "Rhetoric for the Senses: A Consideration of Muslim Paradise Narratives," Journal of 
Arabic Literature 26, no. 3 (1995): 223. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4183375. (Accessed April 16, 2018) 
 162 Abu Hurairah narrated that the Messenger of Allah said from Jami’ at-Tirmidhi (Sahih), Book 38 
Chapters on the Descriptions of Paradise, Arabic Reference, Book 38, Hadith 2733, English Reference: Vol. 4, 
Book 12, hadith 2537, https://sunnah.com/tirmidhi/38  
 163 Muʿadh bin Jabal’s narration of the Prophet from Jami’ at-Tirmidhi (Sahih), English reference: Vol. 4, 
Book 12, Hadith 2545; Arabic reference: Book 38, Hadith 2742, https://sunnah.com/tirmidhi/38 and the previous 
reference. 
 164 Q 7:43 
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“They will hear no idle of sinful talk there, only clean and wholesome speech.”165 Muhammad is 
also to have been reported as saying “There is no differing among them nor mutual hatred, and 
their hearts are like the heart of one man, and they glorify Allah morning and evening.”166 
 Allah will remove all malice and imperfection from the character of humanity. They will 
experience nothing but good will and charity toward the other companions of Paradise. 
Moreover, they will feel what is the dominant sentiment of Paradise – peace.167 Peace will be had 
amongst the inhabitants of Paradise but even more significant is the peace and bestowal of divine 
pleasure from Allah.168 
Sexuality and the Sacred 
 The combination of sexuality and Paradise form a rich narrative in the Islamic traditions. 
Beginning first with the Qur’an and then developing in the hadiths and later commentaries, 
sexuality is a central theme of Paradise. Development happened relatively early on within Islam 
and by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the paradisal traditions were relatively stabilized – 
                                                      
 165 Q 56:25-6 
 166 Abu Hurairah narrated that the Messenger of Allah said from Jami’ at-Tirmidhi (Sahih), Book 38 
Chapters on the Descriptions of Paradise, Arabic Reference, Book 38, Hadith 2733, English Reference: Vol. 4, 
Book 12, hadith 2537, https://sunnah.com/tirmidhi/38  
 167 Q 15:47 
 168 After the inhabitants of Paradise have been shown the pleasures therein, they are overwhelmed with the 
magnificence of the Garden. They seemingly cannot imagine anything greater than what Allah has prepared for 
them. But, Allah grants them something even more pleasurable. This hadith describes what transpires: “O, Dwellers 
of Paradise, and they would say in response: At thy service and pleasure, our Lord, the good is in Thy Hand. He (the 
Lord) would say: Are you well pleased now? They would say: Why should we not be pleased, O Lord, when Thou 
hast given us what Thou hast not given to any of Thy creatures? He would, however, say: May I not give you 
(something) even more excellent than that? And they would say: O Lord, what thing can be more excellent than 
this? And He would say: I shall cause My pleasure to alight upon you and I shall never be afterwards annoyed with 
you.”Sahih Muslim, Book 53, Chapter 2, In-book reference: Book 53, Hadith 10. https://sunnah.com/muslim/53 
Also given on the authority of Abu Sa’id al-Khurdi, Hadith 40 of Hadith Qudsi, https://sunnah.com/qudsi40. Jami’ 
at-Tirmidhi (Sahih) also supports the narration of al-Khurdi, Book 38 Chapters on the Descriptions of Paradise, 
English Reference Vol. 4, Book 12, Hadith 2554; Arabic reference: Book 38, Hadith 2714, 
https://sunnah.com/tirmidhi/38  
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although certain creative liberties had been applied.169 The tradition became quite descriptive of 
the sexual pleasures along with the descriptions of the paradisal spouses awaiting the faithful 
companions. We would do well however not to be reductionist is our analysis of this integral 
feature of Paradise. It seems that the sexual activity of Paradise, while part of the greater 
narrative of paradisal reward, serves a dual role in providing both physical and spiritual pleasure. 
Physical pleasure is obvious and comes in the form of the actual act of sex as well as the sense 
delights of the houris – the virgins of Paradise. This second suggestion of spiritual pleasure may 
at first seem out of place but there is enough extant material to suggest that within Islamic 
tradition, there is a place for the sacred in the sexual. That in the perpetual sexual encounters of 
Paradise there is something sacred to be encountered as well. The extent to which one encounters 
the sacred in the sexual will be discussed below but first the virginal paradisal traditions are 
considered. 
 The virgins of Paradise are perhaps the most familiar feature of the Islamic afterlife to the 
Western world. This is due, no doubt, to the narrative put forth that those who die as martyrs in 
jihad are promised 70 virgins in Paradise as a reward for their sacrifice toward the cause of Allah 
and Islam. It is true that the Qur’an does not mention the number of virgins specifically and that 
                                                      
 169 Bouhdiba makes this suggestion, citing the significance of the works of the following authors without 
subsequent works matching the level of influence. It is important to note that Bouhdiba lists imam Abderrahman Ibn 
Ahmed al Qādhi and sheikh Jalal Addin al Suyūtī and their respective documents are two exceptional documents 
which, in terms of content and quality, represent generally how both the elites and common people viewed the 
Islamic afterlife. Due to linguistic limitations, Bouhdiba will be the source for understanding and analysis of both of 
these scholars (especially Suyūtī whom he seems to interact with more frequently in the chapter “The Infinite 
Orgasm”). Bouhdiba, Sexuality, 72-3. Support for the significance of Suyūtī in the role of commentary on the houris 
and their description comes from Lange’s use of Suyūtī as well. See Lange, Paradise and Hell, 142-43. On the 
dependence on the medieval traditions in Islamic eschatology J. B. Taylor writes “The survival of medieval 
categories to the present day in the Muslim world, and to some extent the continued dependence upon them and the 
reluctance to formulate fresh theological language and symbolism, meant that we shall not only indulge our 
historical curiosity, but may also illuminate the present situation where we try to find themes for constructive 
dialogue.” J. B. Taylor, “Some Aspects of Islamic Eschatology,” Religious Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Oct. 1969): 59, 
accessed January 5, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20000089. 
   
 
 
75
this teaching comes from one of the hadith traditions; however, I do not think it makes it any less 
significant nor authoritative.170 We see in the hadith composed by Jami’ at-Tirmidhi in The Book 
on the Virtues of Jihad, that one of the six rewards promised to the martyr is that he is married to 
seventy-two wives.171 Virgin spouses are promised to the martyr but it would be a mistake to 
assume that maidens of Paradise are promised exclusively to them. The significance, I would 
submit, of the promises given in this hadith are not the spouses; rather it is the forgiveness that 
follows from the first flow of blood and the guarantee of a place in Paradise. The virgins of 
Paradise are a reward to all Muslim men who enter its gates. There are multiple passages in the 
Qur’an suggesting that part of the reward for the devout inhabitants of Paradise are “well-
matched [wives] with modest gaze,”172 and, furthermore, that they are “good-natured, beautiful 
maidens…Dark-eyed, sheltered in pavilions…Untouched beforehand by man or jinn…They will 
sit on green cushions and fine carpets.”173 The paradisal virgins are a promise to all who are 
faithful to Allah, the reward of the martyr specifically is the guarantee of Paradise. 
 Of the marriage companions, there exists a combination of beings – both celestial and 
human. Each companion is married to earthly wives – faithful female Muslims – as well as 
                                                      
 170 Parshall makes the observation that there are “many picturesque and graphic Hadith” regarding sexuality 
in Paradise. Furthermore, he also notes that many of these references are not include in the most authoritative Hadith 
collection – Sahih Al-Bukhari. Phil Parshall, Inside the Community: Understanding Muslims Through Their 
Traditions, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1994), 142. While this may be true, al-Bukhari is not the only 
accepted hadith tradition within the main branches of Islam and the Hadith that have been selected to discuss the 
existence of the houris in Paradise fall within the purview of at least the Sunni tradition of authoritative Hadith. 
 171 Jami’ at-Tirmidhi 1663 (Hasan Sahih), Book 22 The Book on Virtues of Jihad, Chapter 25 “Regarding 
the Rewards for the Martyr,” In-book reference: Book 22, Hadith 46, https://sunnah.com/tirmidhi/22 (Accessed 
March 27, 2018). 
 172 “The devout will have a good place to return to…they will have well-matched [wives] with modest 
gaze. ‘This is what you are promised for the Day of Reckoning: Our provision for you will never end.’” Q 38:49-54 
 173 Q 55:70-6; See also Q 38:52 and 37:48-9, “With them will be spouses – modest of gaze and beautiful of 
eye – like protected eggs.” Abdel Haleem provides this translator’s note after verse 49, “Arabs described beautiful 
women as being as precious as the ostrich eggs they protected from the dust with feathers,” Haleem, The Qur’ān, 
Oxford World Classics, 286. 
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celestial beings called houris – a heavenly creature created exclusively for those faithful to Allah. 
As we have seen so far in this chapter, one common theme in Paradise is that of excess and 
abundance. There is no lack in Paradise, all is given and then possessed in overwhelming fashion 
and this benefaction reflects the good nature of Allah. The same too can be said of one’s 
marriage companions for they too are numerous as they are beautiful. The number of wives in 
Paradise is commonly thought to be seventy-two – two earthly wives and seventy houris; 
however, in the traditions it is as Lange points out, “characteristically, numbers [of wives] 
remain unstable.”174 Lange says this because there are a number of commentators who suggest 
that the number of spouses in Paradise far exceeds the seventy-two. Both Suyūtī and al-Ghazali 
suggest that the number could be anywhere from 500 to somewhere in the thousands.175 
 Being embodied creatures, the inhabitants of Paradise are engaged in pleasure through all 
of the senses. Sight is an integral part of human essence. According to Bouhdiba, “everything 
begins with the look and everything ends with it.”176 Sight leads to contemplation and 
contemplation leads to happiness. Thus, pleasure is, to some degree, ocular.177 The pleasure 
derived from the houris is magnified by their physical appearance. But sight is not the only sense 
through which we experience pleasures. One’s sense of smell also contributes to the pleasure of 
the senses. It is for this reason perhaps that the houris are also described as composite creatures 
                                                      
 174 Lange, Paradise and Hell, 142-3. 
 175 For more on the number of spouses in Paradise see Ibid., 143 fn. 190-90; Al-Ghazālī, Remembrance, 
245. Reporting on al-Ghazali’s claim see F. A. Klein, Religion of Islam, (Published online by Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2013), 95. https://www-taylorfrancis-com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/books/9781136099465, Samuel M. Zwemer, 
Islam: A Challenge to Faith, Studies on the Mohammedan Religion and the Need and Opportunities of the 
Mohammedan World from the Standpoint of Christian Missions, 2nd Edition, (New York: Laymen’s Missionary 
Movement, 1909), 94-5. https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=evtbigSg5YkC&rdid=book-
evtbigSg5YkC&rdot=1 
 176 Bouhdiba, Sexuality, 83. 
 177 Ibid. 
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of various smells and perfumes. Al-Azmeh again notes that the houris are said to be “made of 
musk between their feet and knees, of amber between their knees and breasts, and of camphor 
upwards of their chest.”178 The combination of both sight and smell creates an even greater 
euphoria beyond just the pleasures of the sexual encounter itself. The gaze and the smells create 
a sort of “quasi-immaterial pleasure of matter itself.”179 
 One may wonder, however, at the extensive detail with which these houris are described 
in Medieval and Late Medieval traditionist literature – going far beyond more basic descriptions 
in the Qur’ān. Lange notes that these heavenly creatures of Paradise are imagined as “ideal 
courtesans” to the Muslim man and creative descriptions and interpretations developed 
accordingly.180 The skin of the houris is white enough that the man can see his reflection but 
being translucent, but he can also see the marrow inside her bones like red wine in a glass.181 
What is the significance of translucent skin and being able to see the marrow of the bones? Al-
Azmeh discusses the reasons and points out that the skin is translucent because it is extremely 
soft, as soft as the membrane separating the egg from its shell.182 Furthermore, the skin, being of 
the purest white, is also simultaneously reflective to the extent that the man can see his face in 
the houri’s skin. Beyond the descriptions of the skin and marrow their beauty is also accounted 
for by their eyes which are large and dark and long flowing hair.183 Lastly, the houris are also 
                                                      
 178 Al-Azmeh, “Rhetoric,” 227. 
 179 Bouhdiba, Sexuality, 83. 
 180 Christian Lange, Paradise and Hell, 143. 
 181 Al-Azmeh, “Rhetoric,” 227. 
 182 Ibid. 
 183 Al-Ghazālī writes, [The houris’ heads] are wreathed with crowns inlaid with pearls both great and small; 
flirtatious are they, and coquettish, perfumed and safe from old age or any hardship, secluded in tents (Q 55:72) and 
palaces of sapphire raised up in the center of Heaven’s gardens; modest of gaze and large-eyed.” Al-Ghazālī, 
Remembrance, 232. 
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described by the feminine physical features which men tend to find visually attractive – the 
breasts, waist and posterior.184 In Muslim literature, creative liberties are taken regarding the 
physical make-up of the houris and men imagined what was sensually attractive to them. The 
Muslim poet Abū l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī in his narratival tour of the afterlife writes: 
It occurs to him [the Sheikh], while he is still prostrate, that the girl, though 
beautiful, is rather skinny. He raises his head and instantly she has a behind that 
rivals the hills of ʿAlij, the dunes of al-Dahnā, and the sands of Yabrīn and the 
Banū Saʿd. Awed by the omnipotence of the Kind and Knowing God, he says, 
“Thou who givest rays to the shining sun, Thou who fulfillest the desires of 
everyone, Thou whose awe-inspiring deeds make us feel impotent, and summon 
to wisdom the ignorant: I ask Thee to reduce the bum of this damsel to one square 
mile, for Thou hast surpassed my expectations with Thy measure!” An answer is 
heard: “You may choose: the shape of this girl will be as you wish.” And the 
desired reduction is affected.185 
Al-Maʿarrī’s words depict what is considered beautiful in classical Arabic poetry but we can also 
see the beginning stages of a connection between the sensual and the sacred. When the Sheikh in 
this story beholds what has been given to him by his Lord, he is overwhelmed and immediately 
begins to praise Allah for what has been bestowed to him. The sensual results in praise for the 
sacred, but furthermore, in experiencing the sensual, the believer is experiencing the wisdom of 
his Lord. Here, is it possible that through the sensual one can experience the sacred? This will be 
reflected on further in the next few paragraphs. 
 There is a very significant hadith that makes an integral connection between sexuality 
and the sacred. Not only does this saying contextualize the sexual act on earth within the sacred 
sphere, it illumines the significance of sex and sexual intimacy in the life to come. In this 
                                                      
 184 The houris are described as having a certain kind of breasts, ones that are similar in size and shape to 
that of a young girl’s. Furthermore, the houris have large posteriors. Suyūti writes that the houris wait in their tents 
with “their large posteriors rising over the edges of their seats.” Lange, Paradise and Hell, 143. 
 185 Abū l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī, The Epistle of Forgiveness or A Pardon to Enter the Garden, trans. by Geert Jan 
Van Gelder and Gregor Schöler, (New York: New York University Press, 2016), 128. Gelder and Schöler note that 
“heavy posteriors are part of the ideal beauty in classical Arabic love poetry, whether on women or boys; the 
standard poetic simile is that of the sandhill or dune.” Ibid., 335 n486. 
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particular hadith, some companions of the Prophet are pleading their case to Muhammad in 
relation to the giving of alms (one of the five pillars in Islam) and the subsequent reward. They 
stated that they were able to fast just as the wealthy fast and pray just as they do as well but when 
it came to charitable giving, they were not able to match the giving of the wealthy. The Prophet 
responds to them in the form of a question asking, “Has not Allah made things for you to give in 
charity?”186 Here, Muhammad is reframing their perspective of charitable giving, expanding it 
beyond the scope of simply material giving. He states that every tasbīḥ,187 takbir,188 tahmīd,189 or 
tahlīl,190 these statements of adoration and worship of Allah are a charity. Furthermore, the 
Messenger of Allah states that a person “commanding the good and forbidding an evil is a 
charity, and in the buḍʿī [sexual act] of each one of you there is a charity.”191 Upon hearing that 
fulfilling their carnal desires, the companions of the Muhammad questioned him, seemingly not 
believing what they had just heard. The Prophet then qualifies his former statement, “Do you not 
see that if he were to act upon it [his desire] in an unlawful manner then he would be deserving 
of punishment? Likewise, if he were to act upon it in a lawful manner then he will be deserving 
of a reward.”192 
 The previous hadith – Nawawi 25 – in a way redeems sexual activity for the companions 
of the Prophet. The Prophet contextualizes sex and teaches that when one does it lawfully it is a 
good. That there is a good way to have sex and a wrong way is significant because it supports the 
                                                      
 186 40 Nawawi Hadith, 25. https://sunnah.com/nawawi40/25 (Accessed April 18, 2018) 
 187 Saying: “suhban-Allah” or “Allah is perfect” or “Glory to Allah” 
 188 Saying: “Allahu akbar” or “Allah is greatest” 
 189 Saying: “al-hamdu lillah” or “All praise belongs to Allah” 
 190 Saying: “laa ilaha illAllah” or “There is none worthy of worship except Allah” 
 191 40 Nawawi Hadith, 25. https://sunnah.com/nawawi40/25 (Accessed April 18, 2018) 
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notion that in the proper context it is inherently relational.193 On the relationality of sex Bouhdiba 
notes, “This is understandable. Orgasm is certainly a pleasure. But a shared one. And it is in the 
pleasure derived from another at the same time as oneself that this work of piety resides, a work 
analogous to fasting, prayer and chastity. Eros and Agape, then, are both involved in 
sexuality.”194 Here, Bouhdiba is correct in that sex can be a marriage of both eros and agape 
love. It is curious though that the agape theme should emerge in this discussion of the sexual 
relations in Islam. As it relates to the current discussion, the sexual realities of the afterlife are 
seemingly man-centered and focus solely on the husband’s satisfaction of the flesh. 
 Bouhdiba establishes the sexuality/sacred narrative even further by suggesting that the 
vision of God is constituted in the “very essence of the delights of the Muslim paradise.”195 He 
quickly distinguishes that the extension of the Beatific Vision into the delights are not 
exclusively the vision as that is still separate and distinct; however, the vision is not reducible to 
the Beatific Vision alone. He suggests that this co-extensiveness of the sexual and the sacral is 
difficult for Christians to understand because from their point of view it is “unthinkable that the 
                                                      
 193 My intent here is not to present the concept of sex (along with its prohibitions and allowances) in Islam 
in a purely positive light. I am keenly aware of the sexual ethic, along with its guidelines and prohibitions, in Islam. 
There are some aspects in their teachings which are extremely troubling. Sexuality in Islam appears to be inherently 
man-centered which is why the inclusion of the relationality motif is both curious and refreshing. Analyzing 
sexuality is Islam beyond what is done here would go beyond the scope of the paper but here is one such example of 
a problematic hadith. The Prophet said, “If a man invites his wife to sleep with him and she refuses to come to him, 
then the angels send their curses on her till morning.” Sahih al-Bukhari, 5193, In-book reference, Book 67, Hadith 
127. https://sunnah.com/bukhari/67 This hadith seems to suggest that a wife does not have a right over her own body 
if her husband wants to have sex on a given night. It is her obligation, lest she be cursed by angels, to consent to the 
husbands wishes. Not wishing to be too myopic, but in this hadith it does not seem like Agape love is being 
demonstrated by the husband. Agape love is non-coercive, yet the woman, regardless of her wishes or desires is 
pressured into the sexual act by threat of harm from the spiritual realm. If the sayings of the Prophet are good and 
authoritative for all Muslims, then what is prescribed here for sexual relations within marriage is a moral good. 
Now, there may be occasions where the wife, although herself not necessarily wanting sexual relations or feeling 
strong sexual desires for her husband, will, of her own volition, choose to accept the husbands request. Here, the act 
of giving is voluntary and, in this sense, would be a good but it is hard to see how sex through coercion would be 
deemed a moral good, let alone a demonstration of agape love. 
 194 Bouhdiba, Sexuality, 92. 
 195 Ibid., 82. 
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workings of the flesh, a source of original sin, could find its place in the hereafter.”196 For Islam, 
there is something essential in the Eros, in the fulfillment of the flesh and to some extent, 
Bouhdiba is correct in that this is foreign to Christianity but only to the extent that sexual 
relations are part of Paradise. Bouhdiba further states that to be in Islamic paradise is “the 
fulfillment of self” and this fulfillment can only be realized in “love conceived…as a 
transfiguration, a transcendence of self in others. It is no accident that hell is solitude, non-
presence of others, in a word, absence of love. Paradise, on the other hand, is total, full, infinite 
love. It is unity in harmony with the world, with oneself and with God.”197 Paradise conceived as 
the fulfillment of self in inter-relationality is strikingly similar to the Trinitarian foundation in 
Christianity. Bouhdiba touches upon a foundational component of our humanity in that we are 
inherently relational. Furthermore, emphasizing the transcendent union found in sexuality is also 
significant. Sex is an intimate experience that does unite persons in more than a merely physical 
sense. An emotional and psychological union is formed when two human beings copulate. 
Perhaps sexuality, and the amount of it in Islamic Paradise, is the one area that conceivably 
brings people closest to the sacred. What remains doubtful is that sacred union is actually 
achieved in this manner in Paradise. 
 Perhaps this symbolism – the union of the sacred and sexual – is supported by al-Suyūtī’s 
statement, “On their breasts is written the name of their husband, linked with one of the beautiful 
names of God.”198 The presence of the divine names on the exposed breasts of these paradisal 
maidens coupled with the intimate sexual relations wherein the confluence of eros and agape 
love manifests, is purportedly a simultaneous experience with the Divine, a mystical Theo-
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 197 Italic added. Ibid. 
 198 Bouhdiba is quoting the Muslim scholar al-Suyūtī. Ibid., 75. 
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anthropic union. Bouhdiba suggestion that “the sexuality encountered in others is also a 
projection in God,”199 is both seemingly innovative and provocative. I do not think he is 
suggesting a quite disrespectful imagery of divine-human sex or to say that in having sex with 
the houris, the inhabitants of Paradise are also having sex with Allah. He is suggesting, however, 
sex is a medium wherein one experiences the Divine while ultimately maintaining, I would 
suspect, an agnostic disposition on how that attains. 
 The possible union of the sensual and the sacred highlights the significant concern raised 
against Islamic Paradise, namely, the relationship of Man to the Divine. Allah is fundamentally 
transcendent and unknowable, yet, the Qur’ān and traditions continue to purport a mystical 
experience with the Divine in Paradise. How is this possible? This question will continue to 
develop possible answers in the remaining two sections. 
Paradise as Theophany 
 Paradise as theophany is a concept put forth by the influential mystical thinker and writer 
Frithjof Schuon. Paradise as a theophany, a manifestation of the Divine, is similar to the previous 
union of the sensual and the sacral in that somehow the pleasures of Paradise are a connection to 
Allah but is fundamentally different in terms of the metaphysical reality of Paradise. According 
to Schuon, Paradise as the material construction is ontologically different and metaphysically 
more than the natural realm in this life. In order to understand Schuon’s claim it is necessary to 
contextualize this conversation in relation to the presence of levels of reward in Paradise. The 
levels of Paradise and how man relates to them is the impetus for Schuon’s proposition. 
 As we have already discussed in this chapter, there is an intimate relationship between 
this life and next. The Qur’ān and hadith traditions state the rewards and pleasures of Paradise 
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are contingent upon the choices one made in this life. It is a common perception that a Muslim is 
concerned simply with getting to Paradise. After death and following the general resurrection of 
the dead comes judgment. Allah is the supreme judge and he will weigh each person’s deeds on 
the divine scales. If the good deeds outweigh the bad ones and then the scales tip in favor of 
Paradise.200 But the focus of Muslims should not be to simply get there, to make it to Paradise by 
any means necessary. Many will make it to Paradise but barely. Once there, however, their 
experience is contingent upon the former life on earth. Haleem emphasizes the importance of this 
life and the sealing of deeds at death; he writes, “the Quran emphasizes that nobody will escape 
death, the resurrection or judgment, and That there is no way to salvation in the afterlife except 
through work in this life… it is the only chance to work for a good life in the next world (35:37). 
The urgency is expressed by the frequent use of ‘before’ death for the hour comes.”201 What one 
does in this life matters and carries eternal significance. Life on earth is a journey, a process of 
spiritual formation and for the Sufi specifically, this implies achieving a level of gnosis, a level 
of knowledge pursued and acquired which then transforms into love. 
 Surahs 55 and 56 are two chapters where one clearly sees the division of people into 
groups based upon the deeds of this life. The chapters present a trichotomy of peoples: those in 
the front (or the foremost) and those to the right and left. Those on the left are the ones for whom 
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damnation awaits. They are dealt with accordingly and then sent away to their punishment.202 
The two groups which remain are the faithful and the award that awaits them is Paradise. But 
Paradise is divided into two Gardens (at least) and the two remaining groups are designated for 
one or the other.203 The group in the middle, the foremost, are the highest among the elect of 
God. 204 This group will consist of relatively few people as the spiritual process required to 
achieve this level is difficult. Sufis believe that they alone will comprise the foremost because it 
is only the Sufi doctrine and methods which can guide a Muslim nearer to Allah.205 For this 
group their reward in Paradise is al-Firdaws, the highest level of Paradise and the level closest in 
proximity to Allah. The group to the right consists of believers and their reward is Paradise as 
well although it is not al-Firdaws. Nonetheless, those on the right will enjoy Paradise and all that 
is offered to them. 
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 In relation to this study, the distinction between the two levels raises some interesting 
questions to consider. First, do the inhabitants of the lower level experience Allah in the same 
way as those in al-Firdaws? Second, do all Muslims in Paradise experience the unveiling of their 
Lord or is it merely those who are a part of the foremost? Third, is the reward of the lower level 
relative to the level of spiritual development in al-dunya, that is, if a Muslim believer does not 
renounce entirely the physical pleasures of earth, do they gain the physical pleasures of Paradise 
but miss the ultimate reward of Paradise in the process and what does that imply about their 
character? Fourth, how does proximity to Allah effect the quality of Paradise, will those on the 
right still be eternally satisfied? 
 The existence of levels in Paradise raises interesting questions. Here I will discuss 
Frithjof Schuon’s attempt to correct an improper translation of a relevant hadith and what he 
proposes as a solution. Schuon writes that there is a hadith which states, “the majority of the 
dwellers in Paradise are simpleminded (buhl).” Some commentators on this hadith have 
suggested that the simpleminded are those who are “satisfied with the Garden instead of thinking 
only of the Gardener – who stop short, in other words, with the created and lose sight of the 
Creator.” 206 Schuon disagrees with this reading and believes this interpretation is mistaken. He 
suggests that while these men to whom the hadith is referencing are of holy naiveté, they are not 
men of little intelligence.207 
 Schuon believes that interpretation of this hadith – those who are satisfied with the 
Garden instead of the Gardener – is a forced analogy due to a confused teleological relationship 
between Allah and Paradise. The proper teleology is this: a gardener is there for the garden and 
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not the other way around, that is, the importance of the gardener is connected to and subsisted by 
the existence of the garden. It is foolish, Schuon suggests, to purport that the Gardener (Allah) 
exists for the garden (Paradise) and that He loses interest apart from it. Rather, a better analogy, 
he suggests, would be the absurdity of “honoring the palace instead of the king or the wedding 
gown while forgetting the bride.” 208 In either case –the palace or the gown – their existences 
derives from the king and bride, but the latter’s importance and interest is not contingent on the 
former. But for Schuon, however, these two analogies do not capture the paradisal reality and are 
inadequate to convey its nature. He writes, Paradise is “above all a dimension that unites us to 
God;” and so instead of being the bride’s gown, Paradise is the very body of the bride, and it is 
“therefore what manifests outwardly the mystery of the Personality that is loved.”209 Paradise, 
then, is not a veil that conceals the Divine but an outward manifestation reflecting the Uncreated. 
That the created can reveal the Uncreated is a mysterious function but if it did not have that 
capacity then, as Schuon notes, “it would be impossible to explain this saying of the Companion 
of the Prophet: ‘I never saw anything without seeing God’.”210 
 Returning to the idea of the Beatific Vision, this eschatological feature suggests that 
pleasures or joys in Paradise cannot exist apart from the divine Presence. Preferring a particular 
pleasure in paradise to God would, as Schuon notes, “[have] no meaning here; it is merely an 
illegitimate transposition of an earthly possibility into the heavenly world.”211 It is true that 
human language is limited in its capacity to reveal eschatological truths. Concerning 
eschatology, Hermansen correctly points out, “By their very nature, eschatological doctrines test 
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the limits of our rational and customary experience, thereby reminding us of the fragility of our 
attachment to conditions that strike us now as unquestionably real.”212 But it seems here that 
Schuon’s rejection is the transference of earthly preferences to paradise as the means of joy 
rather than seeing the Divine as its legitimate source of joy. This does not, however, negate the 
existence of external and physical pleasures in the afterlife for as Schuon pointed out previously, 
the external reality is a reflection of the Hidden. It would seem then that Schuon emphatically 
seeks to influence one’s perspective regarding the divine-human relationship of Paradise. A 
proper disposition is one that sees the Divine as the source from which all pleasure derives. 
 That this is Schuon’s goal is made clear when he adds the final and most important 
objection to the “fools who people Paradise” interpretation. If the correct interpretation of this 
hadith is that the majority of people in Paradise are satisfied with garden while overlooking the 
Gardener, it would suggest that the majority of people in Paradise have forgotten God. In Islam, 
the remembrance of God is the beginning of the return (ma’ād) and to forget God is to sin, even 
the “essence of sin,” as Schuon notes.213 Paradise cannot contain sin and so Paradise cannot be a 
place where even one person, let alone the majority, merits the description of foolish and forgets 
the Creator. 
 As we have seen throughout this chapter, the Qur’ān is full of revelatory and descriptive 
language that often depicts a vivid Paradise that has some correspondence to the life humans 
experience now. Following Schuon’s attempt to correct one’s perspective of Paradise, it may be 
the case that the pendulum swing too far in the other direction. He anticipates this reaction and 
seeks to correct that extreme as well: 
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Hasty and simplistic disparagements of Paradise obviously serve to stress the 
supereminence of the Creator, but the immediate objection to this is that God 
requires praise, which is in our interest, but not flattery, which serves no end and 
is an insult to Him; in fact the purpose of praise is not to please the tyrant but on 
the contrary to actualize our awareness of the divine Source of all goods and 
therefore to show forth our human function, which consists in connecting the 
cosmic qualities to God so as to see them in God and God in them.214 
A hasty disparagement of Paradise would be to suggest that in light of the beatific vision, 
Paradise is of little value. Schuon states that this statement is either a “truism or ‘hypocritical 
angelism’.”215 It is a truism if by little value one means it in the sense that the Divine is the only 
absolute real. It is an “angelism” if humans ought to disparage the graces which are accordant 
with their own nature. The latter disparagement compares the human inhabitants of paradise to 
angelic creatures suggesting that human creatures become non-human entities lacking a human 
nature and do not possess the same properties of having a will, physical bodies, etc., and thus 
certain physical desires relating to physical properties.216 Schuon believes that the graces of 
Paradise consistent with our nature include those things which are physical realities and so one 
need not be hasty in disparaging certain imperfect views of paradise without other inherently 
limited, imperfect views. Allah is the source of all good and to delimit Paradise subsequently 
delimits proper human function because it replaces praise with flattery. The cosmic qualities of 
Paradise actualize our awareness of Allah as the divine source of all good which properly results 
in praise of the Creator. But going even further, Schuon’s thesis is that Paradise is a theophany; 
thus, the causal connection between Paradise and Allah is mysteriously ontological. Actualizing 
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the awareness of the divine Source is more than a causal connection as he stated earlier; it is to 
see the cosmic qualities in God and God in them. Paradise should not be disparaged because, as 
Schuon writes, “Paradise is a theophany and, in this respect, cannot be treated as the created 
ought to be treated when considered in its non-divinity or separativity.”217 
 To say that the paradisal realities are more than the veil of the bride but the bride’s body 
itself puts theological tension on Tawḥīd, between the uncreated and the created. Paradise as 
theophany purports that the created reveals that which is uncreated, that Allah, the utterly unique 
and unknowable God, is revealed through that which is knowable. Chittick’s insight is helpful as 
he summarizes Ibn ‘Arabī’s thoughts on existence. He writes: 
Ibn ‘Arabī places it [the isthmus] at the center of his enormous project to 
synthesize all strands of Islamic thought on the basis of the Koran. He points out 
that, in actual fact, everything other than God is located in an isthmus between 
real being and sheer nothingness. All things are contingent upon the Real and 
receive their relative reality from the radiance of his light. All things are in effect 
images of God, or “signs,” as the Koran puts it, though nothing is identical with 
the signified. Everything other than the Real is God’s “dream,” shimmering in a 
tenuous domain that is neither the pure unity of sheer being and absolute 
consciousness nor the utter emphasis of pure nothingness.”218 
Human existence rests on the isthmus between existence or real being and non-existence. Allah 
is the Ultimate Real and as such all that is not-God is contingent and exists only through Allah’s 
power (i.e. the radiance of his light). That all creation derives its existence from God whose 
existence is necessary is not problematic. A contingent entity, by definition, is not necessary so 
for contingent entities to exist, their existence must derive from elsewhere. A problem does seem 
to arise however when the ontology of the other than the Real is defined. When Chittick suggests 
that everything other than God is God’s dream, is he suggesting that all of creation is a mental 
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projection of God? Is creation uniquely distinct and other than the creator or, as a projection, is it 
God Himself? It seems that two options are available: either creation is illusory and not real or 
all that is other than God is merely an emanation of God himself. There is no true other.219 
 Problem of otherness, extension, distinction between Allah and creation are not new 
problems for Muslims scholars. In the case of Schuon’s theophany, however, Paradise is 
ontologically more than a sign, and is not to be considered as normal matter is considered. 
Paradise as the Bride itself is a radical step that is beyond the bounds of orthodox Islam. But, at 
the same time, Schuon is working to reconcile the problems arising from tawḥīd and otherness. 
He is trying to bridge the impassible, to overcome radical transcendence and unknowability, and 
thus experiencing the Divine, while also preserving the fundamental tenet of the faith. 
The Beatific Vision 
 This last section not only brings conclusion to the chapter but to the thematic conclusion 
of the chapter as well. All of the aspects of Paradise have been leading up to this last description 
of Paradise – the Beatific Vision. The Beatific Vision represents the highest level of pleasure in 
Paradise and an overly theocentric emphasis. Surah 10:26 states, “Those who did well will have 
the best reward and more besides.” Al-Ghazālī claims that the “more besides” or “even more” is 
“the Vision of Divine Countenance, which is the greatest of all delights, which shall cause one to 
be oblivious of the pleasures of the people of Heaven.”220 That the Beatific Vision is the highest 
good is not debated in Islam. Where we do find disagreement however, is the exact nature of the 
vision. Consider these two passages, one from the Qur’ān and one from a hadith: “On that Day 
there will be radiant faces, looking towards their Lord,”221 and from the hadith we see 
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Muhammad telling his disciples on a clear night that they will “see your Lord as you see this 
moon, and you will have no trouble in seeing Him.”222 Both passages attest to being able to see 
Allah but these passages become problematic when the mode of the seeing is established. On the 
one hand the Qur’ān and hadith claim that Allah will be seen but on the other hand Allah is 
amodal and therefore does not have a body. What then will the believers see on that day? 
Furthermore, there are other passages in the Qur’ān which state that a person cannot see Allah.223 
A tension thus arises between what it means to see what cannot be seen. 
 Historically, this was cause for debate between the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite schools. The 
Muʿtazilites traditionally held to the position that sight (baṣar) must be understood in a corporeal 
sense and since God did not have a body, vision of him was impossible. Ashʿarite orthodoxy 
affirmed the truth of the vision and proposed that Allah would be seen but held to the traditional 
phrase bilā kayf (without the how). They suggested a number of possible options in response to 
the Muʿtazilites. First, it was suggested that perhaps the passage regarding Moses was given 
contextually to humanity in this life. Perhaps, given man’s current physical condition, he could 
not see God, but it could be that in the new paradisal body vision would be granted.224 Second, 
they also denied that there was any logical reason why vision (baṣar) could not perceive an entity 
that was neither substance nor accident.225 A third way was proposed by al-Ghazālī. According 
to Timothy Winter, al-Ghazālī worked vigorously to defend the Beatific Vision as a true 
description of Paradise. Al-Ghazālī purported that the Beatific Vision was “none other than the 
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gnosis (maʿrifa) already given in an inferior and more fleeting fashion to the saints in this 
world.”226 Al-Ghazālī is referencing here the Sufi path of gnosis, the internalizing of the religious 
life and the contemplation of Allah. The path of gnosis is what leads to the “tasting” or dhawq of 
Allah, a religious experience given in an inferior way not but will manifest fully in the Beatific 
Vision. In this way, al-Ghazālī holds orthodoxy by preserving the truthfulness of the vision while 
at the same time avoiding having to affirm an ocular vision of Allah. 
 The vision as gnosis thesis reiterates the importance of the al-dunyā/al-ākhira dichotomy 
discussed earlier. Muslim anthropology suggests that man is inherently weak and prone to 
forgetfulness. In the person, there is a tension between competing forces in the body – the 
desiring soul and the rational soul.227 The desiring soul is designed to be incline to the pleasures 
of this life. If one is given over to the desiring soul, he becomes more and more attached to this 
world, and less inclined to remember his Lord. The rational soul, on the other hand, is more 
inclined to pursue knowledge/gnosis (maʿrifa) and further contemplation of Allah. As one directs 
his attention more fully to his Lord, the less his desiring soul clings to this life. Thought of in 
another way, the path to gnosis is an emptying of the self, a shedding of earthly desires. The 
spiritual life is directed toward filling the mind with knowledge of Allah which in turn leads to 
contemplation and love. Sufi doctrine highlights this distinction in man and commends the 
contemplative life. 
 The path to gnosis is a journey that begins in al-dunyā and culminates in al-ākhira when 
one attains the Beatific Vision. Perceived in this way – vision as gnosis – the vision (ru’ya) is a 
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spiritual delight and it is suggested that it far surpasses the physical pleasures of the Garden.228 
Because this vision is spiritual in nature, in Sufi literature, it’s description also possesses certain 
mystical undertones of union and assimilation. Seyyed Nasr, a contemporary Sufi, speaks of the 
union of ecstasy where the “Beloved is contemplated in Her infinite beauty, which consumes the 
beholder.”229 The Beatific Vision, however, raises all sorts of theological and philosophical 
questions; especially if thought of in Ghazālīan/Sufi terms of gnosis, union and assimilation. 
First, there is the ever-immanent tension between Tawḥīd and knowability. If God is radically 
transcendent and unknowable, then how can one know anything about Allah either experientially 
or propositionally? Second, how does reducing the Beatific Vision to gnosis impact the highest 
good of Paradise if vision as gnosis cannot reach him? Third, if the vision is attainable in 
Paradise what is the extent of the union and/or assimilation? Descriptions of the vision in the 
literature, when thought of in these terms, seemingly begins to slowly dissolve the human subject 
until naught but Allah remains. These questions and more will be addressed and discussed 
throughout the remaining chapters. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has covered prevalent paradisal themes in Islam. These salient themes were 
arranged and discussed in a manner that attempted to express the relationality of humanity to 
Paradise as well as humanity to Allah. First, the relationship between this life (al-dunyā) and the 
next (al-ākhira) forms an important dialectic in Islamic eschatology. While in al-dunyā, Muslims 
must live in light of al-ākhira for what is done here on earth impacts the life to come. 
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Furthermore, the pleasures of this life stand in contrast to the coming life. They are but mere 
shadows of what Allah has in store for the inhabitants of Paradise.  
 Second, the theme of sensuality in Paradise considered the relationship of the body to 
nature. Paradise is described as an abundance of the sensual where the rewards are constantly 
and perpetually generating pleasure for the body. In connection to this theme of sensuality, the 
third theme – sexuality and the sacred – it was suggested that within the perpetual acts of 
sexuality in Paradise there is a connection to the sacred. Understood in this way, sexuality and 
the sacral is possibly a moment/location in which the human comes into contact with the Divine. 
 The fourth theme, Paradise as theophany, would support the previous proposition as we 
saw from Frithjof Schuon and his classification of the physical realm of Paradise of an 
ontological class differentiated from the physical in this life. Schuon suggests that Paradise is 
more than a sign/signifier relation to Allah and that Paradise is not the veil but the bride itself. 
Although outside the bounds of traditional Islamic orthodoxy, Schuon is attempting to reconcile 
the two creeds of Tawḥīd and experience of the Divine. 
 Lastly, all of these themes as they were assembled led to the Beatific Vision of Allah, the 
highest and loftiest pleasure in Paradise. Again, the tension between Tawḥīd and experience was 
addressed as the passages about seeing God were addressed. Al-Ghazālī offers a possible via 
media between two extremes – denying the truth of the vision on the one hand and affirming an 
ocular vision of Allah on the other. Both ends of the spectrum are problematic in relation to 
revelation. Ghazālī postulates another way when he limits the vision of Allah to gnosis (already 
given in this life but fully manifested in the next). 
 Vision as Knowledge (Gnosis) leads us into the next chapter where we will examine more 
closely Ghazālī’s thesis. Furthermore, the next chapter will also look at the various components 
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which constitute the culminated vision – knowledge, love and union. The causal relation between 
man and the Divine first begins with the Divine. Love, it is said, derives metaphysically from 
Allah both in creating and in the self-giving of revelation. Gnosis, as man receives it leads to 
love for Allah. As one loves his Lord, in return, his Lord will return that love. Lastly, this 
progression of love-gnosis-love culminates in mystical union in the Beatific Vision in the 
afterlife. 
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CHAPTER 3 – THE ISLAMIC BEATIFIC VISION: GOD’S LOVE FOR MAN AND 
MAN’S LOVE FOR GOD 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter concluded with the discussion of the Beatific Vision in Paradise. 
The Beatific Vision represents the highest level of both attainment and pleasure in Islamic 
Paradise. But, as was also mentioned in the chapter, attaining the Beatific Vision in Paradise 
corresponds to a Muslim’s level of spiritual development in this life. Proximity to Allah in this 
life correlates to the degree of nearness, and thus pleasure and satisfaction, in the life to come. 
Keeping the Beatific Vision in mind, this chapter will discuss the process of spiritual 
development in Islam needed to attain the full vision in Paradise. The process will be examined 
within the Sufi tradition for they submit that only along the mystical path can one achieve such 
illumination. More specifically, the process under examination is that of al-Ghazālī’s design, 
what he calls the ‘science of the afterlife.’ There are two central themes emphasized in the 
process or path – knowledge (or gnosis) and love. Along the path, knowledge of Allah comes 
first which is then followed by love for Allah. As one grows in knowledge of Allah so too does 
love for Him grow. As one grows in love for Allah, s/he will pursue more knowledge and thus 
one follows a path towards greater illumination and greater love. The reciprocating 
knowledge/love cycle brings one nearer and nearer to Allah until that person loves nothing save 
Allah alone. It is in this moment, when love for Allah (and His Prophet) is above all else, that 
Allah then loves his servant. In order to understand how this relation is achieved, we will discuss 
the content and nature of the revelatory knowledge as well as the kind and quality of 
Divine/human love.230 
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 The phrase “God’s love for man” may initially seem a contrary conception of Allah 
common to the Western reader. Seyyed Hossein Nasr believes that this idea of Allah as only a 
God of Justice – but not of Mercy, Compassion, and Love – has been “propagated by certain 
Western scholars and Christian apologists,” and that it is “totally false.”231 Perhaps there is some 
truth in Nasr’s claim of propagation but at the same time it is not as if these assertions were made 
in a vacuum, absent from any Islamic doctrines and teachings. I would submit that the notion of 
Allah as loving is not a prevailing theme in many Sunni Muslim societies.232 This does not mean 
however, that Nasr’s claim is to be ignored or rejected. Many Muslims thinkers and writers, 
especially in the classical period of Islam, emphasized Allah’s love, compassion and mercy. We 
turn now to one such person of this period, Al-Ghazālī, the first Islamic reformer, and his quest 
to revive the ever-important religious and spiritual pursuit of the afterlife. 
Al-Ghazālī: Islam’s First Reformer 
 Having a love for Allah that is above all other loves is the telos of all human creatures. 
Subsequently, love for Allah also leads to a love for His Prophet but the degree of love for the 
latter must not supersede the former. Loving the things of this world, the temporal, finite 
pleasures more than the Divine creates a division wherein one neglects his/her ultimate purpose 
in life. Furthermore, love for earthly things more than Allah will cause a person to miss out on 
                                                      
Garden of Truth through such experiences. We must therefore ask ourselves what love and beauty are in the context 
of Sufism and why the Sufis, who emphasize so much principal and illuminative knowledge, speak so much of love 
and beauty, which are inextricably bound to each other.” Nasr, The Garden of Truth, 60. 
 231 Nasr, Heart of Islam, 205. 
 232 In the preface to a modern Sufi treatise Irshad by Muzaffer Ozak, Seyyed Nasr discusses the causes of the 
decline of Sufi prevalence and influence over the past 200 years. He notes that there are two main causes for the 
attacks against Sufism in the past two centuries; he writes, “Despite the ravages which the events of the past two 
centuries have brought upon the Islamic world and the attack made against Sufism by both the Western oriented 
modernists and the so-called fundamentalists and revivalists, Sufism continues to survive and in fact flourish to this 
day in many parts of the Islamic world…” Muzaffer Ozak, Irshad: Wisdom of a Sufi Master, trans. by Muhtar Holland, 
(New York: Amity House, 1988), ix. 
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the blissful life to come as s/he will not attain the Beatific Vision in Paradise wherein eternal 
felicity resides and may even lead to damnation in hellfire. Love for Allah is the utmost concern 
for the Muslim believer. 
 Possessing a love for Allah above all else is preceded by knowledge of Him. A person 
must know his Lord before one can love and so there is a need for divine revelation and 
disclosure prior to love. In Islam, revelation is given in a number of forms. Classical Islam 
teaches that all of creation is a revelation of Allah, testifying of His many wonderful attributes. 
The vast expanse of the cosmos, this world of ours, the human body, evoke a posture of 
remembrance and reflection.233 These modes of revelation manifest in a general sense, but they 
are not sufficient in producing the type of knowledge needed to elicit a full and abounding love 
for Allah. It is the Qur’ān alone, the special revelation of Allah, wherein one learns the most 
fundamental truth of tawḥīd. But such knowledge, however, exists in gradation in the religious 
subject and, as we will see, the level of spiritual development corresponds to one’s ability to 
internalize tawḥīd. 
 As was mentioned earlier in the study, Al-Ghazālī is a very influential Islamic thinker, 
writer, theologian, philosopher and Sufi.234 The influence and gravitas with which he wrote are 
                                                      
 233 They also serve as evidence that Allah exists. Ozak, Irshad, 31-33. 
 234 The traditional paradigm of al-Ghazālī suggests that he rejected philosophy (falsifa) and rational 
theology (kalām) and spent the latter years working to reconcile Sufism with Muslim orthodoxy. Adherents to this 
paradigm cite that in the latter works of al-Ghazālī’s (namely his autobiography), we receive a more final iteration of 
al-Ghazālī that reflects the conclusions arrived at following his long spiritual/existential journey. The current 
scholarship on al-Ghazālī in the West represents a paradigm shift from the traditional narratives that dominated the 
late 19th and then 20th Centuries. In the 1990’s the shift emerged in the publishing of Richard M. Frank’s Creation 
and the Cosmic System. According to Kenneth Garden, Frank’s work demonstrated that al-Ghazālī’s thoughts on 
cosmology changed from the traditional Ashʿarite occasionalism to a more Avicennian (Neo-Platonic) 
emanationism. (For more detail on this distinction and a synthesis of al-Ghazālī’s view see Garden, The First 
Islamic Reviver, pp. 10ff. and Chs. 3ff.) Al-Ghazālī’s cosmology is only one side of the debate in Ghazālīan studies. 
His work on the religious sciences calls into question his incorporation and the influence of philosophy and Sufi 
practices on his thinking. Currently, the works of such scholars as Frank Griffel, Alexander Treiger, and Binyamin 
Abrahamov, all suggest a prominent role of philosophy in al-Ghazālī’s epistemology and methodology and the 
details of that influence, as well as the role of Sufism in his thought, will be discussed in subsequent sections.  
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so widely felt in the Muslim world that he is often given the moniker, “The Proof of Islam.” It is 
at the convergence of knowledge, love and the afterlife where his thoughts and insight are 
paramount for this study. Frustrated with the religious form of Islam in his day, al-Ghazālī set 
out to reform what he saw as a perversion of the faith from how it was originally practiced in the 
days of the Prophet. The Islamic society of his day, it seemed, had become engulfed in the 
formalities of jurisprudence and kalām. These sub-disciplines were having a terraforming impact 
on the religious sciences – both in thought and perspective. He sensed that the emphasis on the 
afterlife and, more importantly, the attaining of the Beatific Vision had been altogether cast to 
the side, yet for him, and for Islam rightly practiced, it constituted the utmost importance in 
religious life. 
 In order to grasp al-Ghazālī’s contribution to Islamic thought as well as understand his 
patented science of the afterlife, it is beneficial to briefly summarize and examine two of his 
works. First, we will look at his autobiography which tells of his intellectual and existential 
journey through epistemological skepticism and religious crisis. Second, the opening pages of 
the Book of Knowledge – Book 1 of the Revival of the Religious Sciences (Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn) 
highlight the need for revival in Islam and thus orients the reader towards what he sought to 
resolve. Al-Ghazālī’s journey is chronicled in his autobiography entitled The Deliverer from 
Error (al-Munqidh min al- ḍalāl)235 completed in the early months of Fall 500/1106.236 The 
timing of the Deliverer is significant due to the cause for writing, a factor which cannot be 
overlooked. Alexander Treiger notes that al-Ghazālī’s autobiography is written in response to a 
                                                      
 235 There are a number of variant translations to the title al-Munqidh min al- ḍalāl : Rescuer from 
Misguidance, The Deliverer from Error, Deliverance from Error, etc. 
 236 Treiger provides this date and notes that apparently this was the first work written after his return to 
public teaching in Nīshāpūr. Ibid., 14. 
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significant controversy – the Nīshāpūr controversy237 – that arose following the publication of 
the Revival (Iḥyāʾ) and so the Deliverer should be read as an apologetic treatise.238 Al-Ghazālī’s 
pointedness in the Revival did not gain him favor with the religious elite of his day, and the 
Deliverer, in part, is answering certain charges against his methodology in the Revival. Thus, 
certain passages in the Deliverer, especially those in relation to philosophy, must be read 
carefully and in light of the entire corpus of al-Ghazālī’s works.239 
 With that in mind, in the Deliverer we are privy to al-Ghazālī’s journey and how he came 
to resolve his bouts with epistemological skepticism and religious crisis. For al-Ghazālī, 
epistemological doubt was the first obstacle in need of navigation. He went through a period of 
skepticism while on a quest for certainty and thirsted for the ability to “grasp the real meaning of 
things” and not to believe something to be true merely because of religious tradition.240 Al-
                                                      
 237 For more on the Nīshāpūr controversy see Kenneth Garden, “Al-Ghazālī’s Contested Revival: Iḥyāʾ 
ʿulūm al-dīn and its Critics in Khorasan and the Maghrib,” (Doctor of Philosophy, Chicago University, 2005), 
https://www.academia.edu/438972/Al-Ghazalis_Contested_Revival_IhyaUlum_Al-
Dinand_Its_Critics_In_Khorasan_and_the_Maghrib_Morocco_Tunisia_Algeria_Spain_?auto=download  
 
 238 Reading the autobiography in this way influences the hermeneutical framework of its study and analysis 
and scholars such a Treiger have suggested that we must read through some of what al-Ghazālī says in latter works 
and not ignore the rest of his corpus of literature – especially his inclusion of philosophical ideas elsewhere in 
various works (especially the Revival).Treiger defends the thesis (supported by Richard M. Frank) that al-Ghazālī is 
in debt to Avicenna (Ibn Sina) in all his writings (his emphasis). He further states that scholars have identified 
“considerable problems with al-Ghazālī’s presentation of his engagement with philosophy…” which leads him to 
suggest that we take al-Ghazālī’s apologetic comments against philosophy in the Deliverer “with a grain of salt.” 
Alexander Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought: Al-Ghazālī’s theory of mystical cognition and its 
Avicennian foundation, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 3 (especially pts. 1-3). 
 239 Kenneth Garden notes that among al-Ghazālī’s objectives in writing the Deliverer were to “exaggerate 
the totality of his break with his pre-488/1095 life and thought, downplay his extensive debt to philosophy, and 
proclaim his unparalleled religious authority.” Garden, First Islamic Reviver, 170. 
 240 On these pursuits al-Ghazālī writes: “In the bloom of my youth and the prime of my life, from the time I 
reached puberty before I was twenty until now, when I am over fifty, I have constantly been diving daringly into the 
depths of this profound sea and wading into its deep water like a bold man, not like a cautious coward. I would 
penetrate far into every murky mystery, pounce upon every problem, and dash into every mazy difficulty. I would 
scrutinize the creed of every sect and seek to lay bare the secrets of each faction’s teaching with the aim of 
discriminating between the proponent of truth and the advocate of error, and between the faithful follower of 
tradition and the heterodox innovator. I would never take leave…of a philosopher without seeking to become 
acquainted with the essence of his philosophy, or of a mutakallim without endeavoring to discover the aim of his 
discussion and polemic, or of a sufi without eagerly trying to obtain knowledge of the secret of his serenity, or of a 
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Ghazālī searched for an epistemological grounding in sense data and rational data. In a scene 
similar to one that would transpire a few hundred years later with Descartes, sense data and 
rational data are conversant interlocutors on al-Ghazālī’s skeptical shoulders. Sense data came 
under scrutiny first and after thorough reflection, al-Ghazālī determined epistemological 
grounding could not be found in sense data because his soul would not allow him to submit that 
he was safely from error whilst relying on it. The strongest of senses, the eyes organs, are often 
deceived by what is seen (i.e. the movement of shadows, the size of stars, etc.) and the 
knowledge provided through sense-data and judged by the “sense-judge” needs refutation from 
another judge – the “reason-judge.”241 Reliance on sense-data for grounding was thus untenable 
and so he then postulated that perhaps one could rely on rational data and primary truths.242 But 
as he did, sense-data spoke up and questioned the judgment of the rational-judge. Just as the 
rational judge had come along and corrected the perception of the sense-judge and exposed the 
lie, how does the rational judge know that the primary truths, as they are perceived, are true? 
Could there not be another judge beyond perception that could render the untrue verdict for the 
rational judge? To make the point, al-Ghazālī considers dream states and how in the waking, one 
realizes that what was perceived reality was merely a dream, that the dreamer did not know s/he 
                                                      
devout worshiper without looking into the source and substance of his piety, or of an irreligious nihilist without 
attempting to find out his background and motivation in order to become aware of the reasons for his bold 
profession of nihilism and irreligion.” Al-Ghazālī, Deliverer from Error (al-Munqidh min al-Dalal), trans. by R. J. 
McCarthy, (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2004), 54. 
 241 Ibid., 56. 
 242 Al-Ghazālī has certain primary truths in mind: “‘Ten is more than three’, and ‘One and the same thing 
cannot be simultaneously affirmed and denied,’ and ‘One and the same thing cannot be incipient and eternal, 
existent and nonexistent, necessary and impossible.’” Ibid., 56. 
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was dreaming until awoken. It could be the case that our conscious reality is merely a dream that 
we could awaken from at any moment (or at death).243 
 This realization gripped al-Ghazālī and by his own testimony he remained extremely 
skeptical for two months. It is important to note that al-Ghazālī’s “malady,” as he calls it, did not 
impact his adherence to religious doctrine and his skepticism did not carry over into his religious 
beliefs. After a while, he testifies that Allah “cured him of that sickness” and that, “…My soul 
regained its health and equilibrium and once again I accepted the self-evident data of reason and 
relied on them with safety and certainty. But that was not achieved by constructing a proof or 
putting together an argument. On the contrary, it was the effect of a light which God Most High 
cast into my breast. And that light is the key to most knowledge.”244 The last two sentences are 
of paramount import for understanding al-Ghazālī’s epistemology and subsequently his 
methodology of the religious sciences as they introduce the phenomenology of inspiration. 
According to al-Ghazālī, most knowledge or the “unveiling of truth” does not depend on 
“precisely formulated proofs” but from the light which is cast from Allah and anyone who 
believes otherwise has “straightened the broad mercy of God.”245 It is Allah who illumines the 
heart with axiomatic knowledge (or first principles) and divine inspiration. But in his quest, the 
question remained of who were the purveyors of the full truth within Islam and how does one 
prepare the heart for reception? Al-Ghazālī was inclined to believe the categories of those who 
were seeking truth was limited to four: the Mutakallimūm, Bāṭinites, Philosophers, and the 
                                                      
 243 Here, al-Ghazālī cites a tradition of the Prophet saying: “Men are asleep: then after they die they 
awake.” Ibid., 57. 
 244 Ibid., 57. 
 245 Ibid., 57. 
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Sufis.246 He committed to immersing himself in the first three and found both positive and 
negative features within each group. 
 The fourth category of truth seekers he investigated were the Sufis. Of the Sufis, Al-
Ghazālī writes that he knew their particular Way was “consummated [realized] only by 
knowledge and by activity [by the union of theory and practice].”247 He further elucidates that 
the aim of their knowledge is removed obstacles in the soul, ridding it of bad habits and qualities, 
so that a pure and polished heart remained, a heart that is “empty of all save God and adorned 
with the constant remembrance of God.”248 At this point in the narrative, al-Ghazālī notes that 
from his journey into the sciences, through their methods and practice, on the quest for the two 
kinds of knowledges – revealed and rational – he had already acquired a certainty about three 
things: God Most High, in the prophetic mediation of revelation, and the Last Day.249 The 
certainty in these fundamental tenets was not caused by any one specific proof but by a number 
of experiences and circumstances. He found, however, more was needed in order to attain the 
beatific vision in the afterlife. Sufism, he realized, was more than just theory and words, it 
demanded piety and the partaking of experiential states. In order to achieve eternal bliss, he must 
move beyond theory and knowledge and seek to internalize these truths of which he had become 
certain. A personal religious battle was emerging within al-Ghazālī for he was realizing what it 
would take in order to cleanse his heart of worldly attachments.250 His teaching post in Baghdad, 
                                                      
 246 Ibid., 58. 
 247 Ibid., 77. 
 248 Ibid., 77. 
 249 Ibid., 78. 
 250 He writes, “It had already become clear to me that my only hope of attaining beatitude in the afterlife 
lay in piety and restraining my soul from passion. The beginning of all that, I knew, was to sever my heart’s 
attachment to the world by withdrawing from this abode of delusion and turning to the mansion of immortality and 
devoting myself with total ardor to God Most High.” Ibid., 78. 
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one of the most prestigious appointments one could attain, was muddying his heart and building 
up the earthly abode of delusion. He faced a choice, to move beyond theory and into practice, to 
embark on the religious experiential journey that is the Sufi Way. R. J. McCarthy suggests that 
this is a very significant moment in the Ghazālī story, as it represents the beginning of the 
religious crisis al-Ghazālī faced following his epistemological crisis.251 Al-Ghazālī made the 
decision to apply himself to the Way and left his teaching post in Baghdad. He set out for 
Damascus and for the next ten years he committed to solitude, remembrance of God, and 
cleansing of the heart from anything but God Most High. During these ten years, al-Ghazālī 
became and, from that point on, was a Sufi.252 
 For the purposes of this study, a specific question emerges here concerning the 
development of al-Ghazālī’s methodology for knowing during this time. It is clear that he 
considers the Way of the Sufis to be superior for attaining the beatific vision but is it exclusively 
the supreme way to know God? The answer to that question is debated and will be developed 
further in following sections but for now, we can consider al-Ghazālī’s own conclusions 
following this ten-year journey. He writes:  
I knew with certainty that the Sufis are those who uniquely follow the way to God 
Most High, their mode of life is the best of all, their way the most direct of ways, 
and their ethic the purest. Indeed, were one to combine the insight of the 
intellectuals, the wisdom of the wise, and the lore of the scholars versed in the 
mysteries of revelation in order to change a single item of sufi conduct and ethic 
and to replace it with something else better, no way to do so would be found! For 
all their motions and quiescences, exterior and interior, are learned from the light 
                                                      
 251 McCarthy writes: “Al-Ghazālī always had an unshakable belief in the “three fundaments” – even, it 
would seem, during his earlier crisis of skepticism, which was not properly a religious, but rather a psychological 
and epistemological crisis. This may also help to explain what follows. For here we begin the important account of 
the great crisis of al-Ghazālī. This is a religious crisis, a crisis of the spirit, not of the intellect alone: to be or not to 
be a true and wholly committed follower of the way logically consequent on a profound and living faith in the “three 
fundamentals.” McCarthy is the translator of this version of the Deliverer. Ibid., 115 n.168 (footnote appears on pg. 
78). 
 252 Ibid., see pgs. 80ff. 
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of the niche of prophecy. And beyond the light of prophecy there is no light on 
earth from which illumination can be obtained.253 
Whatever conclusions are to be made regarding al-Ghazālī’s methodology, it must include, at 
least in part, the paradigm of Sufism. 
 The second part of our initial inquiry looks at the opening section of the Book of 
Knowledge, Book 1 of the Revival. Al-Ghazālī wrote the Revival of the Religious Sciences (Iḥyāʾ 
ʿulūm al-dīn) for the expressed purpose of reorienting the Muslim community into mindful 
pursuit of the afterlife.254 In essence, al-Ghazālī developed a new religious discipline: the science 
of the afterlife. He believed this discipline to be unknown to his contemporaries but also believed 
this science was not new in the sense that it had been known to the first generations of Muslims 
following the death of the Prophet Muhammad.255 
 In the opening passage of Book 1 of the Iḥyāʾ: The Book of Knowledge (Kitāb al-ʿilm), 
we are given the objective of this massive tome.256 Al-Ghazālī begins the Iḥyāʾ with the 
conventional religious introductions and invocations although the structure of his introduction 
does not fully adhere to mandated conventions of religious writing. The haste with which he 
writes the first three steps of the introduction is a rhetorical device suggesting to the reader that 
his message is so important he has not time for formalities.257 The fourth entry of the 
                                                      
 253 Ibid., 81. 
 254 The science of the afterlife has two branches: the science of the unveiling (ʿilm al-mukāshafa) and the 
science of practice (ʿilm al-muʿāmala). 
 255 Treiger, Inspired Knowledge, 4. 
 256 The objective is the same as has just been previously stated a few paragraphs prior. Here, however, we 
get a glimpse of al-Ghazālī’s specific thoughts regarding the religious climate of his day. Also, another note to 
mention regarding the form of al-Ghazālī’s intro to the Iḥyāʾ, Garden states that the introduction, along with 
detailing the objectives, also gives insight into why al-Ghazālī’s critics respond to him as they do. Garden, “Al-
Ghazālī,” 17. 
 257 On the religious formalities and the cause for controversy see Garden, Ibid., 18-20. Garden notes that 
this break from convention is actually a rhetorical device employed by al-Ghazālī to depict a message given with 
haste: “By rushing through the traditional pious invocations, linking these directly to his mission statement, and 
writing in such a florid style, the author conveys a sense of the urgency of his task. This passage is designed to give 
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introduction begins the cause for writing. A brief analysis of this passage will be helpful for 
understanding not only the purposes of the Iḥyāʾ, but also, I would submit, his life’s work as a 
whole. The fourth entry begins as follows: 
 I hasten to enlighten you who are self-righteous and reject belief, and who 
go too far in your reproach and disapproval. 
 I am no longer obliged to remain silent because the responsibility to speak 
and to  warn you has been imposed on me by your persistent blindness to the true 
state of the divine reality, and your insistence on fostering evil, stirring up 
opposition against anyone who, in order to conform to the dictates of knowledge, 
deviates from custom and the established practice of men. In doing this he fulfils 
God’s prescriptions to purity the self and reform the heart, and thus redeems a life 
that has been dissipated in despair of  remedy and avoids the company of those 
who the Law Giver [Muhammad] described as “The person most severely 
chastised on the day of judgment will be the learned man whom God did not 
afford benefit from his knowledge.”258 
Al-Ghazālī begins his charge, making his distaste known for those who are self-righteous in the 
faith. He feels compelled to write against these people for a number of reasons: first, their 
religious thought and practice has become blind to the original intentions of the faith. Second, 
they are not only leading others astray but actively persecuting (and obstructing) those who resist 
these constructs and pursue the “true dictates of knowledge” thus fulfilling God’s prescriptions 
to purify the heart. In this passage, one can begin to see the opponents al-Ghazālī is challenging 
– the religious scholars (ʿulamāʾ) and their acquisition of knowledge (ʿilm), which, according the 
implications of the cited hadith, will be of no benefit to them in the afterlife. One of the keys to 
                                                      
the impression of near recklessness, as though the author were driven by a mission so imperative that he cannot be 
bothered to observe convention and wait until after the formalities to launch his attack.” Ibid., 19-20. 
 258 Al-Ghazali, The Book of Knowledge (Kitāb al-ʿilm), Book I of The Revival of the Religious Sciences 
(Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn), trans. by Kenneth Honerkamp, (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2015), xl. The section division of 
this passage is influenced by Kenneth Garden who interacts with this passage in the source listed below. Also, it is 
important to note that the hadith reference at the end of the passage is also cause for controversy in the Iḥyāʾ. 
Ghazālī uses many hadith throughout The Revival that are of low grade in terms of authenticity and transmission. 
Garden notes this and also points out that this hadith in particular received the grade of ḍaʿīf “which is to say, 
possibly spurious.” Garden, “Al-Ghazālī,” 22. 
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understanding al-Ghazālī’s aim in the Iḥyāʾ is his conception of ʿilm which can be translated 
either as “knowledge” or “science.” We have already seen that the charge to all Muslims is to 
know himself and to seek knowledge (ʿilm) of his Lord. The questions before us in this section of 
the study and for al-Ghazali in the Iḥyāʾ is “what constitutes ʿilm?”259 
 In the next section, Al-Ghazālī continues his explication of the cause for the Iḥyāʾ. One 
can sense his belief in the imminence of the concern as well as the incensed disposition towards 
the religious scholars (ʿulamāʾ) as leaves no uncertainty as to their identity. He writes: 
 By my life! There is no reason for your persistent disapproval except the 
malady which has become an epidemic among the multitudes. The malady [of 
ignorance] is not discerning the importance of the matter, the gravity of the 
problem, and the seriousness of the crisis. The next life is approaching, the 
present world is vanishing, death is imminent, the journey is far, provisions for 
the journey are scant, the dangers are great, and the road is blocked. The 
perceptive know that only knowledge and works devoted to God avail. 
 With neither guide nor companion, the journey on the road to the next life, 
with its many pitfalls, is difficult and tiring. The guides to the way are the learned 
who are the heirs of the prophets, but our age is void of them, and only the 
superficial remain, and Satan has mastery over most of them. All of them were so 
engrossed in their worldly fortunes that they came to see good as evil and evil as 
good, so that the science of religion disappeared, and the light of guidance was 
extinguished all over the world. They made people imagine that there is no 
knowledge except the formal legal rulings of a government by which judges settle 
disputes when foolish people quarrel; or the ability to debate, which is displayed 
by the vainglorious in order to confuse and refute; or the elaborate and flowery 
language by which the preacher seeks to lure the common people. Apart from 
these three [types of knowledge] they could not find other ways to profit and 
[acquire] the riches of the world.260 
It is interesting to note that alongside al-Ghazālī’s castigation of the religious leaders he also sees 
them as part of the sickness or “malady.” They are both the cause of the epidemic and the 
                                                      
 259 Garden states that this question is the most important and controversial theme of the entire corpus of the 
Iḥyā, “the contestation of what constitutes ʿilm.” Ibid., 22. 
 260 Al-Ghazālī, Book of Knowledge, xl-xli. 
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victims along with the remaining multitudes.261 The malady is “forgetfulness” but not necessarily 
the forgetfulness associated with the call to remember their Lord, rather, it is the ignorance of the 
immanence of the life to come (i.e. not being mindful of ma‘ād or the “going back”). Along with 
the immanence of death and the return, what heightens the concern for al-Ghazālī is the 
challenge of the path one must take in order to return. Again, we see the significance of 
knowledge in this process as he notes that only the kind of knowledge he has in mind and works 
attributed to Allah will avail or attain felicity. 
 Certain guides are needed to lead people along the path that is both far and dangerous but 
al-Ghazālī notes that the world is void of them and with the loss of them so too did the science of 
religion disappear, and the light of guidance extinguish.262 Of course religious guides still 
remained within Islam (that is who al-Ghazālī is writing to), but he believes they are all 
superficial and, even more extreme, that Satan has a hold on them. The identity of the corrupt 
guides comes into view as al-Ghazālī notes that the guides have led the people astray by their 
“legal rulings” (fiqh) and “debating...and elaborate/flowery language” (kalām) by leading the 
multitudes to believe their methodologies are, respectively, the only source for religious 
knowledge. The jurist and the theologians are who al-Ghazālī has in mind and in order to revive 
the religious sciences, “this means,” Garden writes, “wrestling ʿilm from the hands of those 
ʿulamāʾ who have blotted out its true spirit.”263 One can see why Ghazālī faced controversy in 
his time. His clearly manifested charges against the religious leaders of his day was perhaps the 
                                                      
 261 Garden, “Al-Ghazālī,” 24. 
 262 The “science of religion” referenced here refers to what al-Ghazālī identifies as the “science of the 
hereafter.” 
 263 Garden, “Al-Ghazālī,” 26. 
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most significant cause for controversy in his time for in doing so he was essentially challenging 
their faith, wealth, power and influence throughout the Muslim world. 
 In the closing section of his opening statement al-Ghazālī writes: 
 The knowledge of the next life according to which our predecessors 
walked and which God, in His book, called discernment, wisdom, knowledge, 
illumination, light, right guidance, and rectitude, has been quite forgotten. This is 
a calamity in religion and a grave crisis, [so] I considered it an important duty for 
me to compose this book in order to revive the religious sciences, to reveal the 
ways of the early imams, and to clarify the branches of knowledge the prophets 
and predecessors regarded as useful.264 
Al-Ghazālī believes that he has been chosen to revive the all-important religious sciences for the 
way of reform has been shown to him. He does not want to do away with the religious 
methodologies of jurisprudence and kalām-oriented theology; rather, to reorient them and, as 
Garden writes, “subordinate them to what al-Ghazālī calls the “other-worldly science” (ʿilm al-
ākhira).”265 The distinction made here by al-Ghazālī – the “other-worldly” vs “worldly” science 
– likely stems from the same distinction made in Surah 30:6a-7, “…but most people do not 
know; they only know the outer surface of this present life and are heedless of the life to come.” 
Awareness of the life to come is paramount, not only for al-Ghazālī but as evidenced throughout 
the many passages in the Qur’ān warning people to heed the coming judgment. But as al-Ghazālī 
rightly advocates, heeding the coming judgment is only half of the picture, it is not enough to 
merely make it to Paradise. A Muslim should strive for felicity in Paradise which is achieved 
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through the attaining of the Beatific Vision, achieved only after one pursues knowledge of the 
divine in this life. 
The Revival: Preparing the Heart for Inspiration 
 The previous section served to contextualize al-Ghazālī’s thought and prepare the reader 
for his main body of work – the Revival of the Religious Sciences. The Revival is a revival of the 
science of the afterlife, the locus classicus in Islam for attaining practical religious knowledge 
pertaining to the perusal of felicity. For al-Ghazālī, it is imperative that all Muslims pursue 
knowledge of the afterlife, and more specifically knowledge of God.266  
 The science of the afterlife is divided into two categories: the science of proper conduct 
and the science of spiritual unveiling. The former is the means to achieve the latter, that is, the 
former constitutes the path leading to the unveiling. The Revival is an instruction manual, a 
science for how to attain knowledge through the unveiling which in turn leads to felicity in the 
life to come. The role of knowledge in the Revival cannot be understated and the pursuit of 
knowledge is the most excellent of quests but at the same time, it must not be disconnected from 
action. Knowledge and action share a dialectical bond in the Revival. On the one hand, right 
action is needed to purify the heart in order to make it receptive of inspirational knowledge 
(ilham), i.e. unveiling, but, on the other, knowledge of proper action (i.e. ethics) is needed to 
know how to complete the actions of proper conduct. Thus, knowledge is foundational to 
achieving eternal bliss and the pursuit of knowledge the most excellent of virtues.267 According 
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to al-Ghazālī, unveiling is the aim of every saint and of the sincere, and it is toward this aim he 
wished to make accessible, but it is also that case that he does not permit the knowledge of the 
unveiling to be recorded in writing.268 The key to understanding al-Ghazālī’s role in this study 
lies in unlocking the science of the unveiling. Thus, the following questions will be addressed in 
this section: How is unveiling achieved in this life? Which methodology does he employ – 
Sufism or Philosophy – to achieve said phenomenon? What content is revealed in the phenomena 
of unveiling? 
 In order to answer these questions, we must examine the elements of al-Ghazālī’s noetic 
structure. While each element deserves its own section, due to space limitations, they will be 
interspersed into a tandem conversation regarding the methodology of the science of the afterlife. 
The first and fundamental element on his noetics – the heart (qalb) – is the locus of the sciences 
and where both the noetic and methodological discussion begins. Al-Ghazālī believed that the 
most glorious thing about man, separating him from all other creatures, was his capacity and 
aptitude to know God. The heart is the element in man which prepares him for knowledge and 
allows him to receive it for it is the heart, as al-Ghazālī states, “that knows God, and works for 
God, and strives towards God.”269 This conception of heart (qalb) does not refer to the physical 
heart and actually stands in contrast to the physical organ in that it is non-physical and immortal, 
the part of man which endures through death.270 The heart of man is also the seat of desires and 
that which inclines him to either obedience towards God or disobedience. The outward actions of 
                                                      
 268 Ibid., xlv. The reason for the prohibition is complicated and is due to the esoteric nature of what is 
ultimately reveal in the unveiling itself. More will be said about the nature of the unveiling later on but for now if 
one desires to see a list of the content of the unveiling provided by al-Ghazālī see Treiger, Inspired Knowledge, 40-
41. 
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either good or evil, obedience or disobedience and the physical parts which carry them out are 
the either the heart’s light or its darkness.271 It is imperative then that a person search and know 
his heart for the heart is also the place wherein one knows himself, and if one knows himself 
then he knows his Lord.272 Likewise, if one does not know his heart and thus himself, he does 
not know his Lord. 
 For al-Ghazālī, the heart, which he calls the “subtle tenuous substance,” is the real 
essence of man.273 The heart is the part of man that perceives, knows, and experiences and in this 
sense, it is synonymous with the part of man the philosophical tradition calls the rational soul or 
intellect. Such equivalence may cause one to wonder why al-Ghazālī opts for a different element 
to reflect the human intellect rather than traditional philosophical noetics. Treiger suggests that it 
was not al-Ghazālī’s intent to overturn philosophical tradition or to make a more “emotional” 
noetic element; instead, it was an attempt, to “defuse the concept’s philosophical connotations so 
as to make it more palatable to the broader circles of religious scholars.”274 Here, the choice to 
use “heart” demonstrates al-Ghazālī’s sometimes covert methodology in the Revival and a 
glimpse (among many) of his philosophical commitments. 
 Lastly, there is, as Treiger suggests, perhaps another crucial reason al-Ghazālī employs 
the heart as his noetic foundation. He writes, “Because of its religious connotations, the heart, 
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more so than the intellect or the rational soul, is an appropriate meeting point of the two 
dimensions of spiritual life: the ascetic praxis and the mystical theoria.”275 As we have seen and 
will continue to develop further, al-Ghazālī’s science of the afterlife is a combination of the 
sciences of proper conduct and unveiling – praxis and theoria.276 These two sciences converge in 
the heart and this convergence is demonstrated by a powerful analogy of the heart as a mirror, an 
analogy crucial for understanding al-Ghazālī’s science of the afterlife. 
 In the Revival, the science of proper conduct is divided into outward and inward 
knowledge. Outward knowledge is connected to the senses and is subdivided into acts of worship 
and religious custom (Books 1 and 2 of the Revival); whereas, inward knowledge is connected to 
the states of the heart and characteristics of the soul and is subdivided into blameworthy and 
praiseworthy states (Books 3 and 4 of the Revival).277 The heart, being the locus of inward 
knowledge, is where praxis (i.e., ethics) is developed. However, according to al-Ghazālī, the 
heart is also a battleground wherein various internal armies vie for control.278 Al-Ghazālī lists 
three internal armies that are present in the heart – the armies of anger, appetence and 
knowledge.279 These armies have an array of purposes – both internal and external – serving the 
human need to live in this life as well as prepare for the life to come. The first two armies – 
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appetence and anger – belong to the class of armies that “incites and instigates” in order to, as al-
Ghazālī states, “obtain that which is profitable and suitable (i.e., appetence); or to ward off that 
which is harmful and destructive (i.e., anger).”280 The third army, called knowledge or intellect, 
is part of the third class which perceives and gathers information as “spies.”281 Above all, it is 
imperative that the heart gain the assistance of this army for it is “the party of God.”282 The other 
two armies – appetence and anger – are two armies easily given over to Satan and those forces 
will war against the heart if not brought under subjection. This is the plight of many people 
according to al-Ghazālī for their intellection has been forced to devise “stratagems to satisfy the 
appetence,” whereas it should be the other way around, appetence serving the intellect.283  
 At this point, the introduction of the third army highlights another element of al-Ghazālī’s 
noetic structure –intelligence/intellect (ʿaql). According to Al-Ghazālī, the intellect (ʿaql) is “the 
source of knowledge, its point of origin and its foundation; knowledge springs forth from it like 
fruit from a tree, light from the sun, and vision from the eye.”284 In light of al-Ghazālī’s use of 
the term, Treiger suggests the primary interpretation of ʿaql be ‘intelligence’ instead of ‘intellect’ 
as the former denotes the primary rendering of the term as a quality of the heart rather than the 
heart itself. In this sense, ʿaql, as a quality of the heart, is as Treiger describes, a configuration 
“…in virtue of which the heart becomes receptive of intelligible forms.”285 ʿAql (‘intelligence’) 
as a quality or attribute is consistent with al-Ghazālī’s own explanation:  
It [ʿaql] is the attribute that differentiates human beings from all other animals 
and affords them the ability to apprehend the speculative sciences and to organize 
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the subtle rational disciplines. Al-Ḥārith b. Asad al-Muḥāsibī intended this as his 
definition of ‘the intellect’. He said, ‘It is an innate inclination whereby the 
speculative sciences are grasped and understood. It is like a light cast into the 
heart that prepares it thereby to comprehend existent entities’…It is like the innate 
quality present in a mirror that differentiates it from other corporeal bodies and 
gives it the ability to reflect images and colors in a manner unique to each, namely 
its polish or sheen.286 
Al-Ghazālī’s words call us back to the mirror analogy referenced earlier. Al-Ghazālī likens the 
heart to a mirror and in this analogy, if the heart is a mirror, then intelligence is likened to the 
mirror’s polish, or in this case its ability to reflect the knowledge revealed to it. 
 Furthermore, mirrors are prone and susceptible to becoming dirty, and when that does 
happen, it is no longer able to properly reflect the image across from it. A mirror in this condition 
will not functioning properly until it is cleaned and the tarnished removed. In this Ghazālīan 
analogy, the human heart is also susceptible to impurities, the tarnishing of the polished mirror, 
or the subjection of the third army to the others which vie for the heart’s focus and attention. Just 
as a physical mirror ceases to function properly if it is marred and unpolished, so too does the 
heart of man cease to function as it should if it is dark and murky. The darkened, murky heart is 
the heart of the wicked person because a darkened heart cannot remember his Lord and on the 
Day of judgment that person will be cut off from the Lord (cf. Q 83:12-17). The righteous are 
those whose hearts are polished and are ready to receive and reflect the true nature of things, i.e. 
divine inspiration (ilham).287 
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The Way Forward: Mystical Sufism or Theoretical Philosophy? 
 Recognizing the reality of the negative tendencies in the heart, the Revival is al-Ghazālī’s 
attempt to revive the Muslim community away from such harmful propensities. He desired for 
his work to be disseminated to the Muslim community at large. With such a goal in mind, he 
presented certain sciences one way and re-package others in another in order to appeal to the 
masses. One example of his rhetorical methods can be seen in the four-fold division of the 
Revival. The division of sections mirrored the four-fold division of the science of jurisprudence 
(fiqh). Al-Ghazālī did this because many students of his time were interested in jurisprudence 
which, as he observed, had become popular among those who did not fear God. Through forming 
the Revival in such a fashion similar to the books on jurisprudence, he hoped this would be a 
“clever way to win hearts over gradually.”288 It is this sort of re-packaging – form of 
methodology, terminology, etc. – that makes him difficult to label. Nonetheless, as this section 
continues to work through al-Ghazālī’s science of the hereafter, one of the questions that will be 
answered concerns the identification of his methodology within the larger Islamic traditions. 
 In order to address the identity of his methodology, it is important to first briefly establish 
the contexts of both of the sciences al-Ghazālī’s is often identified – Sufism and Philosophy.289 
In his day, Sufism was a practical discipline more than a theoretical one. It was a spiritual 
exercise wherein one molded the self into an ideal form. Kenneth Garden notes that Sufis saw 
the ideal as a “Godly self,” an ideal derived from a hadith often quoted by them: “Acquire the 
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virtues of God.”290 The path to the ideal formed many stations along the way. Garden further 
notes that the most basic of these stations amounted to “scrupulously obeying God’s 
commandments,” and the furthest “to the self’s obliteration in an overwhelming awareness of the 
Divine that breaks down the distinction between knower and known.”291 This latter stage was an 
immersion in God, a loss of self, a type of knowledge of God (maʿrifa), but it was not the 
concern of the Sufis to systematize or theorize these experiences. 
 Islamic philosophy was a robust science in al-Ghazālī’s day. Being influenced by 
Aristotelian, Platonic, and Neo-Platonic philosophy, it had become uniquely Islamic. For the 
Islamic Philosophers, philosophy was not strictly an intellectual exercise. Islamic philosophy 
was very much concern with the practicality of their teaching, and like the Sufis, aimed to 
transform the self in order to attain salvation in the afterlife.292 The most well-known and 
influential Islamic philosopher at that time was Ibn Sīnā (or the Latinized Avicenna). Avicenna 
believed that knowledge of God, the knowledge necessary for salvation, proceeds only from the 
middle terms of syllogisms. The capacity to gain knowledge of the intelligibles is a mental act 
“whereby,” as Dimitri Gutas summarizes, “the human intellect comes into contact with the active 
intellect and receives…‘divine effluence.’”293 
 Sufism and Islamic philosophy shared commonalities in the time of al-Ghazālī. Both 
believed that they were the purveyors of truth and both were practical disciplines seeking to 
perfect the human soul with the goal of a higher knowledge of God.294 However, the ends, and 
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the methods of achieving those ends, differed. Sufis believed that knowledge of God came 
suddenly and was the result of spiritual exercise; whereas the philosopher believed this 
knowledge was achieved through rational inquiry. It is interesting to note that before al-Ghazālī, 
the goal of attaining felicity in Sufism was not prevalent. It existed in some Sufis writings but 
none that al-Ghazālī mentions having read. Felicity in the afterlife was, however, the goal of the 
philosophers but it would seem that their philosophical influences provided a dualistic view of 
the afterlife and thus knowledge and contemplation were the highest goal to attain.295 
 Having this context in the foreground, let us return to al-Ghazālī’s analogy of the heart. 
Al-Ghazālī has demonstrated the need to polish the heart, to remove all of the tarnish, the 
temporal and finite things which hinder it from being proper configured to receive knowledge. In 
the previous discussion concerning al-Ghazālī’s quest through intellectual and religious 
skepticism, it was shown that he considered philosophy and Sufism to be among the four 
disciplines seeking truth. Al-Ghazālī finds the Sufi path of spiritual purification containing the 
necessary methods of cleansing the heart from all impurity, or, as he states, “to lop off the 
obstacles present in the soul and to rid oneself its reprehensible habits and vicious qualities.”296 
This pure, polished and empty heart is ready for the rush of divine wind to remove the veil and 
by Allah’s grace, provide the subject with the light of the divine knowledge of God.297 Before al-
Ghazālī, Sufis were thus inclined towards the knowledge gained through immediate inspiration 
in contrast to that gained by instruction. They did not pursue the study of knowledge nor did they 
concern themselves with discussions about doctrines or proofs. The way to knowledge is through 
ritual and devotion. 
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 For al-Ghazālī, the Sufi practice of purifying the heart was necessary for unveiling but at 
the same time their practices subjected them to many difficulties and perils. First, the heart is by 
nature easily given over to destructive elements. Al-Ghazālī quotes the Prophet here saying that 
“the heart of the believer is more unsteady than a cooking pot as it boils.”298 Experience alone 
cannot sustain the highest state of knowledge because of the confusions found in the heart. All it 
takes is for one impure thought to enter the heart and it will be rendered unpolished. Second, the 
practice of asceticism, the stripping away of all earthly appetites and desires, has a harmful effect 
on the physical body and weakens one’s constitution. If inspiration occurs in this state, one can 
easily become confused, the mind being blurred by lack of nutrition. Third, because the Sufis do 
not pursue learned knowledge (i.e., the sciences and the discussion of doctrine or proofs) and 
philosophy, when they do receive a vision they can succumb to confusions and be trapped in that 
vision for up to twenty years! Lastly, because of the lack of learning the mystical states of 
unveiling can lead the Sufi to make prophetic statements (i.e. ecstatic utterances) that are 
heretical pronouncements of the relation between the knower and the Known.299 The two most 
notable of these utterances were made by al-Ḥallāj (d. 309/922) and al-Bisṭāmī (d. 261/874). 
Following their supposed inspiration and perceived union with God the former declared “I am 
the Truth” and the latter proclaimed “Glory be to Me!”300 Both men were put to death for these 
sayings which were seemingly innocent proclamations of union and worship, albeit, heretical 
claims. 
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 Continuing with this analysis of the Sufi way, al-Ghazālī believes that these problems 
could be avoided if the Sufis also followed a path of learning. He does not wish to correct their 
intentions of polishing the heart or their pursuit of mystical knowledge, both are necessary aims. 
Al-Ghazālī does however suggest that the path of learning (i.e. theoretical knowledge) be 
incorporated into their practice. On the critique of confusion mentioned earlier, he writes that “if 
he [the Sufi] had mastered knowledge beforehand, the point of confusion in his vision would 
have been opened to him at once. To busy one’s self in the path of learning is a surer and easier 
means of attaining the aim.”301 Furthermore, al-Ghazālī expounds on this thought and describes 
the expectations of the Sufis in their quest for knowledge. It is worth quoting him at length as 
this sequence is crucial to understanding his methodology: 
They [Sufis] claim that it is as though a man left off the study of jurisprudence 
(fiqh), asserting, ‘the Prophet did not study it and he became one who understood 
the divine law by means of prophetic and general inspiration without any 
repetition or application, and perhaps discipline of the soul and steadfastness will 
bring me finally to that goal.’ Whoever thinks this, wrongs himself and wastes his 
life. Nay, rather, he is like one who gives up the way of gain through farming, 
hoping to chance upon some treasure. The latter is indeed possible, but extremely 
unlikely. So too [in the matter of gaining knowledge]. They say, ‘It is first of all 
necessary to attain to that which the learned have achieved and to understand 
what they said. Then after that there is no harm in expectantly waiting for that 
which has not been disclosed to the other learned men, and it may be that this will 
be disclosed afterwards through strenuous effort.’302 
Notice the two approaches to divine knowledge highlighted here. The first group supposes the 
model of the Prophet claiming that he received full understanding of the divine law without 
having to develop in the way of jurisprudence. But al-Ghazālī notes that this rarely happens, that 
God’s grace is not commonly bestowed in this manner. The latter option is the one al-Ghazālī 
supports, advocating for it in the chapter from which the quote came. Elsewhere, in the Book of 
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Knowledge, al-Ghazālī advocates the pursuit of learning through deduction, inference and study. 
He cites a story told by Al-Makkī of whom al-Junayd of Baghdad was his teacher: “Then when I 
departed I heard him saying, ‘May God make you a partisan of hadith who is a Sufi, not a Sufi 
who is a partisan of hadith.’ He pointed out that one who acquires hadith and knowledge then 
takes the Sufi path will succeed; while one who takes the Sufi path before acquiring knowledge 
is gambling with his soul.”303 Here we again see the preferred approach of al-Ghazālī in the 
pursuit of divine inspiration – acquire knowledge through learning before pursuing general 
inspiration. 
 In the conclusion to this section on al-Ghazālī’s methodology for acquiring divine 
inspiration, I am highlighting a number of dialectical relations at play in his work: the 
saints/prophets and the learned men, Sufism and Philosophy, inspiration and inference, and the 
few and the many. The first three groups all stand in conceptual relation to one another and 
represent the crux of both tension and confusion in al-Ghazālī’s methodology. Perhaps the main 
challenge in understanding his methodology is in trying to identify it with what has come before. 
Some scholars purport that al-Ghazālī was a Sufi given his propensity towards their ethical 
practices and pursuit of mystical experiences of divine inspiration. Other scholars purport that his 
system was entirely philosophical and not to be confused with Sufism.304 But al-Ghazālī’s 
methodology cannot be confined to what had come before or to any one particular system. Al-
Ghazālī was creating a new way forward, a reformation of sorts, and so the best way to define his 
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methods is through synthesis and new creation.305 The methodology of the religious sciences is 
not purely Sufic or philosophical; rather, philosophy aids the Sufi goal of attaining mystical 
knowledge. I would submit that al-Ghazālī still maintains that higher knowledge (i.e., divine 
inspiration, ilham) is ultimately achieved through Sufi practice but that it must be supplemented 
by philosophical learning or what he calls theoretical knowledge. Polishing one’s heart is of 
utmost concern and allows a more beautiful, albeit mystical, revelation to manifest.306 
 Al-Ghazālī’s revival of the science of the afterlife forever reshaped the Islamic landscape, 
especially in regard to the relation between Sufism and Philosophy. Although his methodology is 
not purely Sufic or Philosophical, his inclusion of both led to a narrowing of the gulf in the 
spectrum between the two in later thought. Before the time of al-Ghazālī, Sufism was more 
practical discipline than theoretical; however, after his time, Sufism became increasingly 
theoretical as practitioners attempted to give rational explanations of their mystical experiences. 
Garden suggests that the rich cosmologies that were developed based upon mystical experiences 
from theoreticians such as al-Arabi, may have been made possible by al-Ghazālī’s innovative 
methodology.307 
                                                      
 305 Concerning the assessment of al-Ghazālī’s methodology Treiger writes, “In conclusion, the science of 
divine disclosure cannot be reduced either to philosophy (Frank’s ‘higher theology’) or Sufism (Dallal): both 
influences are present, and neither is sufficient to explain the science of divine disclosure as a whole. It is the fruit of 
Ghazālī’s own synthesis, in which both philosophical and Sufi elements can be discern. Yet this synthesis is not a 
mere mixture or sum of total disparate elements, but an original creation, which needs to be understood on its own 
terms.” (Italics added for emphasis) Treiger, “The Science of Divine Disclosure,” 98. Kenneth Garden also writes, 
“his [al-Ghazālī] Science of the Hereafter [is understood] not as Sufism by another name, but as a discipline of al-
Ghazālī’s creation, a new synthesis of Sufism and philosophy that is reducible to neither. And it supports a view of 
al-Ghazālī not as an inwardly focused seeker of Truth and salvation, but as an engaged scholar of the hereafter who 
sought to transform the religious landscape of his age, as a deliverer and as a reviver, one of the most successful in 
the history of Islamic thought. Garden, First Islamic Reviver, 176. 
 306 On the relation between the types of knowledge and how they are acquired see al-Ghazālī’s analogy of 
the Byzantine and Chinese murals commissioned by a certain king in Marvels Ch. 9 (esp. pp. 62-3). 
 307 Garden, First Islamic Reviver, 33. 
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 Lastly, there is the dialectic of the few and the many as it relates to the level of human 
spiritual development. Every Muslim adherent finds him- or herself on a path of spiritual 
development in this life. Each person is called to remembrance (dhikr) of Allah and some 
achieve this calling far better than others. The end goal of this remembrance results in divine 
inspiration (ilham), the goal of the process we have been looking at in this chapter so far. For the 
prophet or saint of Islam, this process happens immediately. The winds of divine grace, in an 
instant, rush in and reveal divine knowledge to the heart. But it is important to note that 
inspiration is not reserved to the prophets and saints alone; rather, in al-Ghazālī’s methodology, 
all have the potential to attain to the same spiritual level (i.e., the experience of inspiration) of the 
prophets. This process happens immediately for the saints and prophets but is achieved through 
the spiritual process of the purification of the heart, the methodology al-Ghazālī develops in the 
Revival. This does not mean that every Muslim can become a prophet but that each Muslim can 
reach the state of prophecy wherein the veil of the heart is removed and inspiration floods in. 
Lazarus-Yafeh notes that this aspect of al-Ghazālī’s theory of prophecy ran counter to orthodox 
Islam and was perhaps one of his “most dangerous doctrines.”308 Al-Ghazālī believed that 
achieving the highest stage was the last stage of religious development on earth but that few 
would end up reaching it. 
The Nature of Theological Love in Islam 
 This next section turns to the topic of love in Islam looking both at the relationship 
between God and man as well as the kind and quality of love exhibited by both parties. We begin 
first with man’s love God. 
                                                      
 308 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in Al-Ghazālī, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 
1975), 275. 
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Man’s Love for God 
 Knowledge and love form a reciprocal relationship which moves spirally upwards in 
spiritual progress.309 Knowledge logically precedes love for how can a person love that which is 
not known?310 Now that the process of divine inspiration has been discussed, the study now 
focuses on the other half of the religious equation, that is, love for God. Al-Ghazālī thoroughly 
develops the concept of man’s love for God, most directly in Book 36 of the Iḥyāʾ entitled Love, 
Longing, Intimacy and Contentment.311 
 As with all sections and topics of the Revival, Al-Ghazālī begins his discourse by first 
turning to proof-texts found in the Qur’ān and sacred traditions relating to the topic of love for 
God. Al-Ghazālī notes that within the Muslim community, love of God and His Messenger is an 
obligation and serves a condition of faith (īmān).312 In the hadith of Sahih Muslim, it is stated: 
“No person believes, till I am dearer to him than the members of his household, his wealth and 
the whole of mankind.”313 On the existence of love for God, he first cites “He loves them and 
they love Him” (Q 5:54). In a succinct and relatively terse manner, al-Ghazālī declares that love 
for God must be possible because the Qur’ān affirms its existence. On its existence and 
                                                      
 309 A famous ḥadīth qudsī states the following: “Who seeketh Me findeth Me. Who findeth Me knoweth 
Me. Who knoweth Me loveth Me. Who loveth Me, his I love. Whom I love, him I slay. Whom I slay, him must I 
require. Whom I require, Myself am his requital.” This is a ḥadīth qudsī attributed to ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib. A ḥadīth 
qudsī is distinct from a passage from the Qur’an and a traditional ḥadīth. It is a sacred narration, one in which Allah 
gives to the Prophet through inspiration or dream from which the Prophet conveys to the people. This particular 
passage was cited in Lings, Book of Certainty, 75. 
 310 Lumbard states: “For al-Ghazālī, love must necessarily follow upon knowledge and perception because 
only that which is known and perceived can be loved…” Joseph E. B. Lumbard, Aḥmad al-Ghazālī, Remembrance, 
and the Metaphysics of Love, (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2016), 142. 
 311 Eric Ormsby, the translator of this book, suggests that al-Ghazālī sets out to resolve the seemingly 
paradoxical way of thinking about the notion of reciprocal love between God and man. Al-Ghazālī, Love, Longing, 
Intimacy and Contentment. Book XXXVI of The Revival of the Religious Sciences (Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn), trans. by 
Eric Ormbsby, (Cambridge, U.K.: Islamic Texts Society, 2012), xxxi.  
 312 Ibid., 5. 
 313 Sahih Muslim, Book 1.75, https://sunnah.com/muslim/1 
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possibility al-Ghazālī has little to say beyond this affirmation. He does, however, have much to 
say regarding the nature of said love. 
 Al-Ghazālī’s conception of man’s love for God is described as having a longing for Him 
as the ultimate object worthy of such affection, the Beloved whom is the aim of all earthly 
pursuit. This longing stems from the reality that human creatures lack perfection and are thus in 
search of that which will fulfill what is lacking in their person. God, the ultimate Good, is the 
only being who does not lack in any way and so this sense of love cannot be applied to Him. He 
is, however, the object of this kind of love as love for God in this manner is the pursuit of filling 
what is lacking in our own humanity, and when that which is yearned for is grasped, man 
delights in it.314 This pursuit of filling is also described as a growth of the soul and is the process 
of becoming fully human, achieving the telos of human existence. According to Chittick, “They 
[Al-Ghazālī and others] often call it ‘assuming the character traits of God’ (al-takhalluq bi aklāq 
Allāh).”315 In this manner, love for Allah entails the putting on of God’s attributes, and thus 
closeness to God, as al-Ghazālī states, “lies in attribute rather than in physical location.”316 
 Longing for Allah in a way which manifests itself through a process of spiritual 
development is seemingly synonymous with the multi-leveled concept of jihad or struggle. Jihad 
is undoubtedly a loaded concept, especially in the West, but we need to make the distinction 
between the forms of struggle – inward and outward.317 When considered inwardly, jihad 
                                                      
 314 Al-Ghazālī, Love, 104. 
 315 William Chittick, The Sufi Path of Love – The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi, (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 
1983), 142. Chittick elaborates further, stating, “The philosophical tradition is more explicit about what this entails: 
human beings are called upon to actualize the “deiformity” of their souls’ the Arabic word, ta’alluh, derives from 
the same root as Allah.” 
 316 Al-Ghazālī, Love, 103. 
 317 Morgan also notes that Jihad is sometimes considered the sixth pillar of Islam. Diane Morgan, Essential 
Islam: A Comprehensive Guide to Belief and Practice, (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, ABC-CLIO, 2009), 87. 
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denotes the process and need for man to overcome his feeble-mindedness and spiritual weakness. 
Ozak likens this weakness to coming into this world as a blind man who is born into darkness.318 
The Qur’ān suggests that whoever is blind in this world will be blind in the life to come (cf. Q 
17:72). Overcoming the spiritual blindness is thus of paramount importance in achieving the life 
to come and so jihad against the flesh and longing for that which is lacking in the flesh are 
pursued in tandem accord.319 
 In this sense, love, defined as longing for that which is Good, is consistent with the 
notion of love as eros in Plato’s Symposium.320 At the dinner party, the main setting of the 
Symposium, Socrates recounts his conversation with Diotima, the wise sage, and how, in 
Socrates’s estimation, she provided him with a correct understanding of love. Throughout the 
course of the dialogue between Socrates and Agathon, erōs love emerges as a spirit or daimon 
that guides the subject in the pursuit of the Good (or Beautiful). Now, on the pursuit of the Good, 
one does not have the capacity to immediately perceive the Beautiful. Socrates states that erōs 
typically manifests first in a desire for physical beauty. This is the first rung in the progression of 
                                                      
 318 Ozak, Irshad, 359. 
 319 The Prophet Mohammad was asked by his Companion what was the best deed in Islam. His reply to 
them was “belief in Allah.” When asked to give the second most deed, he said, “Jihad (struggle to the utmost) in the 
cause of Allah.” Sahih Muslim, “Clarifying that Faith in Allah Most High is the Best of Deed,” in The Book of 
Faith. Sahih Muslim, 83, In-book reference: Book 1, Hadith 155, accessed May 4, 2018, 
https://sunnah.com/muslim/1. It is also important to make note of the significance of jihad and the debate regarding 
the superiority between men and angels. It is man’s capacity to overcome his evil propensities that led the 
Ashʿariyya school to consider man as superior over the inferior angels. The Muʿtazilites considered the angles 
superior because they were pure beings without the propensities of weakness and forgetfulness. The Ashʿarites 
argued, however, the God loves those who love him and who demonstrate the love in performing acts of love under 
great difficulties. The angles can only do what is good and therefore do not have to struggle but man has the 
freedom to choose the evil or the good, to love Allah or not. When man overcomes his evil propensities, the 
demonstration of his love is more valuable because he could have done otherwise. Love for God is achieved only 
after man has fought and conquered his inner self, after he chooses God over the world. F. A. Klein, Religion of 
Islam, (originally, London: Kegan Paul, 1906/online Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 65. https://www-taylorfrancis-
com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/books/9781136099465 
 320 This is a classic definition of love going as far back as Socrates as recorded in the Symposium. 
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what has been labeled Diotima’s metaphorical “Ladder of Love.”321 From the love of physical 
beauty, mankind can climb the ladder and ascend the vertical progression of desire leading 
ultimately to the highest rung, the love (erōs) of the Beautiful.322 Erōs is thus a sort of driving 
force that compels the subject towards the perfection which it lacks. 
 If love is the perpetual desire for the good, this provides a causal explanation for human 
action. Irving suggests that Plato believes every action, every desire, everything which man 
strives for is done in pursuit of acquiring the Good or goodness. This being true, it would entail 
that all activity, understood as a desire for the good, is equivalent to saying that erōs is what 
drives human action.323 Socrates would suggest something similar but as Sheffield suggest, he 
does not claim and would not go as far to say that all human desire is erōs; the qualification of 
this perspective that desire is erōs insofar as it is directed towards the good, but this does not 
include all grounding of desires.324 Identifying erōs as the impetus for some, if not all, human 
actions implies that whatever human beings pursue, it is due to the perception that the object of 
their pursuit is good. But we know that perception is not always reality and some objects which 
are perceived to be good are not so. I believe this was the source of both al-Ghazālī’s frustration 
and motivation. The majority of Muslims in his day were pursuing an end that was not aimed at 
the Good, not directed towards Allah. 
                                                      
 321 Thomas L. Cooksey, Plato’s Symposium: A Reader’s Guide, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), 
17. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/10.5040/9781472598394. (Accessed September 14, 2018) 
 322 Diotima’s definition of love “‘Then love,’ she said, ‘may be described generally as the love of the 
everlasting possession of the good for oneself?’ ‘That is most true.’” Plato, Symposium, trans by Robin Waterfield, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 48. 
 
 323 Irving Singer, The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther (Part 1), (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009), 
54.  
 324 Frisbee C. C. Sheffield, Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2007), 54. Doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286775.003.0003, (Accessed 
September 14, 2018). 
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 Longing for Allah is the quintessential component of Islamic religious life. In fact, 
al-Ghazālī purports that longing is necessary for the gnostic pursuing the afterlife. There are 
numerous ways in which this longing can be satisfied and satiated. Al-Ghazālī identifies two 
ways specifically in which longing manifests in human beings and where satisfaction is found in 
God the Beloved – ocular and conceptual longing. The former entails a longing to see the 
Beloved. This longing is not fulfilled in this life; rather, fulfillment in this manner is found in the 
life to come. The highest attainment of Paradise is the Beatific Vision of Allah. In this event the 
ocular longing for God is fulfilled.325 Now, this could not be the only type of fulfillment because 
if one’s longing was satiated in a specific encounter at a specific instance in the afterlife, 
satisfaction would reach a limit. Thus, while the ocular longing is fulfilled in a magnificent way 
in the afterlife is cannot be the extent of that which is longed after. 
 Along with an ocular longing for Allah, al-Ghazālī also identifies a conceptual longing 
for Him. This type of longing has no end, whether in this life of the next. If it did have an end, 
that would entail a full disclosing of Allah to man meaning that man had the ability to fully 
comprehend that which is fundamentally Other, radically transcendent and unknowable. In this 
form of longing, Allah is both being known and yet is concealed. This tension is consistent with 
the idea of longing as the notion of longing entails some form of concealment for if that which is 
longed after is manifested in a real and complete way, longing logically ceases. Elaborating on 
this point, al-Ghazālī writes, “it should be explained that longing is inconceivable except for 
something that is perceptible in one aspect while remaining imperceptible in another.”326 In 
                                                      
 325 It is not at all definitive what this vision will entail or through what means Allah reveals himself. Some 
Muslims scholars affirm that Allah will be visible to the eyes while other affirm that the vision entails a particular 
revelation in the heart. 
326 Al-Ghazālī, Love, 88. 
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Paradise, man will eternally long to continue to contemplate the Beloved. Contemplation as 
pleasure and satisfaction is part of what al-Ghazālī calls the “twin graces” of Paradise, the other 
being divine disclosure.327 
 Disclosure and contemplation as the means of pleasure and satisfaction in Paradise of 
course presupposes that disclosure is a possibility. Al-Ghazālī was aware of this and responds by 
stating: 
Of course, this presupposes that disclosure of that which cannot be disclosed in 
this world will actually be possible [in that world]. Were it not given unstintingly, 
bliss would reach a limit and not be augmented; as it is, that bliss continues 
everlastingly. God’s statement, Their light will shine in front of them and on their 
right, and they will say: ‘Lord, perfect our light for us and forgive us’ [Q 66:8] … 
supports this sense: bliss is the perfection of light notwithstanding any [prior] 
light gained in this world.328 
Al-Ghazālī is correct in his analysis of the relation between bliss and that which is unstintingly 
given. It would seem that satiation and limitation could be reached in the afterlife if these two 
things are true: the afterlife is eternal and infinite in duration and the source of said satisfaction 
and bliss were of finite capacity and resource. Thus, it would further seem that the source of 
human satisfaction in Paradise need to be of unlimited capacity and resource. But that is only one 
part of the consideration. The other considers that which is to be known through disclosure. 
Unending bliss is contingent upon the source’s (or in this case Source’s) ability not only to 
disclose unstintingly and be infinite in nature, but to be able to disclose in the first place. Is it the 
case that discloser of Allah is possible in the next world? Any measure of divine disclosure must 
initiate from the divine subject and subsequently directed to the other. Al-Ghazālī purports that 
                                                      
 327 Ibid., 90. Joseph Lumbard points out that for al-Ghazālī, love and gnosis are the same thing when 
viewed in terms of culminating bliss in the afterlife, in the instance of contemplation. Longing for Allah or having a 
love for Him in this manner is called ʿishq or “passionate love.” Lumbard, “From Ḥubb to ʿIshq,” 383. 
 328 Al-Ghazālī, Love, 91. 
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this disclosure is possible and cites a passage from the Qur’an as support.329 In this passage, the 
believing Muslim petitions Allah to perfect their light where light, in this context, refers to divine 
disclosure. Allah’s light is given to them and provides a fundamental element of eternal bliss. 
 Al-Ghazālī’s conception of man’s love for God is consistent with the eros motif seen in 
Plato but the analysis of al-Ghazālī’s conception cannot overlook the potential mystical influence 
of Neo-Platonic thought. In Plotinus’s philosophical system, the eros motif is the “core,” and the 
most important end for the human creatures is, as Abrahamov points out, “the return of the soul 
to God [or the One].”330 The return of the soul is the third of three stages of the way of man’s 
return to God. For Plotinus those three stages consist of “an ethical stage, then one of knowledge 
and love, leading to the mystical union of the soul with God.”331 The mention of acquiring 
knowledge and love leading to a mystical union echoes of al-Ghazālī’s methodology in the 
Revival. Furthermore, Plotinus suggests that a newly awakened soul is too feeble to bear and 
perceive the Good and must be trained and shaped. He likens this development to a sculpture 
perfecting a statue through cutting, shaping, and of all things, smoothing (polishing?), so that one 
may “glow of beauty” and “see the perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine.”332 
Once the soul sheds all the hinders it from joining to the One, it is at last joined to the One in an 
scene of ecstasy and bliss.333 Al-Ghazālī’s formulation of human love is consistent with the eros 
                                                      
329 “Their light will shine in front of them and on their right, and they will say: ‘Lord, perfect our light for 
you and forgive us’.” (Q 66:8)  
 330 Abrahamov, Divine Love, 4. 
 331 A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1953), 7. 
https://archive.org/details/plotinus032932mbp (Accessed September 14, 2018) 
 332 Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. by Stephen MacKenna, (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 54. 
 333 Consider Plotinus’ words describing this moment: “Thus we have all the vision that may be of Him and 
of ourselves; but it is of a self wrought to splendour, brimmed with the Intellectual light, become that very light, 
pure, buoyant, unburdened, raised to Godhood or, better, knowing its Godhood, all aflame then – but crushed out 
once more if it should take up the discarded burden.” Ibid., 546. 
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motif of Plato and the more mystical emphasis of Plotinus. Abrahamov suggests there is enough 
similarity to suggest the possibility that the Greek philosophical tradition “plays an important 
role in the formulation of Muslim mystical thought on sacred love” while also cautioning to not 
make too certain the causal connection.334 It does seem safe to say, however, that al-Ghazālī was 
influenced by the Greek philosophical tradition but at the same time his version of the eros motif 
is distinct for he remains faithful to Islam by retaining and incorporating Islamic ideas of this 
world and the world to come.335 
God’s Love for Man 
 In relation to al-Ghazālī’s chapters on man’s love for God, he has relatively little to say 
about Allah’s love for man. This is not due to lack of significance; rather, it is simply because 
there is not much to say in terms of description.336 As he is wont to do, al-Ghazālī continues his 
consistent method of appealing first to the Qur’ān and then the sacred traditions.337 Al-Ghazālī 
calls the passages of the Qur’ān which speak of God’s love for man “proof-texts” and since they 
attest to God’s love for man we can know that it exists, “it is no mere metaphor.”338 Even though 
the Qur’ān and traditions speak of God’s love for man as declarative statements with little 
theological content, a theology of Allah’s love for man did develop within Islam. To receive 
Allah’s love is the telos of every Muslim believer because it entails that one has striven and has 
successfully emulated the divine characteristics in his/her own person. 
                                                      
 334 Abrahamov, Divine Love, 40-41 
 335 Ibid., 85-6. 
 336 Ibid., 4. 
 337 Q 5:54; 4:61; 2:222. See also this popular statement from the traditions: “When my servant constantly 
draws near to me by works of supererogation, then do I love him, in once I have started to love him, I’ve become his 
eye by which he sees, his ear by which he hears, and his tongue by which he speaks.” Sahih al-Bukhari 6502, Book 
81, Hadith 91. www.sunnah.com/bukhari/81 Accessed Sept 28, 2017. 
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 Common to his methodology for explaining various in-depth points and distinctions 
relating to knowledge and love, al-Ghazālī provides a helpful analogy for understanding Allah’s 
love for mankind. In this analogy, he tells the story of a king and his servant. In this story there is 
a king who grants a servant access to his court, to be in the king’s presence. The servant has 
many laudable traits and because of this the kings allows the servant to be present in his court at 
any time the servant wishes. Al-Ghazālī suggests that the reason for the king’s actions might 
have been so that he could consult with the servant for advice or to refresh himself by looking at 
him, etc. Whatever the reason was, al-Ghazālī states “It is safe to say that the king loved him; 
this means he inclined to him since his friend had within him some affinity corresponding to 
himself.”339 As the story progresses, the king allows the servant to enter his presence but, in a 
shift of causality, al-Ghazālī then explains, it was not because the king needed the servant or 
sought his aid; rather, it was because the servant had developed a “pleasing manner and laudable 
traits” that he was allowed to draw near and not because of any need the king possessed.340 When 
the veil was lifted and the servant allowed to approach the king, it can be said that the king loved 
the servant and that he (the servant) benefitted greatly by being in the king’s presence. 
 The analogy demonstrates two way in which the king loved the servant. In the first way, 
the king was inclined towards his servant and saw in him the potential of benefitting in some 
way from their relationship. The king inclined towards him because there was something that the 
king needed, some way in which the servant could help the king. Thus, we can say that the king 
lacked something in his own person and assumed it could be found in the servant. In this sense, 
the king loved the servant where love is regarded as a desire for that which is lacking in one’s 
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own person. It is also consistent with al-Ghazālī’s definition of human love.341 The second kind 
of love in this analogy is love as benefaction. By the king allowing the servant to draw near, that 
act denotes a love entailing benefaction on behalf of the king toward the servant. Al-Ghazālī 
explains that this parable of the king and servant only holds true in relation to Allah and Man if 
understood in the second sense, that is, the king allowing the servant to draw near but having no 
need of his assistance. In the loving demonstration of drawing near, one must not assume any 
movement on the part of Allah towards man. Allah does not incline towards man out of any need 
or want and there is no alteration or distinction in Him when man is allowed to draw near. Man is 
granted nearness to Allah contingently, upon his first drawing near to Allah and removing from 
his person those lower, beastly, and carnal tendencies which mark mankind’s disposition. Only 
after a man develops his character favorably, that is, emulate the divine traits, is he allowed to 
draw near to Allah. Allah’s love for mankind can be thought of directionally but only in the 
sense of man’s movement towards Him and not the other way around. Furthermore, Allah’s love 
for man lies in His lifting the veil which in doing so causes man to draw even nearer to Him and 
experience the divine reality on a much deeper level. In this sense, Allah’s love can be thought of 
as benefaction similar to the kind of love that was first demonstrated in creation. Out of His 
mercy and grace, Allah provides man with the capacities necessary to achieve his established 
telos – proximity to Allah. As a point of clarity, Al-Ghazālī cogently summarizes the distinction 
of loves between and from both God and man in the following statement: 
 So then, God’s love for man lies in His drawing him near, and out of 
himself, by warding off distractions and sins and in purifying his inmost nature 
from the spots of this world and in lifting the veil from his heart until he eyes Him 
as though he saw Him with his very heart. 
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 Man’s love for God lies in his inclination to seize this absent perfection 
which he lacks. He yearns for what he lacks; whenever he grasps some part of it, 
he delights therein. Love in this sense is unthinkable for God.342 
In short, love in Islam between Allah and man can be simplistically described as the process of 
drawing near (man) and allowing man to draw near (Allah). 
 In this process of love given and received, a sequential pattern emerges. Love 
metaphysically begins with Allah. He is the causal first mover and displays benefaction towards 
man by bestowing upon him special physical and cognitive capacities. Also, it would seem that 
the self-disclosure of Allah through special revelation is a further act of benefaction. If man is to 
draw near to Allah through emulating the divine traits, he must be granted epistemic access to 
them. Next in the sequence, man has a moral responsibility to love Allah, this being done 
through the spiritual processes discussed throughout this chapter. Once man becomes favorable 
in the sight of Allah, He then grants special access to the divine through divine disclosure 
(ilham). This second phase of God’s love is seemingly similar to the first in that the subject is 
shown benefaction from Allah in that he has the capacity to and may partake in the divine 
pleasure of Allah bestowed on those who first incline to Him. The difference, however, between 
the two instances of benefaction is that the first is given freely and without contingency whereas 
the second act of benefaction is conditioned up man’s prior action, that is, contingently directed 
towards those who first love Him.  
 Abrahamov puts forward an interesting designation for this love as benefaction. He 
observes that when discussing man’s love for God in Islam, one realizes that Allah is the 
ultimate cause of man’s love for God in that Allah has given man the capacity to do so. This 
ability has been given because Allah is merciful and graceful in provision. Abrahamov states that 
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this kind of love from Allah is “a notion reminiscent of the agape motif.”343 This designation is 
significant for a number of reasons. First, he casually makes this suggestion at the conclusion of 
one of the sub-sections without developing the notion any further, leaving the reader to decide 
what is meant by the statement. Second, it would seem that if this is truly a reminiscent notion, it 
would be worthy of further explanation due to its categorical distinction from eros and its 
common designation of the love of the gods. Third, it is uncertain which context of agape 
Abrahamov has in mind here. His analysis of al-Ghazālī’s conception of eros was in relation to 
the Platonic and Neo-Platonic contexts and so perhaps he has in mind an agape love relative to a 
Greek conception. If this is so, agape in the Greek context is relatively shallow in meaning and 
there is scant material in the extant literature to provide a robust understanding of the term and to 
strongly distinguish it from the other usages of love – eros and phileō.344 There is however, some 
nuance in the usage of eros and agape worth noting in this context. According to Quell and 
Stauffer, agape love must often be translated “‘to show love’; it is a giving, active love on the 
other’s behalf,” whereas, eros “seeks in others the fulfillment of its own life’s hunger.”345 These 
two definitions are consistent with al-Ghazālī’s distinction between man’s love for God as 
longing and God’s love for man as benefaction; however, the use of agape to describe 
benefaction could possibly be misunderstood if the reader thinks there is any more nuance in the 
term than this simple definition. That the reader would have a more nuanced understanding is 
because the notion of agape love took on a more robust definition and significance when it was 
                                                      
 343 Abrahamov, Divine Love, 84. 
344 On the Greek use and nuance of agape, Quell and Stauffer note, “The examples of ἀγάπη thus far 
adduced are few in number, and in many cases doubtful or hard to date.” G. Quell and E. Stauffer, ἀγαπάω, ἀγάπη, 
ἀγαπητός, G. Kittel, G. W. Bromiley, & G. Friedrich (Eds.), Theological dictionary of the New Testament (electronic 
ed., Vol. 1, p. 37). Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. 
345 Ibid. 
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adopted by New Testament authors to describe the love that the Triune God has for mankind. If 
Abrahamov has in mind the usage of agape in pre-Biblical Greek, this would be consistent a 
consistent usage of agape in relation to Allah’s benefaction. However, he must not imply any 
more significance to agape than this basic definition. Anything beyond this understanding, any 
inclusion of New Testament nuance is unwarranted. That this is so will be demonstrated in the 
following section concerning the object of Allah’s love. 
The Object of God’s Love  
 We have seen that Allah’s love for man is described as kind of benefaction, given to 
mankind when He allows nearness and proximity. But there is still an important component of 
God’s love yet to be discuss, that is, the object of His love. In al-Ghazālī’s analogy of the king 
and servant, the servant is shown a kind of love in the form of benefaction, but the analogy fails 
to demonstrate the true object of the king’s, in this case Allah’s, love. Any consideration of 
Allah’s love must be understood in concert with the doctrine of tawḥīd, the most fundamental 
Islamic statement concerning God’ ontology. Tawḥīd, when applied to Allah’s nature, denotes 
unicity within Himself and dissimilarity towards the other, that is, there is no distinction within 
Allah’s essence and He radically transcendent and wholly other-than creation. 
 In order to understand the significance of tawḥīd in relation to love, especially its object, 
let us approach the subject indirectly and begin from the human perspective of spiritual 
progression as it relates to mankind’s internalization of tawḥīd. Al-Ghazālī likens the doctrine of 
tawḥīd or unity as a jewel that is enclosed by layers of husks. Each layer forms a gradation of 
tawḥīd and spiritual progress is measured in terms of one’s ability to uncover the layers of 
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tawḥīd until the last stage, the jewel, is illuminated and internalized.346 The first husk of tawḥīd, 
the outer layer, is to pronounce with your mouth the first pillar of Islam, “There is no god but 
God (lā ilāha illa-Llāh).” Proclaiming that Allah is One stands over and against any conception 
of a trinitarian deity; however, this pronouncement is the outer layer because, as al-Ghazālī 
points out, these words can be mere lip service or even be uttered by a hypocrite.347 The second 
husk moves inward and considers the internal state of the person. Here, the pronouncement of 
tawḥīd is in direct correspondence to the belief in divine unity. In this state, al-Ghazālī writes, 
“there is not within the heart the least contradiction or denial of understanding this attestation; on 
the contrary, the exterior of the heart envelops its conviction and affirms its veracity.”348 The 
third level is the jewel of tawḥīd and the heart of the matter – both in location within the heart 
and the nature of reality. For al-Ghazālī, the third level is reached when a person realizes that 
everything arises from Allah and from Him alone, that he is the only Real and Absolute.349 This 
realization arises in the polished heart and marks the final stages of spiritual progression – a 
union of love and knowledge.350 Moore labels this process a “transformation” wherein there is a 
                                                      
 346 Fadlou Shehadi describes this process as a progression through three phases: qurb (likeness), subjective 
tawḥīd, and objective tawḥīd. Shehadi, Ghazālī’s Unique Unknowable God, 32-3. 
 347 Al-Ghazālī, Book of Knowledge, 92. 
 348 He also notes that this is the husk guarded by the dialectical theologians who guard it against innovation 
and perversion. Ibid. Shehadi calls this phase “Subjective tawḥīd.” In this phase the subject shuts off all other 
attention to anything that his not-God. Shehadi, Ghazālī’s Unique Unknowable God, 33. 
 349 On the third husk, al-Ghazālī writes, “The one who attests to unity is one who perceives naught but the 
One (al-wāḥid), the Absolute Truth (al-Ḥaqq). He directs his face only to Him, and he exemplifies God’s words, 
Say, ‘God [revealed it].’ Then leave them in their [empty] discourse, amusing themselves [Q6:91]. The intended 
meaning here is not the utterance of the tongue; the tongue is but an interpreter, truthful at times, lying at others. The 
locality for the vision of God only [comes] from where the interpretation arises, and that is the heart, the repository 
of unity and its source.” Al-Ghazālī, Book of Knowledge, 93-94. This is the phase which Shehadi calls, “Objective 
tawḥīd.” In this phase, Shehadi states that the subject comes to understand objective reality, he writes, “the mystic 
attains an intuitive perspective from which he sees that there is naught in existence except Allah.” Shehadi, 
Ghazālī’s Unique Unknowable God, 33. 
 350 Lumbard notes that this is the culminating stage in man’s love for God, the transition from ḥubb to 
ʿishq, a longing to a passionate longing, an infatuation of sorts where all else is naught except Allah. Here, the heart 
longs for nothing else but Allah, its allegiance is not divided in any way purged of any longings for this world. He 
goes on further to point out that for al-Ghazālī this kind of love and gnosis culminate in a unity, that following the 
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shift in focus from “individual consciousness to the greater ‘cosmic’ consciousness,” or in the 
case of certain Sufi practices, “to be annihilated from our effective ego-self and allow God, Who 
Alone exists, to be experientially realized in His singular existence.”351 That a person should 
pursue such a level of internalization is imperative not only because it is merely the highest level 
of spiritual attainment, but also because it is the most fundamental truth of reality, revealing the 
ontological nature of the Real and the non-real.352 
 The jewel of tawḥīd, that there is none but Allah, that He alone is the truly Real, directs 
the object of Allah’s love. From the perspective of man, Allah alone is the Real and everything 
arises from Him, or, as Ormsby writes, “the more plainly he [man] sees that behind all his 
actions, it is God, and God alone who acts.”353 From the perspective of Allah, however, this 
means that He has no view of anything else other than Himself. Al-Ghazālī states this point more 
strongly, writing, “God has no view of anything other than Himself as being other than 
Himself.”354 It seems as if al-Ghazālī is here making the claim that Allah does not see anything 
other than Himself because there is no other being than Himself. He goes on to write,  
He [Allah] only sees His own essence and His own acts exclusively since nothing 
exists except His essence and his acts. For this reason, the master Abū Sa'īd al-
Mīhanī said, when God's statement ‘He loves them and they love Him’ was 
recited to him, ‘In truth He loves them for He loves only Himself,’ meaning that 
God is all and that there is nothing in existence other than God. For he who loves 
himself, his own actions and his own creations, does not pass beyond his own 
essence in his love nor the consequences issuing from his essence, inasmuch as 
                                                      
attaining of this knowledge – the kernel (jewel) – love (‘ishq) necessarily follows. Lumbard, “From Ḥubb to ʿIshq,” 
382. 
 351 Daniel Abdal-Hayy Moore, “Dhikr, a Door that When Knocked, Opens: An Essay on the Remembrance 
of God,” in Voices of Islam, Vol. 2 Voices of the Spirit, ed. by Vincent J. Cornell, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 
2007), 55. 
 352 For further explanation of the relationship of the Real and creation, see Chittick, “Ambiguity,” esp. p 67. 
 353 Ormsby in the introduction of Al-Ghazālī, Love, xxxi. 
 354 Ibid., 101-2.  
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they stand in a nexus with his essence. It is in this way therefore that He loves 
only Himself.355 
Statements such as this have led to the suggestion that the doctrine of tawḥīd taken to its logical 
conclusion results in a form of pantheism in which all that exists is merely an extension of Allah 
although Skellie believes that al-Ghazālī protects against this heresy which emerges within 
extreme forms of Sufism.356 Ontological considerations notwithstanding, Allah having nothing in 
view other than His self and His acts, one must consistently say that the only object of God’s 
love is Himself alone. Furthermore, it would seem then that if everything derives from Allah – 
love included – then the love which human creatures have for God is really God loving Himself. 
Joseph Lumbard suggests this, stating it accordingly, “every love, every inclination and every 
delight is for God and from God. The five stages of man’s love for God are thus five ways in 
which God loves Himself through the love of His servants for Him.”357 The notion of divine self-
love, however, does not come from the Qur’ān directly and according to J. N. Bell is a later 
development within classical Islam through the influenced of Neoplatonic thought.358 Although 
not deriving specifically from the Qur’ān, the notion of self-love is entirely consistent with 
tawḥīdic Allah. We know that love existed prior to creation because it is one of the 99 names of 
Allah (al-Wadud) and thus we can deduce that Allah demonstrated self-love sans creation as 
there was naught but Him in existence. This also follows because there is no differentiation 
within His divine essence and there can be no change relating to creation – love, if it existed 
prior to creation must have been self-love. While discussing Allah’s self-love, Bell highlights the 
                                                      
 355 Ibid. 
 356 Walter James Skellie, Translator’s introduction in Al-Ghazālī, Marvels of the Heart, xiv. 
 357 Lumbard, “From Ḥubb to ʿIshq,” 384.  
358 J. N. Bell, Love Theory in Later Hanbalite Islam, (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1979), 71. 
http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=7444&site
=ehost-live&scope=site. (Accessed September 22, 2018) 
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words of the Sufi poet al-Daylamī (d. 11th Century) in which he makes an outright, unequivocal 
pronouncement on the matter:  
God has never ceased to be described with love (mahabba), which is an attribute 
subsisting in him. In his pre-eternity he considered himself for himself and in 
himself (or "by himself": bi-nafsihi) and he was conscious of (wajid) himself for 
himself and in himself. Thus he loved himself for himself and in himself, and 
there were there lover, beloved, and love, one thing without division, for he is 
pure unity ('ayn al-ahadiya), and in unity two things cannot coexist.359 
In this quote one cannot help but notice the three-fold distinction of lover, beloved and love and 
be reminded of the same Augustinian formulation regarding the Trinity. It is important to 
distinguish though that when applied to Allah, He is all three – lover, beloved, and love – at 
once. Allah is the lover, the beloved, and love all in one, demonstrating a hyper-reflexive, self-
reciprocating, inward-focused love. Bell further notes that for al-Daylami, this same original love 
is what appears, albeit indirectly, in the world of contingency.360 This view is consistent with al-
Ghazālī’s conception of Allah’s self-love as well as how His love manifests towards creation. 
Bell’s use of indirectly to describe Allah’s love is significant and only begins to capture the non-
reciprocating love of Allah for man. Allah does not desire anything other than Himself and sees 
none other than His essence, will and acts. In this way, the object of Allah’s love is the Self; He 
only sees Himself and not the other. Insofar as a human creature loves those same attributes and 
acts, and when Allah sees enough of Himself in a human person, then he or she is allowed to 
draw near so that Allah can love and admire Himself as he sees His attributes and acts reflected 
in that person. The telos, then, of every Muslim believer is to become a mirror in which Allah 
                                                      
359 Ibid., 72. 
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141
sees His reflection and is subsequently allowed to come closer so that Allah may continuously 
love and admire Himself in that mirror.361 
 Allah’s love for man must first be understood within the context of the object of His love 
– the Divine self – and only then can one begin to understand the nature of His love for mankind. 
Love as benefaction is a bit misleading because one can wrongly assume that this benefaction is 
a primary concern for Allah. Allah’s love for man is causally indirect, disinterested, radically 
removed, a bi-product and after thought deriving from loving the Self as ultimate. Allah’s love 
for man may be some form of benefaction but in the same breath, it must also be said that human 
creatures are in no way the object of His love. In fact, it seems metaphysically consistent to say 
that they cannot be the object of His love for how could love for the other arise in such radical 
unicity? There can be no movement, no descent down towards the other-than God.362  
 Following this conclusion, that Allah’s love for man is disconnected, disinterested love, 
one question that naturally arises is how does this impact the pleasure of Paradise? What then 
can be expected in terms of knowledge and love as it relates to the Divine-human relationship in 
                                                      
 361 This is consistent with Moore’s analysis. He writes, “What a mystery, but not a mystery! Why have we 
been created in a manifest universe if not by Him Who created us to become vehicles to reflect Him back to 
Himself? He says in a hadith Qudsi, ‘I created the creation in order to be known.’ We are not one with Allah, but we 
are not separate from Him either. ‘The whole universe cannot contain Me, but the heart of the believer can contain 
Me.’…What separates us from Him is His utter transcendence of this entire known and unknown cosmos.” Italics 
added for emphasis. Moore, “Dhikr,” 65-6. It should be noted that this hadith qudsi, while being cited in Sufi texts 
often, does not appear in any of the canonical hadith traditions. Lumbard, “From Ḥubb to ʿIshq,” 350 fn. 18. 
 362 At this juncture, Nygren’s descriptions of Plotinus’ conception of God is interesting, he writes: “It is 
fundamental to Plotinus’ thought of God that the Divine is self-sufficient and never issues forth from its sublime 
repose. Any suggestion of a spontaneous coming down is out of the question here. In harmony with this – lastly – 
there is the fact that the Descent, in so far as it is a reality, means not an act of Divine condescension, but the Fall of 
the soul into sin and guilt. Anyone who descends to a lower level always does so involuntarily, according to 
Plotinus; and that is a proof of weakness and of an inability to maintain the higher position. It is consequently 
unthinkable that the Divine Being should ever really descend.” Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1953), 197. In this quote Nygren does not make the connection to Islam that is being suggested 
but it is interesting to note the other al-Ghazālīan similarities to Neo-Platonism and wonder if perhaps he was 
influenced by Plotinus’ conception of descent and ascent as well as the notion of love as longing. 
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the Beatific Vision? Ormsby’s summation of the relation between love and knowledge in al-
Ghazālī’s thought is beneficial, he writes: 
Nevertheless, the love of God, as presented here, is a love the ultimate purpose of 
which is an ever-deepening knowledge of the divine; and in fact, for all Ghazali’s 
recourse to the well-established terms and figures of amatory discourse, these 
betoken knowledge of God as much as love of Him. When he speaks of 
“intimacy” with God, this denotes not “union” but something more akin to an 
unending exploration of the mystery of God, an infinite foray into the 
unknowable. The reciprocity lies in the search itself, in the divine summons to the 
search. If there is “jubilance and gladness” in this intimacy, that is not only 
because of “nearness to God”, but because that intimacy involves an incessant 
unveiling, a progression of epiphanies, rather than some final absorption into the 
godhead. If knowledge and love seem virtually indistinguishable at this ultimate 
stage, that is perhaps because they are mutually transfiguring. Love, in the end, is 
a matter of passionate cognition.363 
The Beatific Vision, as Ormsby states, is a fusion of knowledge and love, a final culmination of 
the quest through the science of the afterlife which was al-Ghazālī’s motivation and intention. 
For those who are drawn near in Paradise, love from God will be demonstrated through the 
giving of ‘incessant unveiling,’ a never-ending self-revelation. But notice that the reciprocity 
between God and man is indirect, and one-sided. Yes, there is a divine summons to partake in 
this unending foray into the unknowable, but it is still indirect benefaction on Allah’s part, it 
must be. Intimacy and love in this context, it would seem, is grounded in attaining propositional 
knowledge and the ever-recursive sublimity resulting from such revelation. To suggest any 
further degree of intimacy would infringe on the doctrine of tawḥīd, yet one does sense that for 
al-Ghazālī, there is an experiential intimacy that comes from such interaction that transcends 
knowledge and sublimity but it is at this point one must refrain from inquiry and default to the 
famous Ashʿarī principle of bi-lā kayf “without asking how.”364 
                                                      
 363 Italics added for emphasis. From Ormsby’s introduction in Al-Ghazālī, Love, xxxii. 
 364 Lange, paradise and Hell, 182. 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed the nature of love in Islam as it pertains to God’s love for man 
and man’s love for God. Within this framework, the two main themes of knowledge and love 
emerge. The telos of humanity being nearness in proximity to Allah in the afterlife, knowledge 
of God and the subsequent love for Him are paramount for attaining such ends. Knowledge and 
love were discussed within the framework of al-Ghazālī’s thought and more specifically within 
his massive tome Revival of the Religious Sciences. Al-Ghazālī set out to reform the Islam of his 
day as its leaders, both spiritual and civil, had become too focused on and concerned with this 
life and had neglected the life to come. In the Revival, we saw al-Ghazālī’s development of how 
one can attain divine inspiration (ilham) the level of spiritual development in this life which 
leads to the Beatific Vision in the life to come. There is a current debate concerning al-Ghazālī’s 
methodology and the systems he employs within his body of work. Al-Ghazālī can be difficult to 
label due to his common practice of using terminology of certain groups in his own way. The 
modern consensus is that al-Ghazālī’s methodology was not wholly Sufi or not entirely 
philosophical but a combination of the two, a new synthesis of thought. Sufism serves as ethical 
and practical framework for polishing the heart whereas philosophy serves to prepare the heart 
contextually for inspiration and to guide and correct the heart when it receives, digests, and 
interprets said revelation. 
 Love is also another integral theme in this chapter. It was shown that in Islam, man’s love 
for God is primarily that of longing for that which the human person lacks (i.e. the perfection 
that is Allah). Love as longing is consistent with the Platonic and Neo-Platonic conception of 
love as eros, an influence al-Ghazālī likely received following his interaction with Muslim 
philosophical in that time. Also consistent with Neo-Platonic thought is the notion of self-love as 
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it pertains to the kind of love God has. As a perfect being who lacks in nothing, love, if it exists 
within the divine, is directed inward to the Self, as the highest object deserving of love. This kind 
of love is reflexive, ever-turning in upon itself in a radical reciprocity. Within this context, 
Allah’s love for man emerges as a type of benefaction in that man is allowed to draw near in 
close proximity and enjoy (benefit from) the bliss of contemplating the eternally emanating God. 
But Allah’s love in the context of relationality remains directed inward to the Self and love for 
man is derivative and secondary, a bi-product of Allah’s Self-love that enjoys seeing His 
attributes reflected in mankind. 
 In the next chapter the study turns to the Christian tradition and will discuss the same 
paradigm – the nature of God’s love for man and correspondingly Man’s love for God. Within 
this context, the same themes of knowledge and love will be interacted with as they are 
inevitably inter-linked. Furthermore, we will see how knowledge and love relate to the human 
experience of the afterlife and if there is a qualitative distinction within Christian conceptions of 
Heaven. 
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CHAPTER 4 – THE CHRISTIAN BEATIFIC VISION: GOD’S LOVE FOR MAN AND 
MAN’S LOVE FOR GOD 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, we now shift to a Christian context and consideration of the themes being 
examined in this study – the beatific vision, knowledge of God, God’s love for man and man’s 
love for God. Like Islam, Christianity affirms that God is the highest/ultimate Good and is the 
chief end of man. As was mentioned in the opening chapter, space does not allow for an overly 
thorough treatment of the nature of the Christian doctrine of heaven. Christian conceptions of 
heaven occupy a broad spectrum of thought – both biblical and imaginative, egocentric and 
theocentric, etc. In the opening section of the chapter, the discussion of heaven will focus on 
fundamental features of heaven particularly pertaining to the nature of this study. Nevertheless, 
the central focus of the chapter will be a theocentric view of heaven consistent with the 
corresponding theocentric Islamic view – the beatific vision of God. Following the discussion of 
heaven, the chapter will then examine the nature of God’s love sans creation, as it eternally 
existed in the triune relation of the three persons in the Godhead. Here, the question of how love 
is to be understood in terms of passages in Scripture which state that “God is Love” is 
examined.365 Is love part of God’s divine essence, and, if it is, do human beings have epistemic 
and experiential access to that aspect of God? Furthermore, the chapter will then follow a similar 
format as the previous chapter in which the themes of God’s love for man, knowledge of God, 
and subsequently man’s love for God are considered. 
 
 
                                                      
 365 1 John 4:8. 
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Heaven: A Theocentric View 
 There are many various conceptions within the Christian tradition regarding what heaven 
will be like. As such, the doctrine of heaven has not been, in any way, a monolithic doctrine 
within Christianity. A historical study of the doctrine of heaven reveals many different 
conceptions of the life to come, each influenced by theological and cultural trends of the day. 
Plato and Aristotle, early church persecution, Benedictine monasticism, Medieval Scholasticism, 
the Reformation, Victorian era Romanticism, the Enlightenment and Religious skepticism, as 
well as art, poetry, literature, agrarian and urbanized communities have all made their mark on 
the doctrine of heaven.366 In this way, the historical study of heaven is also a history of Christian 
thought from the inception of the church to modern day. Out of this history emerge two 
prevailing themes of which all views ascribe – theocentrism or anthropocentrism. The former, a 
theocentric view of heaven, places God at the center of the heavenly experience. Here, the 
beatific vision of God, or often known as the beatific knowledge of God, is the highest form of 
human happiness and bliss. This view is often, but not necessarily, linked with some form of 
Platonic or Aristotelian philosophical presuppositions. While the philosophical influence does 
not need to be rejected a priori and is beneficial in many areas, at the same time, there seems to 
be theological compromises in others for the sake of the philosophical position. The thought of 
Thomas Aquinas is one such system which falls within this classification – of both theological 
and philosophical compromise – and is worth examining in the pages to follow.367 The second 
                                                      
 366 For a very detailed and thorough history of heaven see Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang’s 
Heaven: A History. For a concise summation of the book’s central themes, see the last chapter “Paradise Found: 
Themes and Variations.” pp. 353-358. 
 367 Aquinas does fall in line with the Aristotelian tradition but it should also be noted that Aquinas’s 
influence is based largely through the Augustinian medium. Both Augustine and Aquinas incorporate Aristotelian 
philosophy into their theological systems with the former theologian/philosopher having a large influence on the 
latter. The Augustinian influence on Aquinas has been well-documented and there is no doubt that the Aristotelian 
influence on Aquinas is dependent upon Augustine’s thought; however, the reason for focusing largely on Aquinas 
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part of this section will consider the felt effects of Modernist and Enlightenment thinking on the 
doctrine of heaven and how this influence created the need for a Christian reformation of heaven 
in recent years. Lastly, I will submit that recent discussions of heaven which focus on the 
centrality of the resurrection and the restoration of all things, is the healthiest way forward for 
Christians contemplating heaven. 
The Medieval Renaissance 
 In Heaven: A History, McDannell and Lang note there were three new cultural shifts in 
the Medieval period that gave shape to the concept of heaven: the city, the intellect, and love.368 
The increase of urbanization during this period gave rise to the emphasis of heaven as a great 
city, the new Jerusalem, a move that shifted away from the more agrarian conceptions of heaven. 
The theme of heavenly love in this period is linked to the increase in the male-female 
relationships of courtly love. Tales of knights in pursuit of lovely ladies inspired a more 
passionate conception of marriage as opposed to the more contractual nature of many courtly 
marriages. Furthermore, the scholastic depictions of heaven, which will be considered in a 
moment, were often seen as cold and devoid of passion. And while the contemplative conception 
of heaven might have been acceptable to the scholastics, the poets and mystics rejected it 
because they emphasized a more relational union with the Divine.369 The intellectual shift in the 
                                                      
rather than Augustine is due to the proximity of Aquinas to Al-Ghazālī. Alongside the proximity of time, there is a 
connection of thought between the two views. As will be seen in the pages to follow, both Aquinas and al-Ghazālī 
emphasize contemplation as the highest form of happiness in the life to come. 
 368 McDannell and Lang, Heaven: A History, 69.  
 369 It should be noted that the love theme during the Medieval period can be separated into theocentric and 
anthropocentric categories. Those who emphasized courtly love could not conceive of a heaven in which there was 
not love between the beloved and themselves. This sort of social imaginary was seemingly significant for eternal 
happiness. The poets and mystics, while finding the rigidity of the scholastics to be unsatisfactory, maintained a 
more theocentric view of dynamic love between God and man. This view of consummate love was in no way erotic 
but did emphasize the longing of the soul for the divine and the anticipation of union in the life to come. For more 
on this see Ibid., 94-107. 
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Medieval period was influenced by the rediscovery of the classic Greek philosophers, namely 
Plato and Aristotle, through interaction with Muslim philosophers and theologians (e.g. 
Avicenna). Chief among the Medieval Scholastics was the theologian and philosopher Thomas 
Aquinas. We now consider his views on the afterlife. 
 The two main theological and philosophical influences on Aquinas’ thought were 
Aristotle and Augustine, the former being his philosophical authority and the latter his 
theological authority.370 Aquinas was indebted to both of these thinkers and often cites them as 
authoritative support in his systematic treatises. Of particular importance in this study is 
Aristotle’s specific influence on Aquinas’s conceptions of heaven and what constitutes the 
ultimate good for humanity. Aristotle once wrote, “…every action and choice, is thought to aim 
at some good; and for this reason, the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all 
things aim.”371 Aristotle thought men and women pursue certain actions because they believe 
that those actions are aimed at a certain good. Now, if this is true, it is of course important to 
discover what the good is to which all must aim. Aristotle suggested that happiness is such a 
good and that the way to achieve said happiness was from the contemplative life.372 This 
philosophical framework of things having particular ends to which they aim and that end for 
human beings being the pursuit of happiness was accepted by both Augustine and subsequently 
Aquinas.373 Specifically regarding the Christian application of this framework, the contemplative 
life was rooted in contemplation of the divine. Consistent among the scholastic writers was belief 
                                                      
 370 Ibid., 88. 
 371 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1 (I.1.1-3). 
 372 Happiness, for Aristotle, is the end which is achieved as a human pursues the good. Human good is the 
activity of the soul exhibiting virtue, whether it be intellectual or moral. Ibid., 12-13 (I.7-8). 
 373 On the relation of Aquinas to both Aristotle and Augustine, McDannell and Lang write, “While 
philosophy, for Aquinas, mean Aristotle, his main theological authority was Augustine.” McDannell and Lang, 
Heaven: A History, 88. 
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that contemplation of the divine was the goal of man while on earth and that it would be the 
eternal occupation of the beloved in heaven.374 Aquinas argued that contemplation is the highest 
activity of intellection, and it is that mental capacity which separates man from the animals and 
plants.375 Furthermore, everything finds an ultimate end in God and so for human beings, who 
possess higher-level mental capacities, their end is intimately connected to the intellect. Thus, 
man’s ultimate telos, according to Aquinas, is the contemplative life in relation to divine 
knowledge. This activity is the chief end of man and also wherein eternal bliss is derived. 
Neither the carnal pleasure of life, nor any other external thing, can be what satisfy human 
creatures, because they all would detract from the last end of everything which is God.376 
 For Aquinas, heaven is the culmination of human perfection and happiness. The reason 
for this is due to the encounter the beloved will have with the Divine once in paradise – the 
beatific vision of God. It is in this specific culmination where his contribution to the doctrine of 
heaven is most significant for this study. In order to achieve ultimate happiness through 
contemplation, Aquinas posits that a few things must happen first. The reason that human 
creatures cannot achieve perfect happiness in this life is because they see through a glass dimly, 
that is, their perception and knowledge of God is incomplete.377 Once in heaven, the soul is freed 
from the imperfections of the body and can thus be rightly oriented towards God.378 But the soul 
                                                      
 374 Ibid., 88. 
 375 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III. 25, 27. 
 376 Ibid., Chs. 27-37 with special emphasis places on 37. 
 377 Ibid., Chs. 38-48. 
 378 This point is most significant in terms of Aristotelian influence as well as a major point of departure 
from Aquinas in the view of heaven presented later. This point is also quite technical and might detract from the 
scope so it will be discussed here. The heavenly realm for Aquinas is very static and there is little emphasis given to 
the physical realities of heaven. Aquinas writes that the active life will cease in the future life of the blessed and will 
consist solely of contemplation of God. This might lead one to suggest, what role then does human bodies have in 
the life to come? It would seem that the resurrection doctrine, the teaching that Jesus raised bodily from the dead, 
would have bodily implications for Christians as well in the life to come. Aquinas does see the importance of the 
body but not for purposes of enjoying physical, bodily pleasures. The reason for the importance of the body has to 
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does not exist separate from the body, rather, the body is resurrected, glorified, and reunited with 
the soul in order to form the unified human substance. Second, and consistent with the 
Aristotelian concept of God, Aquinas was committed to the principles of perfection including 
aspects such as impassibility, timeless, static, etc.; God is outside time and thus does not 
experience change. Furthermore, because God is immaterial, he is not seen in the traditional 
sense of seeing. The vision of God is not vision in seeing rather it is vision as perception. The 
beatific vision is equivalent to having knowledge of God which, according to Aquinas, is 
possessing knowledge of his essence, the very substance of God.379 Third, Aquinas also states 
that no human intellect can, by its own natural power, perceive God’s essence. The moment in 
heaven when revelation is given, when the beloved no longer sees (perceives) through a glass 
dimly, is an act of God’s grace. In this moment, the beloved receives a “divine ray of light.”380 
                                                      
do with his anthropological commitments to Aristotle and the view called hylomorphism. Hylomorphism is the 
anthropological view that suggests human beings are both body and soul and, more specifically, the soul is what 
gives form to the body. Unlike other forms of dualism which parse out body and soul in human creatures and 
suggest that the soul is eternal and can exist separate from the body, hylomorphism suggests a more unified human 
substance. To give an example, Aquinas writes, “Abraham’s soul, properly speaking, is not Abraham himself, but a 
part of him…there needs to be life in the whole composite, i.e., the body and soul.” Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 
trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (Cincinnati, OH: Benziger Brothers (RCL Benziger), 1947),  
https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/ (Accessed December 2, 2018), Supplement.Q75.Reply to Objection 2. A 
person is not reducible to a soul in hylomorphism but is part of a whole which must necessarily include the body, a 
human person is essentially both soul and body. Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences, vol. 10, trans. by Beth 
Mortensen, ed. by Peter Kwasniewski and Jeremy Holmes, (Parma 1858 Edition), IV.D44.Q1.A1, Response to 
Quaestiuncula 1, https://aquinas.cc/31/32/~275 (Accessed December 3, 2018). See also, Summa Theologica, 
Supplement.Q93. A1. The implications then for heaven is this: the beloved in paradise will not be a disembodied 
soul because that soul would be incomplete and lacking. The soul needs the body just as the body needs the soul, the 
two form a sort of internal symbiotic relation. Moreover, Aquinas suggests that without the body, the soul would be 
imperfect because it is only part of a whole and although the soul does not need the body for contemplation, the 
glorified body is more conducive to the intellectual operation because, “insofar as through being united to a glorified 
body the soul will be more perfect in its nature, and consequently more effective in its operation.” Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica, Supplement. Q93.A1. 
379 It seems that Aquinas equates the divine essence to a divine intellect and it further seems that he does 
this not from a strong scriptural inference but philosophical commitments. His argument can be summarized 
according: 1. God cannot be seen in his essence in the traditional sense of seeing, however, human creatures have 
the natural desire to arrive at understanding of the divine substance. 2. There cannot be a natural desire which does 
not have a corresponding mechanism to meet said desire, 3. “We must,” Aquinas writes, “conclude that it is possible 
for the divine substance to be seen by means of the intellect, both by separate intellectual substances and by our 
souls.” Summa Contra Gentiles, III.51  
380 Ibid., III.53.  
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All of God’s knowledge is at once possessed by the beloved and for an eternity will contemplate 
God’s knowledge in a state of bliss. Aquinas describes this moment as an outpouring of divine 
goodness and an act of grace whereby God elevates the beloved. 
 Aquinas’s view of heaven can be appreciated for a number of reasons. First, his 
commitment to a hylomorphic anthropology is consistent with an embodied view of the beloved 
in the afterlife. Second, his view is inherently theocentric and rightly recognizes God as the 
summum bonum. Third, Aquinas seeks to preserve the doctrine of God’s transcendence yet, at 
the same time, demonstrates that there is a degree to which God is knowable. At the same time, 
Aquinas’s view is problematic on a number of fronts. The first problem is in relation to the last 
point of agreement. Aquinas’s view helps the believer to see that his only end is in God “yet”, as 
Peter Vardy has noted, “a God identified with the supreme Platonic values.”381 Vardy takes issue 
with this conception of God and suggests that the timelessness of God can be challenged. The 
doctrine of the incarnation and resurrection suggests that the second person of the Trinity 
persisted in the incarnation following the resurrection implying that Jesus is still in bodily form, 
located in space and, it would seem, experiencing time.382 Vardy also notes that the idea of 
                                                      
381 Vardy, “A Christian Approach”, 20. 
 382 This is not the only way to work through the problem with Aquinas’s view. Admittingly and for reasons 
one can applaud, Aquinas was trying to preserve the notion of perfection as it relates to God but there are ways one 
can synthesize both the idea of perfection and a dynamic personal interaction. Consider the words of W. Norris 
Clarke, a Thomist, who considers a creative way forward: “I would answer—in my project, “creative retrieval of St. 
Thomas”—that our metaphysics of God must certainly allow us to say that in some real and genuine way God is 
affected positively by what we do, that He receives love from us and experiences joy precisely because of our 
responses: in a word, that His consciousness is contingently and qualitatively different because of what we do. All 
this difference remains, however, on the level of God's relational consciousness and therefore does not involve 
change, increase or decrease, in the Infinite Plenitude of God's intrinsic inner being and perfection—what St. 
Thomas would call the “absolute” (non-relative) aspect of His perfection. God does not become a more or less 
perfect being because of the love we return to Him and the joy He experiences thereat (or its absence). 
 The mutual giving and receiving that is part of God's relational consciousness as knowing and loving what 
is other than Himself is merely the appropriate expression or living out of the intrinsic perfection proper to a 
perfectly loving personal being, the expression of the kind of being He already is. To receive love as a person, as we 
better understand the unique logic of interpersonal relations today, is not at all an imperfection, but precisely a 
dimension of the perfection of personal being as lovingly responsive. What remains fixed as the constant point of 
reference in our concept of God is Infinite Perfection.” W. Norris Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God: A 
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humans possessing a body and remaining timeless are seemingly a contradiction. A fundamental 
aspect of being human is to experience time, to change and progress. The timeless beatific vision 
does not do justice to the idea of individual persons surviving death. Nor does it do justice to the 
doctrine of the bodily resurrection of the second person of the trinity. Jesus rose from the grave 
with a physical, albeit glorified, body. Another of Vardy’s main issues is with the impersonal 
nature of the beloved towards one another. “Heaven,” Vardy writes, “appears to be a community 
with an active social life focused on Christ and on continual praise of God.”383 To this I would 
add that the social life of heaven is not only focused on Christ, but it entails relationality with 
Christ. It is not altogether obvious, nor necessary, that contemplation of the divine is both the 
chief and the source of eternal bliss in Heaven. It would be agreeable to suggest that bliss partly 
entails contemplation and reflection but at the same time, Scripture suggests that we are known 
by God and the relationship between Christ and the Church is that of a marriage. In a marriage 
relationship, both parties know and are known by the other. Aquinas suggests however that the 
beloved of heaven experience felicity when they come to know God as he knows himself, but 
this felicity delimits the relationality between God and the beloved.384 
 Aquinas’s conception of heaven is influenced by a philosophical understanding of God 
that is unnecessarily static and abstract. I do not wish to discount the focus on God for the source 
of eternal bliss, however, I do wish to challenge Aquinas’s conception of the beatific vision. I 
agree with Peter Vardy when he states, “The possibility is open to us of a life lived in fellowship 
                                                      
New Thomistic Perspective, 2nd Revised Edition, New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 136-37. 
http://fordham.universitypressscholarship.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu (Accessed Jan. 7, 2019) 
383 Vardy, “A Christian Approach,” 22.  
384 “For God Himself understands His own substance through His own essence; and this is His 
felicity…And so, may they who enjoy the same felicity whereby God is happy to eat and drink at God’s table, 
seeing Him in the way that He sees Himself.” Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III.51.  
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with God in a heavenly society where the Christian idea of agape or mutual love prevails.”385 
Because of the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus, the beatific vision should not be seen as a 
final “static purpose but a dynamic joy” which is imparted to the individuals who have been 
transformed by love because of God’s grace.386 
Heaven Reimagined 
 Vardy’s analysis segues favorably into this final section on heaven. This is due to his 
emphases on love, fellowship, society, and an overall dynamism characterizing the eternal 
activity of heaven. Before building upon Vardy’s depiction, it is important to first provide a brief 
context of the doctrine of heaven in the 21st century. Following the emergence of Modernist and 
Enlightenment thinking, the doctrine of heaven, among other Christian doctrines, came under 
significant criticism and attack. For the past two-hundred years, a robust understanding of 
heaven has been waning in the many Christian traditions to the point where believe in heaven 
itself is in steady decline.387 Even if the doctrine of heaven is strongly retained in some Christian 
traditions, such as Fundamentalism, McDannell and Lang argue, “eternal life has become an 
unknown place or a state of vague identity.”388 
 Jerry Walls identifies a number of significant negative influences which he suggests have 
influenced the doctrinal decline of heaven in Christianity. First, the internal coherency of heaven 
has been challenged regarding certain philosophical considerations. Eternity and living forever 
are ideas which challenge the human mind especially in the areas of personal identity and eternal 
                                                      
385 Vardy, “A Christian Approach,” 24. 
386 Ibid., 24-25 
 387 See specifically, Ch. 10 “Heaven in Contemporary Christianity” in Heaven: A History by McDannell 
and Lang, 307-52.  
 388 Ibid., 352. 
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joy.389 Second, Walls notes that broad cultural and intellectual trends have had a significant 
impact on the supernatural framework altogether, heaven included. The philosopher Charles 
Taylor has suggested that we live in what he calls the “Secular Age.”390 By “secular” Taylor 
does not mean that the Western Culture is thoroughly areligious – far from it. What he means by 
the term is that there is no longer one belief structure that is granted a higher plausibility over 
another, all are open to criticism and debate. Within this context, there is space for a frame that is 
thoroughly secularized, a “closed world system” that is characterized by what Taylor calls the 
“Immanent Frame,” that is, a frame which constitutes a “natural order, to be contrasted to a 
supernatural one, an immanent world, over against a possible transcendent one.”391 An aspect of 
this frame which is truly unique to the post-modern era is that these closed world systems are 
self-contained in terms of meaning and morality. Throughout the Enlightenment era, in the midst 
of a very liberal theology, heaven was still a concept that provided moral reasoning and meaning. 
Immanuel Kant purported that heaven was a necessary concept for the postulate of practical 
reason, even though morality was grounded in a non-religious duty. But today, within these 
supposed self-contained models, heaven is not necessary for meaning and morality. Moreover, 
along with the emergence of these models came the notion that heaven and the notion of an 
eternal life was evil because it kept people focused on the life to come and not on their 
                                                      
 389 Walls, Heaven, 9-10.  
 390 Charles Taylor’s tome The Secular Age may not be overly accessible for some readers. James K. A. 
Smith’s How (Not) To Be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor is a very nice supplement to the work, if one finds The 
Secular Age difficult to work through. Smith’s summation of Taylor’s three-fold taxonomy of the “Secular” was 
quite helpful. See James K. A. Smith, How (Not) To Be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor, (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2014), 20-23. 
 391 Charles Taylor, The Secular Age, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 
542. ProQuest Ebook. https://ebookcentral-proquest-
com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/lib/liberty/detail.action?docID=3300068 (Accessed Dec. 19th, 2018). For more on the 
Immanent Frame see ch. 15. 
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immediate futures. This is why Karl Marx called religion the “opium of the people.”392 So, on 
the one hand, the doctrine of heaven is waning because of the rise in acceptance of naturalistic 
presuppositions, on the other, it is even deemed evil by some because it provides a false sense of 
hope and meaning in this life. 
 Christian culture in the West is not immune to the Immanent Frame and a thorough-going 
secularism has fostered space for a thoroughly secularized theology. Even those whom have 
resisted a liberal theology have still been impacted by the Immanent Frame and, consequently, a 
critical component of heaven is in need of restoration – a renewed emphasis on Christian hope. 
In Heaven, Walls does well to demonstrate the reasonableness of heaven and its value for 
addressing extremely difficult philosophical issues, especially in relation to the meaning of life. 
 In concert with Walls’ work, N.T. Wright, through contextual biblical exegesis and 
biblical theology, and has reclaimed another aspect in need of renewal – biblical imagery. One 
common conception of heaven in popular Christian circles is the notion of heaven being some 
place far away where people go when they die; a place out there, an ethereal reality of harps and 
clouds with the earth being jettisoned and left behind. But is that an accurate interpretation of the 
Scriptural depictions of heaven? N. T. Wright argues that this is not a biblical imagery of heaven 
as it tends to minimize two key components tied to heaven in Scripture and early Christian 
theology: resurrection and restoration of nature.393 
                                                      
 392 He goes on to write “The abolition of religion as the illusory of happiness of the people is the demand 
for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a 
condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears 
of which religion is the halo.” Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Aristeus Books, 2012), 4. 
(Kindle Edition)  
 393 See N. T. Wright, Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the Mission of the 
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 In Surprised by Hope, N. T. Wright has done well in reclaiming what I would submit is a 
sound and thoroughly biblical vision of heaven. His project focuses largely on the life of Christ 
and the significance of the incarnation, ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus.394 The life of 
Christ was a demonstration, a foretaste of the what the kingdom of God will one day be like. 
This preview reached its climax when God raised Jesus, the Son, from the dead and showed 
God’s power over death and the grave. The resurrection became the focal point of Christian hope 
of life and the Apostle Paul teaches that without the truth of a literal, bodily resurrection of Jesus, 
Christianity fails, and its message preached in vain.395 Central to the message of Christ’s ministry 
and subsequent death and resurrection is the message of hope and restoration. This is what it 
looks like when Jesus comes into his kingdom. This coming restoration is foreshadowed in the 
OT in scenes of coming judgment. Wright suggests this is where some of the modern 
eschatological confusion emerges. The modern conception of judgment tends to be negative but 
for the Jews reading Psalms 96 and 98 as well as Isaiah 11 and 65-66, the coming judgment of 
God was a cause to celebrate.396 In the OT, to have judgment was a good thing because justice 
will be ensured. Judgment done according to righteousness. God will sort it out. Furthermore, 
following the judgment of the Lord, renewal and restoration were promised to follow. The 
                                                      
 394 N. T. Wright is not the only voice championing the life of Christ for understanding the nature of heave. 
Jerry Walls highlights this significance and centrality as well. He writes, “Recall from the introduction that the 
resurrection is the ground of the specifically Christian hope for eternal life. Because Jesus was raised from the dead, 
we hope to be also, in a body like his resurrected body. If the resurrection is denied, the basis of this hope is 
undercut. There is, then, a tight connection between the defining event of Christian doctrine and the notion of 
heaven. 
 But this is true not only of the resurrection but also of the other central Christian doctrines I have 
mentioned. Incarnation and atonement were part and parcel of God’s saving activity, which culminated in 
resurrection and ascension. These events achieve human salvation, a salvation fully accomplished at the second 
coming of Christ, when believers anticipate a perfected relationship with God and other believers. This perfected 
relationship involves being taken up, in some sense, into the very life of the Trinity.” Walls, Heaven, 32. 
 395 1 Cor. 15:14 
 396 Wright, Surprised by Hope, 137-38. 
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promise of cosmic renewal has no greater scene than in the culmination of the new heaven and 
new earth in Revelation 21-22 where the writer depicts the New Jerusalem coming down out of 
heaven to be united with the earth. This passage reveals two important themes of heaven. First, 
in the end, heaven and earth are meant to come together and this physical reality will be the 
eternal dwelling place for the beloved. Second, heaven is proximity to God. Through Scripture 
we see glimpses of heaven wherein man enjoys a certain measure of proximity to God. In the OT 
the Temple was the place where God and people met. In the NT, it is in Jesus and the Holy Spirt 
where this happens. In the final scene of Revelation, heaven has come to earth and the temple, 
which was once the symbolic and literal dwelling place of God among his people, will be no 
more for in this new city “its temple is the Lord God the Almighty and the Lamb.”397 To this we 
can add, where God is there too will be love for God is love and so it is true, as C. S. Lewis says, 
“For where agape is, there is, in some degree, heaven.”398 The blessed reality of heaven will be 
the union of the beloved to Love itself, this will be, as John Wesley writes, what “crowns all” for 
“there will be a deep, and intimate, an uninterrupted union with God; and constant communion 
with the Father and his Son Jesus Christ, through the Spirit; a continual enjoyment of the Three-
One God, and of all creatures in him!”399 
 Amidst all of the various biblical interpretations, cultural trends and theological 
traditions, a biblical view of heaven entails what N. T. Wright calls “eschatological duality.” He 
                                                      
 397 Rev. 21:22; for a more thorough understanding of the centrality of Christ in the eschaton see Jeffrey R. 
Dickson, The Humility and Glory of the Lamb: Toward a Robust Apocalyptic Christology, (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
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 398 C. S. Lewis, “Agape” in The Four Loves Radio Broadcast (Audio Book), (Nashville, TN: Thomas 
Nelson, 2005). 
 399 John Wesley, The Works of John Wesley: The Bicentennial Edition, Vol. 2 (Sermons 34-70), Sermon 
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writes, “What matters is eschatological duality (the present age and the age to come), not 
ontological dualism (an evil ‘earth’ and a good ‘heaven’).”400 As Christians contemplate heaven, 
they ought to look to Christ for direction. His birth, life, death and resurrection all tell the story 
of love, redemption, new life and restoration. These components of Jesus’ life form not only a 
foreshadow of what is to come but establishes a hope that is relevant for believers in this present 
life. What Christ demonstrated to the world was the love God has for it and not only that but his 
active working to restore the broken relationship, a paradise lost, which will one day culminate 
in the final age to come. 
 
The Mystery of God 
 An orthodox Christian theology of God begins with two basic questions: “what is God 
like?” and “who is God?” These two questions, while related, are distinct as Bray suggests – the 
former is an inquiry into the essence or being of God and the latter concentrates on his personal 
nature.401 An orthodox Christian theology also rests on two fundamental assumptions: first, that 
God has spoken to man and through man in history (special revelation); and two, that God is, at 
least in some capacity, knowable.402 In Christianity, the revealed Scriptures are the authoritative 
source of knowledge about God. What the Scriptures reveal about God allows for humanity to 
                                                      
 400 Wright, Surprised by Hope, 95. 
 401 These two distinctions are emphasized by Bray. Gerald Bray, The Doctrine of God: Contours of 
Christian Theology, (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993), 53. 
 402 These two assumptions have been intentionally placed in a sequential order which reflects that causal 
connection to human knowledge of God. A staple feature of the three monotheistic faiths – Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam – is that God has revealed himself specifically to men who then have either transcribed and/or been inspired to 
write down said holy writ. In these monotheistic traditions, knowledge begins with the divine and so revelation must 
be given before one could make any claim of knowability. This position stands in contrast to any rationalistic 
theology (i.e. Neo-Platonism) suggesting the revelatory ascent may begin through man’s initial efforts. The fact that 
God has revealed seems to also suggest some form of knowability – although this point is the cause of much 
discussion and disagreement. Nonetheless, in the causal chain of events it is God who must act first and thus the 
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theologize and make inferences about what God is like and who he is. The first consideration, 
what God is like in his essence or being, has led to much debate throughout the centuries 
concerning what can actually be known about God. One challenge facing this aspect of theology 
is the proposition that God is utterly other and unique, incomprehensible. God’s being is so other 
than our own, it is purported, that is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive it through creaturely 
language and finite minds. Feinberg points out this challenge noting that is it difficult to discuss 
because it is “difficult to find biblical language that talks about the ‘divine essence’ (perhaps the 
closest is Paul’s claim about the ‘form of God’ in Phil. 2:6, though Paul’s intent is not to teach 
the Trinity).”403 Essence and nature language is inherently a philosophical category and while 
they are important for understanding a thing and what it is like, the Bible does not exactly speak 
in that categorical way. Historically, this led many theologians towards a mystical approach to 
God, a means of approaching God through non-rational means (i.e. an existential encounter) and 
speaking of God in ‘negative,’ apophatic terminology.404 But not all theological endeavors were 
of the mystical tradition. The Reformers were very reluctant to say anything about God’s essence 
but did not go so far as to endorse a ‘negative’ theology in its entirety. Calvin, as Bray points out, 
affirmed negative theology in relation to the Divine essence but not as it relates to what could be 
known through God’s personhood and personal relationship.405 The second fundamental 
question, who is God?, should be, according to Calvin, the focus of the Christian endeavor. He 
                                                      
 403 John Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God, (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001), 437. 
 404 The mystical tradition in Christianity predominates the theological landscape after the time of Augustine 
all the way up till the Scholastic period and Thomas Aquinas. According to Bray, Aquinas did not reject the mystical 
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writes, “Those, therefore, who, in considering this question, propose to inquire what the essence 
of God is, only delude us with frigid speculations – it being much more our interest to know 
what kind of being God is and what things are agreeable to his nature.”406 Certainly, to know 
what is agreeable to God is of utmost importance, but at the same time it seems that to speak of 
God’s nature is to say something about his essence, that is, what is essential to God’s being. 
 Part of the challenge in this discussion is a categorical one. It is difficult to discern what 
is meant when one uses terms such as essence, nature, being and attribute and whether or not 
they are separate or synonymous. I would submit that it is philosophically consistent to use 
essence and nature synonymously so that when one speaks of the nature of God, they are 
referring to his essence.407 Furthermore, we must be careful to not dissect the nature of God into 
two parts, separating the being of God and his essence (ουσια( from his personhood (ὑποστασις). 
It is problematic to speak of God in his singular essence first and then get around to discussing 
the tri-unity of persons. The tri-unity of persons in the Godhead is central to our conception and 
consideration of the Christian God. On the centrality of trinitarian doctrine, Wolfhart Pannenberg 
writes,  
It is not a doctrine of only secondary importance in addition to some other basic 
concept of the one God: If the issue is considered in terms like that, the case for 
trinitarian theology is lost. It can be defended only on the condition that there is 
no other appropriate conception of God of Christian faith than the Trinity. In that 
case we cannot have first a doctrine on the one God and afterwards, in terms of 
some additional supernatural mystery, the trinitarian doctrine…Everything that is 
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said in Christian theology on the one God has to be predicated, then, on the three 
persons of the Trinity in their communion.408 
If a thing’s essence is that which without it, it would cease to be that thing and since personhood 
is of primary important to the concept of the Christian God, do we not then understand 
something of the divine essence, however minimal it may be? It would seem that God’s 
revelation of himself has demonstrated something essential to his being. This is not to say that 
the nature of the tri-unity of persons in a singular substance has been comprehended fully, there 
is no denying that God transcends human comprehension, but it does seem we can begin to 
understand the essence of God, however hidden and mysterious. 
 When talking about God, theologians throughout Christian history have walked a fine 
line avoiding the extremes of agnosticism and anthropomorphism, transcendence and 
immanence, revelation and hiddenness, knowledge and mystery, trying to rest in the dialectical 
tension. Certainly, on the one hand, Christians want to maintain that God categorically 
transcends the creation and therefore religious language.409 And yet, on the other hand, they also 
affirm that God has revealed himself through the Scriptures and ultimately in the person of Jesus 
Christ. Furthermore, knowledge is so central to the discussion about love because one cannot 
love that which they have no knowledge about. To provide clarification on this tension the last 
dialectical set – knowledge and mystery – is worth examining in a little more detail. 
 In Boyer and Hall’s, The Mystery of God, the authors discuss the idea of theological 
mystery, a motif that is sprinkled throughout the Scriptures. In the beginning of their analysis, 
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they highlight the dialectic of knowledge and mystery in terms of light, and more specifically, 
the sun. They employ a popular C. S. Lewis quote which states, “We believe that the sun is in the 
sky at midday in summer not because we can clearly see the sun (in fact, we cannot) but because 
we can see everything else.”410 The authors here suggest that “Lewis’ point was clear: there may 
be certain things that are themselves too great to understand but that nevertheless enable us to 
understand lesser things with remarkable clarity.”411 Like the sun in the midday sky, which is not 
visible to the naked eye yet illumines everything else, so too does God illumine reality while also 
not being known through normal means of knowing. The Scriptures state that God, the Creator, 
“lives in unapproachable light” (1 Tim. 6:16); this same God announces, “No one may see me 
and live” (Exod. 33:20). Through this construction, Boyer and Hall note that this is the God 
whom “philosophers, theologians, and ordinary Christians have recognized as 
‘incomprehensible,’ ‘inscrutable,’ ‘hidden,’ ‘past finding out.’”412 God is a mystery and yet 
human beings are called to seek and know him. How can this be, how can this divine invitation 
be meaningful if the mystery cannot be overcome? The answer lies in the meaning of theological 
mystery. For most, the first definition of mystery which comes to mind entails some notion of a 
puzzle or problem that is in need of solving. That meaning does not suffice in relation to God, he 
is not some puzzle that can be solved. “The mystery of God is not,” as Boyer and Hall state, “a 
question to which we must find an answer; it is itself the answer.”413 The Apostle Paul states that 
the mystery revealed to him was made known through revelation (Eph. 3:3). This kind of 
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mystery is one that remains so – still mysterious – even after it is revealed and unlike 
investigative mystery which is eliminated once enough knowledge is obtained, this “revelational 
mystery” is “in some sense established, not eliminated or solved, by its revelation.”414 When God 
revealed certain things which had heretofore been unknown, they are revealed as mystery so that 
the knower has knowledge of the mystery but is still left in awe and wonder, the mystery still 
remaining. 
 Revelational mystery, as the authors call it, can be divided into three sub-categories: 
extensive, facultative and dimensional.415 For the purposes of this study, I wish to discuss only 
the last type of revelational mystery – dimensional mystery. The authors define dimensional 
mystery as “characterized by an unclassifiable superabundance that transcends but does not 
invalidate rational exploration.”416 In order to help with understanding on this type, the authors 
present the analogy of the Flatlanders and shapes. Imagine if you will that there are people who 
are called Flatlanders who only perceive reality in two-dimensions – length and width but no 
depth. Further imagine the consideration of a circle in this two-dimensional reality. The 
Flatlanders are able to rationally perceive the circle without a problem. Now, what would happen 
if the Flatlanders were asked to consider rectangular extension from the circle so that the shape 
under investigation were now a cylinder. They would not be able to understand the notion of 
cylinder-ness because this shape adds another dimension to the consideration, a dimension that is 
outside of their capacity to understand and perceive. Notice that this mystery has nothing to do 
with the cylinder itself, the concept of cylinder is not irrational, but it is beyond the rational 
capacities and reality of the Flatlanders. Transpose this analogy to the dimensional mysteries of 
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God as reveal to finite creatures. The authors state, “The problem we will face as we address the 
reality of God is not that reason does not apply but that we do not know how to apply it. The 
things of God are not internally self-contradictory, but what we say about God would be self-
contradictory if we were speaking of the ordinary things of this world.”417 Knowing God does 
not dispense with reason, knowledge of God is not less rational, it is above human reason. 
 In light of dimension mystery, the challenge then for Christian theology is the avoidance 
of agnosticism. How is this to be avoided if knowledge of God is beyond human dimensions? 
The authors admit that it is difficult to conceive of revelation as both knowledge and mystery, to 
use one’s reason but at the same time realize God is beyond reason. This is not an impossible 
task however, and the authors suggest that resolution begins not just with the right sources of 
information but also “being the right kind of knower.” 418 Left to our own finite selves, 
knowledge of God would remain in another dimension, and so Christian theology begins with 
God and in order to know what kind of knower we humans are, we must first turn to what God is 
like. 
 Knowledge of God begins with God, with the kind of being he is and the intentions he 
has for creation, namely, human beings. The Scriptures reveal a God who is inherently and 
fundamentally personal, a God who is not merely some abstract “thing” or “it,” but a personal 
“Thou,” and, more specifically, a tri-unity of persons.419 Being personal is not something that 
                                                      
 417 Ibid., 17. 
 418 Ibid., 71.  
 419 Donald Bloesch would agree that knowledge of God and relationship rests in what he calls “biblical 
personalism.” He writes, “The subject-object relationship must not be dissolved (as in idealism) nor entirely 
transcended (as in mysticism); instead, it must be transformed and redirected (as in biblical personalism)” (48). For 
more on the relationship between Rationalism and Mysticism see Donald G. Bloesch, God the Almighty: Power, 
Wisdom, Holiness, Love, (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 1995), 47-50. 
   
 
 
165
God has by means of a quality or relation to something external, it is what God essentially is.420 
We can say that God is the premier persons and all personhood derives from him. God’s 
personal-ness is self-contained and self-sustaining within the three persons of the trinity and 
from eternity past, these three have enjoyed unending communion, a rich reciprocity of giving 
and receiving, of loving and being loved.421 
 As it relates to human creatures, not only was the creation created by a personal God, but 
this personal God creates other individual persons external to himself, human creatures that were 
endowed with the imago Dei.422 Going back to the emphasis on being a certain kind of knower, 
we see from Scripture that God’s creation of human beings was special and unique. No other 
creature in creation had been given the image of God. Having knowledge of God was linked to 
God’s intentions and the kind of creatures he not only intended to create, but whom he intended 
to be in relationship with. Thus, we can say that God created human beings with the capacity to 
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meaningfully engage with the various degrees of revelational mystery. Only because of the work 
of the Creator can human beings engage with such mystery. Moreover, in this divine work is 
manifested the agapē love of the Creator towards his creation. A love that is rooted in doing and 
action and not because of any need or want external to God, “but,” as Lewis states “of plain 
bounty.”423 But, and perhaps more importantly, human beings can only be personal because the 
Creator himself is personal, the premier persons, and not only that, those persons share in a 
unbounded, perichoretic love from all of eternity. 
 In the backdrop of the theme of mystery and knowledge, the next section examines the 
notion of God’s love for man. This section expounds of God’s love toward human beings and 
discusses the tremendous undertaking he undertook in order to love such finite creatures. 
Experiencing and sharing God’s love is a form of knowing God and so knowing what God’s love 
is like is beneficial for any meaningful relationship between humans and the divine. 
God’s Love For Man 
 God’s love for mankind is a central pillar in Christianity and, as Feinberg rightly suggest, 
“one of the grandest themes in all of Scripture.”424 Perhaps the most famous verse of the Bible – 
John 3:16 – begins with the powerful phrase “For God loved the world in this manner, that he 
gave his only begotten Son.” God’s love for the world was conveyed to the world through the 
giving of the beloved Son, the Son who would become a ransom for many and through whom the 
world would be saved.425 For confessing Christians, it is humbling to consider the manner in 
which the Triune God loves mankind – a thought that inspires wonder and mystery. When 
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considering the love God has for mankind, one thought that should not be so quickly passed over 
concerns the lengths God went to love human beings. Few people consider the theological and 
philosophical difficulties inherent in a reality in which the infinite comes into contact with the 
finite in a loving, relational way. The qualitative difference between the Creator and the created 
is so vast and incommensurable, it would be quite remiss of human creatures to not take 
seriously the lengths the Triune God took not only to revealed himself but to achieve the 
particular end which manifested in the Incarnation, Death and subsequent Resurrection of Jesus. 
The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard took this relationship between the Creator and 
creature seriously. He contemplated and discussed the lengths to which God, whom, according to 
the Kierkegaardian designation is infinitely qualitatively different than the creature, went to not 
only love humanity but be victorious in love, overcoming the unfathomable chasm that existed 
between them. 
 Two fundamental assumptions direct Kierkegaard’s reflections of God’s love for man: 
first, God’s love is his motivation as well as his end, and two, love is genuinely expressed and 
experienced only among equals. The first assumption touches upon of an important theological 
and philosophical consideration: “what is the motivation for God’s action?” In relation to 
creation, God is the primary cause, the Unmoved Mover as Aristotle calls him. But unlike the 
Aristotelian designation of God, which was merely a necessary condition for reality to obtain, the 
Christian God, alongside being the Creator is also loving and relational towards creatures. 
Neither choice nor necessity dictates a certain measure of distance for he is not far removed and 
detached from creation. However, God’s disposition towards creation seemingly creates this 
tension of causality which can be summarized in this way: If God is perfect, that means he is 
self-contained, in need of nothing, nothing can be added to his essence or taken away; therefore, 
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he does not act according to some external need as if he was lacking in any way or had a desire 
necessitating a certain occasion. What then causes God to move? To act? To appear? 
Kierkegaard recognizes this tension and asks the same question,  
…nor can he [God] be so determined by any occasion that there is as much 
significance in the occasion as in the resolve. What then could move him to make 
his appearance? He must indeed move himself…But if he moves himself it 
follows that he is not moved by some need, as if he could not endure the strain of 
silence but had to break out in speech. But if he moves himself, and is not moved 
by need, what else can move him but love?426 
Why does Kierkegaard assume that nothing but love be that which moves God to act, he answers 
“for love does not have the satisfaction of need outside itself but within.”427 God is love and is 
moved by love and this motivation comes from within God himself. Agapē love is love grounded 
in action, in doing. God acts because he is love. Thus, God was not forced to love mankind, he 
freely loves through an act of the will. Because God is love and had such determinations towards 
his creation, he would, in the fullness of time, make himself known. Kierkegaard states it this 
way, “Out of love, therefore, the god must be eternally resolved in this way, but just as his love 
is the basis, so also must love be the goal, for it would be a contradiction for the god to have a 
basis of movement and a goal that do not correspond to this.”428 The question of how God 
achieves such an end is revealed in the problem which underscores Kierkegaard’s other 
assumption. 
 Kierkegaard’s second assumption is fascinating when considering the love between God 
and man. He reminds the reader that God loves the learner and it is his aim to “win him.”429 
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Kierkegaard suggests that this kind of love, that one that win’s over the individual, must be one 
that is shared among equals. He writes,  
 …for only in love is the different made equal, and only in equality or in 
unity is there understanding. Without perfect understanding, the teacher is not the 
god, unless the basic reason is to be sought in the learner, who rejected what was 
made possible for him. 
 Yet this love is basically unhappy, for they are very unequal, and what 
seems so easy – namely, that the god must be able to make himself understood – 
is not so easy if he is not to destroy that which is different.430 
Here, Kierkegaard’s point is that God’s love for man, the kind which seeks reciprocated love, is 
frustrated by the inability of God and man to understand one another – the emphasis being on the 
side of the beloved’s incapacity to understand God the lover. In order to win mankind over, the 
gap of difference must be overcome. So how does God avoid this frustrated love? How is the 
equality of lovers resolved or must God’s end be frustrated for eternity? He says that, in this 
frustration, the grief on God’s part is infinitely more profound and something only the superior 
being in the relationship will fully understand. There is not a creaturely analogy which can 
adequately grasp the extent of the misunderstanding. Nonetheless, Kierkegaard is resolved to at 
least try and explain this frustration knowing that human conceptions cannot capture the full-
measure of qualitative difference between God and man. 
 Aware of the limitations, Kierkegaard asks the reader to consider the analogy of the king 
and the maiden. Imagine that there was a king who loved a lowly maiden. Their status was such 
there existed an asymmetrical relationship for he was the lordly king and she a humble maiden. 
Not being hindered by this, the king simply declares her his equal, raises her up, and they are 
wed. As time goes on, however, the king begins to have an anxious thought but one that he keeps 
to himself lest by speaking it to others it begins to germinate. The king thinks to himself, “what if 
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the maiden becomes displeased with her status,” not because she is not grateful for what the king 
has done; rather, because the king has made her into something she is not. She will always be the 
humble maiden and he the lordly king. The thought might even cross her mind, as Kierkegaard 
writes, “she would have been happier had she remained in her obscurity, loved by an equal, 
content in her humble cottage.”431 In this moment, the king’s love would become frustrated, and 
not because he had done something wrong, that his love was not of a self-less kind; rather, it is 
the weakness of the beloved’s perception of the relationship that is the cause of great frustration. 
 Notice that the problem is not that they are not equals in a positional sense, the king has 
made the maiden his queen and she is. The problem lay in understanding, of the maiden’s 
attempt to return to a lesser love. This is the learner’s error according to Kierkegaard. God’s love 
for man is like the love the king had for the maiden and in the same the way the king’s love 
could conceivably become frustrated so too the love God has for man will experience an 
“unfathomable grief” out of frustrated love.432 God’s grief arises out of frustration for at least 
two reasons. First, it is frustrated because his ends are not being realized. Second, the love of 
God only seeks that which is best for the other, but the learner wants to return to the lesser, to the 
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squalor of his lowly position. Perhaps the grief is like that of a parent’s love for a child that 
allows them to make their own choices knowing that they are choosing the lesser but allowing 
them to do so anyway. The parent knows what is best but does not force the child’s hand, all the 
while knowing that even if the child leaves, the love for them will remain. In the same way 
God’s love does not cease, “for the divine love,” as Kierkegaard writes, “is that unfathomable 
love which cannot rest content with that which the object of love might foolishly consider 
himself blissfully happy to have.”433 
 But would not God expect this of his creation? Yes, the Triune God, would certainly have 
known that this love would have become frustrated, that humanity’s volition was weak and that 
love could easily become frustrated as the creation frivolously sought that which would only 
temporally satisfy. On this anticipation, the words of C. S. Lewis are helpful:  
It would seem that Our Lord finds our desires not too strong, but too weak. We 
are half-hearted creatures, fooling about with drink and sex and ambition when 
infinite joy is offered us, like an ignorant child who wants to go on making mud 
pies in a slum because he cannot imagine what is meant by the offer of a holiday 
at the sea. We are far too easily pleased.434 
Humanity is far too easily pleased with the lesser, but God does rest content. He is not content to 
leave humanity in the mud and so now we must ask how God avoids the frustrated love? How is 
the asymmetry between the Lover and the beloved overcome and true love realized? Kierkegaard 
considers two options: first, the union might be brought about by the elevation of the 
learner/beloved or, two, by the decent of the Lover. 
 The first option – the elevation of the learner/beloved – is like the king’s decree to make 
the maiden his equal. God could have elevated the humanity’s status by divine fiat, a royal 
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decree. God could, at once, overcome the weaknesses of human creatures and perfect their 
character but such a decree, Kierkegaard suggests, would come at a price.435 In this moment of 
transformation, the sin and separation are overcome but so too is the will of the human 
individual. In this moment, God makes the decision for human creatures and in order to 
guarantee that love is not frustrated the will of humanity is bolstered and stands resolute but at 
the same time, the memory of a past life is altered and wiped clean. The person has no memory 
of how they arrived in the condition they are in, they do know however that they are in a place of 
goodness, happiness and bliss. The learner/beloved would no longer desire to return to the lesser, 
back to the making mud pies in the mud. But, the choice to be there was not their own. Now, this 
is not to say that God does not exercise his authority and will in the lives of human creatures at 
decisive moments in history, he does, but it does not seem to be the way he normally operates, 
and it definitely does not seem to be the case in relation to love. With love being the prime 
motivation for God’s ends, it would seem consistent to submit that the free choice between the 
Lover and the beloved is of prime importance. Thus, the elevation of the learner in this manner is 
not acceptable, not because the learner objects but the Lover knows his beloved did not choose to 
be there on his/her own accord. 
 Another scenario within the first option of elevation is God could reveal himself to 
mankind in a display of majesty, power and glory.436 Perhaps the scene would be similar to that 
of the return of Christ on the white horse in Revelation or the scene depicted around God’s 
throne where the angels continuously worship.437 In this manifestation, there will but one option 
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for all living creatures, to bow and confess in worship that Jesus is Lord.438 At once, the learner 
would lose himself in adoration and he/she becomes enraptured in the glory of the divine. 
Kierkegaard suggests that this could have satisfied the maiden but at the same time it would not, 
he writes, “satisfy the king, for he did not want his own glorification but the girl’s.”439 Two 
things are of important note here. First, it is only a mere suggestion that this manifestation could 
have satisfied the maiden and in this hypothetical scenario the learner as well. Kierkegaard 
suggests it might have satisfied the maiden, but I suggest that it would not. It would not because 
of the particular telos of mankind. Being made in the image of God, human beings are persons 
endowed with a likeness to the premier persons of the Triune Godhead. As persons, human 
beings are inherently relational yet are unique individual selves and it seems that in this kind of 
manifestation the individual self is lost in a quasi-divine absorption. Second, and following from 
the first, the relation between the tri-unity of Persons and human persons is frustrated. There is 
no doubt that mankind would, in this instance, worship God but would this end fully align with 
God’s purposes? According to Kierkegaard, it would not. The first option – the elevation of the 
learner – may in fact please the individual but it would be shrouded in deceit, it simply will not 
do for, as Kierkegaard states, “In taking this path, then , love does not become happy – well, 
perhaps the learner’s and the maiden’s love would seem to be happy, but not the teacher’s and 
the king’s, whom no delusion could satisfy.”440 The tension is thus revealed, how does God 
annihilate the unlikeness that exists between them and yet not annihilate individual persons in the 
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process? The unlikeness must be overcome because, “not to disclose itself is the death of love,” 
and yet how will God accomplish that for, “to disclose itself is the death of the beloved!”441 
 God was not satisfied with the kind of relationship which either was shrouded in deceit or 
abolished the individual selves whom he loved. The Scriptures are replete with relational 
commands – both to challenge and invite – directed to the learner to taste, see, know, respond, 
choose and love God. But these commands are fraught with frustration due to the kind of thing 
human creatures are: sinful, frail, weak, finite, contingent, etc. Given the infinite qualitative 
distance that exists between God and man, that would seem enough to highlight the lengths God 
undertook in order to achieve that particular end of love. But humanity, in the most extreme form 
of arrogance, added another layer of complexity to this task. Not only is there a difference 
qualitative difference between God and man, the Creator and creation, human creatures rejected 
their Creator and, in His place, set themselves as gods. The Bible says mankind professed to be 
wise in their rejection of God but in reality they were demonstrating their foolishness.442 Thus, 
not only was there a divide in quality of essence, there too was divide of character and purity. 
Standing in the ultimate form of ignorance and self-aggrandizement, the creation had become an 
enemy of and to the Creator.443 This added dimension only heightens the qualitative degree of 
God’s great love for humanity. Human beings cannot ever fully understand the degree to which 
God’s love has overcome but nevertheless, when we begin to try and comprehend we are filled 
with the words from John’s epistle, “behold what great love the Father has for us…”444 
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 Because God is motivated by love, if the frustration in the Lover remains following the 
elevation of the learner/beloved, then perhaps it can be absolved through descent. Kierkegaard 
considers the notion that in order for love to be actualized and the asymmetry overcome, the 
lover must alter himself for the sake of the beloved, to meet the beloved wherever he or she may 
be. In the case of the infinite and the finite, the higher becomes the lower, taking on their 
humanity, becoming the lowest among them – the servant, the one who serves others. The 
Gospel of John states that the Word became flesh and dwelt among humanity.445 This incarnation 
of the second person of the Triune Godhead, the putting on flesh and becoming the servant was 
no mere Docetist shell. The servant form was not, as Kierkegaard noted, “an outer garment, like 
the king’s beggar-cloak, which therefore flutters loosely about him and betrays the king…It is 
his true form and figure. For this is the unfathomable nature of love, that it desires equality with 
the beloved, not in jest merely, but in earnest and truth.”446 It was in the gesture of love, the 
incarnation of God, that divine love was put on the center-stage of human history. But the full 
extent of God’s love for mankind was not fully revealed until Jesus took up his literal cross and 
died the death which was the beloved’s fate, an act for which there can be no greater 
manifestation. 
 The Lover went all the way to Calvary’s cross on behalf of the beloved. The human life 
of the Lover, Jesus the Christ, was a revelation of the Father, of what God is like in His essence. 
It was in this form, that of the true God becoming man, wherein the asymmetry was overcome. 
In light of this beautiful revelation, one could rightly ask, “did God intend it to be this way from 
the beginning?” The simple answer is, yes. Scripture states that the Lamb of God was slain 
                                                      
 445 John 1:14 
 446 Søren Kierkegaard, “Philosophical Fragments,” 31-2. 
   
 
 
176
before the foundations of the world.447 This passage, among many others, suggests that it was 
part of God’s plan for the Son to die as the Father’s chosen Lamb. Perhaps, it could even be 
suggested further that this was the only way for love to be realized. Kierkegaard implies as much 
in his concluding thoughts: 
For love, any other revelation would be a deception, because either it would first 
have had to accomplish a change in the learner (love, however, does not change 
the beloved but changes itself) and conceal from him that this was needed, or in 
superficiality it would have had to remain ignorant that the whole understanding 
between them was a delusion (this is the untruth of paganism). For the god’s love, 
any other revelation would be a deception.448 
What was or was not necessary is not the point here; rather, it is that this is what God did to 
demonstrate his love towards mankind and overcome the asymmetry that existed between God 
and man. Looking back at the cross, at God’s love on full display, the beloved is left in awe, in a 
humble adoration of the Lover, of what has been done on his/her behalf. 
 The learner owes everything to the teacher, that there is no thing about the learner that 
earns merit or has the ability to overcome the misunderstanding.449 Through the descent of the 
Lover, the learner and maiden are thus elevated in Christ but in this event their place and position 
are not lost on them. There is a scene in the book of Revelation where the crowns of glory are 
given to the sons and daughters of God. They are heirs according to the promise, they are raised 
up by the Teacher who is also the King. But love is reciprocal, it is self-giving, always focused 
on the other and in this Regal scene, those honored and brought high, take off their royal crowns 
and lay them at the feet of the true King. This is not synonymous with the humble maiden 
                                                      
 447 Rev. 13:8. While some translations place the prepositional phrase “from the foundation of the world 
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realizing her humble place and desiring to return to that lesser love. This laying down of crowns 
at the feet of Jesus results from the realization that the King became the Servant, that for the sake 
of love fulfilled, the lover lowered himself to the status of the beloved. There is understanding, a 
beautiful understanding and yet there is the inability to comprehend the lengths the Lover went 
to win the beloved; yet, the beloved know that glory, honor, and worship are due to the Lover 
alone. 
 This intention of God, to be engaged in love between equals, provides us an apologetic 
response to the so-called hiddenness of God problem and the common retort made by skeptics 
that if God exists, why does he not simply reveal himself right here and now? This retort may 
seem a glib jest and will likely gain some rhetorical favor for the skeptic, but at the same time it 
can be a simple and honest question: Why does God not acquiesce to these revelatory demands? 
Would it not be simple for the Godhead to be revealed in all power and glory and at once make 
its existence known to the skeptic and believer alike? The answer is both dialectical and 
paradoxical. In a dialectical sense the answer is both yes and no. Yes, it would be easy for God to 
make people know that He exists, but that kind of knowledge is not what God is after nor would 
it do humanity any good. Scripture states that even the demons know and believe that God exists 
and shudder at that reality.450 The knowledge of God which demons possess is of no use for the 
human’s soul, it is not a knowledge grounded in love, submission and worship. So, no, it is not 
simple, especially having seen the challenges between the king and the maiden – how great then 
between God and man. But do not be mistaken, the non-simplicity of the matter was not because 
God lacked the ability or the resolve; rather, it was the weakness and limitations of the persons 
whom God loved. 
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 Paradoxically, the manner in which God displayed his love is both simple, and yet for 
some profound and offensive, to grasp. This is what Jesus means when he teaches you must 
become like the children in order to enter the kingdom of God.451 Children realize their need for 
help that is external to them. In their youthful disposition, perhaps they see with clearer eyes both 
their need and the beauty of this story. Furthermore, it is simple to those who have responded to 
the invitation of love, who have tasted and seen that the Lord is Good.452 For those who have yet 
to experience the goodness of God’s love, it seems lowly, offensive, a “stone of stumbling and a 
rock of offense.”453 C. S. Lewis’s distinction between looking at versus looking along something 
is quite helpful here.454 Lewis describes a moment when he was in a very dark toolshed and a 
saw a single beam of light shining through a crack at the top of the door. As he looked at the 
light he could see the beam distinctly and it illuminated the shed faintly. But as he aligned his 
eye with the beam of light Lewis writes that the inside of the shed vanished and “I saw no 
toolshed, and (above all) no beam. Instead I saw…green leaves moving on the branches of a tree 
outside and beyond that, 90 odd million miles away, the sun.”455 There is an experiential 
difference between looking at and looking along something. After having offered a few more 
examples of the differences between at and along, Lewis then asks the qualitative question of 
which is more valid or true than the other. Or, which of the two distinctions tells you most about 
the thing? This question, Lewis suggests, is taken for granted and over the past fifty years it has 
largely been assumed that in matters of religion, a true account must come from the outside, that 
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is, those looking at – the anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists.456 Lewis pushes back 
against this default assumption pointing out there are things we can look at but simply not know 
what it is like until we look along. Being outside of something can offer a clearer picture but it 
does not detract from the significance and validity of seeing along the beam, being on the inside. 
Those having looked along the beam of God’s sacrificial love know through experience the 
depths of this great love. 
 Conventional wisdom scoffs at the idea of God on the cross. Friedrich Nietzsche affirms 
as much when he writes, 
Obtuse to all Christian terminology, modern people can no longer relate to the 
hideous superlative found by an ancient taste in the paradoxical formula ‘god on 
the cross.’ Nowhere to date has there been such a bold inversion or anything quite 
as horrible, questioning, and questionable as this formula. It promised a 
revaluation of all the values of antiquity.457 
Nietzsche’s words highlight a profound truth of the crucifixion of Jesus, that it transcends human 
wisdom, logic and morality. No time before or no time following has such a conception entered 
the hearts and minds of men. But that is what God does, He takes the foolish things of the world 
and shames the wise.458 Nietzsche’s words are prophetic as they, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, illuminate the “bold inversion” of Christ on the cross and the reality that this 
event creates a confrontation with every single human being. Nietzsche was correct, Christ on 
the cross calls for a revaluation of all values, it calls for one to make a choice, to either die to self 
and take up one’s own cross or to reject this call to love and submission. So, why does God not 
write your name in the sky and meet your demands for knowledge and epistemic access, because 
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He has already revealed himself. Where you may ask? Kierkegaard has the answer, “Look, there 
he stands – the god! Where? There. Can you not see him? He is the God; and yet he has no place 
where he can lay his head.”459 Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, is the revelation of God and 
the kind of knowledge that God desires man to have is captured in the words of Jesus to his 
disciples when he asks “and who do you say that I am?”460 Here, Jesus demonstrates that he is 
concerned not only that the disciples have an opinion of who he is but that they have knowledge 
of his identity. God was revealed in Christ so that man could have the relationship God intended 
to have with those creatures made in His image. 
 The relational purposes of God are intended for heaven as well. God’s intentional love 
for man extends into this current life but it also will continue on into the afterlife for an eternity. 
Kierkegaard’s analogy helps one to contemplate the lengths God went to achieve his purposes. 
The current experience of God’s love is a profound reality. The God who descended out of love 
to overcome finite humanity invites those very same creatures to be in personal relation with him 
for an eternity. If the love is God is such a good experience now, consider how much more joy 
there will be when humanity sees their Lord face-to-face. Heaven is the ultimate culmination of 
God’s love for man; where the author of love and life and light calls the redeemed his own and 
as the Scriptures state, “so shall we be with the Lord forever.”461 
Man’s Love for God 
 Man’s reciprocating love for God is the last section to be considered in this chapter. 
Integral to the possibility of love between two persons is first the possibility of knowledge of the 
other who is to be known. Without the potential for knowledge and its corresponding actuality, 
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there can be no love. In this way, knowledge and love are intertwined. As the previous section 
noted, the incarnation, life, death and subsequent resurrection of Jesus Christ provides both 
knowledge of God and a demonstration of the kind of love God has for human beings.462 In 
Christ, not only does God cross the infinite qualitative difference in terms of knowledge about 
himself, he also does so in the realm of love. The incarnation is at once both a revelation of 
knowledge and a revelation of love in space and time, the descent of God bridging the divide 
which would have not been possible for man to ascent to or overcome.463 With the way made 
available, the resulting work of Christ comes with an invitation and a command, the call to come 
and die to self through loving God and loving others. This command is rooted in both the kind of 
personal being we were created as and what we were created to do. It is not a cold-hearted 
command given by a disingenuous over-lord, but it is stern and unyielding. Much like Lewis’s 
Aslan, the metaphorical Christ-figure, who is a great lion that cannot be tamed and isn’t safe but 
is also good and the king, so too, is Jesus Christ the same person loving person who will also 
return to judge the earth with a sharp sword.464 He is the Savior-King, the lover and the judge. 
Furthermore, the nature of this command is that its burden is easy and the yoke light.465 It is easy 
                                                      
 462 John 14:5-11. In this passage Jesus tells his disciples, (v.7) “If you had known me, you would have 
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and light for a number of reasons but perhaps the most striking of them all is connected to the 
very life of Christ himself. Humans being are not asked to do something that God himself has not 
already done in the second person of the Trinity. Jesus is the archetypal human being, a perfect 
example of what it is to fulfill the greatest commandments – to love God and love others.466 His 
life and death demonstrate that qualitative nature of God’s agapē love. Not only is this the way 
in which God has loved us, it is also the motivation the compels us to love one another in the 
same manner.  
 The Scriptural mandate to love God and love others is of premier importance in the life of 
a Christian. The pair stands resolute as the two greatest commandments to follow, the latter 
being second in importance only due to the nature and necessity of the former. But Loving God 
and loving others are also mediums of knowing God, a way of understanding the dimensional 
mystery. In the first epistle of John, the author states, “Everyone who loves has been born of God 
and knows God.”467 Whoever has agapē love for his neighbor has both been born of God and 
knows God. A person who loves in this sense knows God because God is love and in that act one 
knows what God is like. Why is this the case though, why is it that those who love others with 
agapē love have been both born of God and know God? Regarding the latter part, knowledge of 
God, the answer is found in the following verse when the author says, “because God is love.” 
The phrase God is love (ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν) is perhaps one of the most profound statements in 
all of Scripture concerning God, not merely because of the directness of the copulative formula 
but also because it reveals to us a glimpse of the divine essence. This statement goes beyond 
describing what God is like in the sense that God is comparable to love; rather, from it we are to 
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understand, through the copulative, that God is love in the equative sense. John goes on to show 
how the love of God was made manifest to the world through a double unfolding. He first notes 
that the love of God was demonstrated in the sending of his only Son (τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν 
μονογενῆ) into the world in order that we might have life. Secondly, John further develops the 
Son’s commissioning noting that God’s love was demonstrated not only in the purpose of 
bringing life but in being the propitiation for sin. In fact, it is in this act of propitiation through 
which we can have the kind of life which demonstrates God’s love. Nestled in-between the two 
examples, in perhaps a chiastic fashion, the apostle reminds us of a fundamental aspect of God’s 
agapē love, it is always prior to and independent of any act of benevolence on the behalf of 
mankind.468 God loves not because we loved God but because he first loved us, a statement John 
reiterates a few verses later: “We love because he first loved us” (1 John 4:19). 
 As it pertains to human creatures and the knowledge of God, it is interesting to note that 
in this passage knowledge of God is obtained through agapē love. This means that knowledge of 
God is gained, not through the transmission of a propositional statement about God, but rather in 
the act of love, in doing.469 The following verse does convey such a propositional statement, 
perhaps one of the most important ever revealed of God, but here in verse seven the author 
appears to be adding another layer of knowledge that goes beyond what one thinks about God. 
Of course, what one thinks and believes about God is important and fundamental to right living, 
but here the author seems to say there is another degree of knowledge that is gained only through 
action, through love that is defined by doing. In the act of agapē, one gains knowledge of what 
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God is like because God is agapē. When a Christian loves another person selfishly and 
unconditionally and acts rightly towards the other’s good, treating them as a proper end, he/she 
gains a sense of what God is like. He/she gains knowledge that was not hitherto known by 
propositional statements. This kind of knowledge is gained only through experience and is thus a 
subjective truth. It is subjective truth but not in the sense of a relativistic postmodern 
subjectivity, that kind of purporting relegates truth to judgment of the individual. In the Christian 
sense, the kind of subjectivity in mind here is realized only when the human person, the subject, 
comes into direct contact with objective truth, with the true Real. 
 There are some truths that can only be experienced in this way and they tend to be the 
most significant truths of human experience. Consider this example of knowledge gained 
through experience. Imagine there are two people, a guy and a girl, who have been brought 
together by two families in an arranged marriage. Both of them have never seen or met one 
another and they are about to meet for the first time before deciding to officially marry. Up to 
this point the girl’s family had told the prospective groom and his family about her, descriptions 
of what she is like, her personality, likes and dislikes, quality of character, strengths and 
weaknesses and even favorite foods (they were very thorough). Likewise, the guy’s family 
relayed the same kind of information to the prospective bride, being very thorough and covering 
similar material and topics as they had received. Both the prospective bride and groom feel they 
know a lot about their future mate but in what sense do they know the other? Up to this point 
they only possess propositional knowledge of the other marked by statements such as “he is 
kind,” “she enjoys jokes,” “she is sentimental,” “he is generally pessimistic,” etc. But how well 
can they really be said to know one another even though they have been told so much about the 
other? There is still another kind of knowledge to be gained, it is called, knowledge through 
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acquaintance. There is an immediacy to this kind of knowledge that begins in the initial 
subjective encounter. Even in the moment of the first meeting, the first hello, the first smile, 
there is something new, a subjective knowledge gained through a direct encounter with the 
person, in this case the future spouse, that was not possibly acquired through propositions. In this 
moment there is a new degree of knowledge gained, a new level of relationality that can only 
come through such an interaction of which propositional truths cannot compare. 
 Human love for God is rooted in agapē, in action. But at the same time, Christian love for 
God has also been thought of in terms of erōs love, of desire for the ultimate Good. This leads us 
to the discussion concerning the relationship between agapē and erōs as it pertains to man’s love 
for God. There is a rich history of theological development of agapē and erōs but there are two 
figures – Augustine and Luther – who are perhaps most prominent in this discussion and yet 
stand in stark contrast towards one another’s thought. 
 Beginning with the ancient Greek philosophers, one question which they earnestly sought 
an answer entailed the movement or what A.E. Taylor calls “the first step” towards conversion of 
the soul from the world to God.470 The answer began with contemplation and a knowledge of the 
self which “is also the knowledge of our own ignorance of true good.”471 Human beings are 
lacking and in want for they do not possess the Good, the reflective life is the beginning process 
of discovering or in some instances returning back to the Good.472 From these reflections 
emerged the idea or erōs love and the notion of the soul searching or longing for that which it 
lacks. Underlying the Greek idea of erōs is an embedded dualism in which the soul longs to 
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separate from the physical world (including the body) which is transient and temporal, to escape 
from Plato’s cave and enter the “sunshine of the intelligible world” to that which is permanent 
and eternal.473 Lindberg purports that this goal is more clearly expressed in the writings of 
Plotinus who reflects Plato and Aristotle and heavily influenced Augustine.474 
 Augustine was indeed influenced by Greek philosophy, especially the idea of erōs love. 
Because of this influence, perhaps the most significant feature of Augustine’s theology of human 
love is that all love is acquisitive love or erōs. That all men seek the Good is a universal 
presupposition for human being. But more than just seeking the Good, Augustine adds to this 
saying that all men love.475 Love is the most elementary function in man. But Augustine begins 
to diverge from Greek influence at precisely the moment of discerning the proper object of one’s 
love. Concerning the starting point of introspection in Greek philosophy, A. E. Taylor rightly 
quips, “How do we pass from the discovery that we are in this miserable and shameful ignorance 
of the one thing it is incumbent on us to know to apprehension of the scale of true good? How do 
we get even so far beyond our initial complete ignorance as to be able to say that a good soul is 
immeasurably better than a good body, and a good body than abundance of possessions?”476 If 
man’s love is to be rightly ordered how does he find where to begin? Towards what Good does 
he aim? Augustine would affirm Taylor’s point here, and this is manifested in his distinction 
between Caritas and Cupiditas. For Augustine, acquisitive love is neither good nor bad, to desire 
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is to be human, it is the way God has created us.477 The distinction between these two forms of 
love, then, is not in acquisition (kind) but in the object of the acquisition. In this sequence, there 
are only two possibilities, either love ascends or it descends.478 Caritas is that love which is 
ascends because it is rightly order on God whereas Cupiditas is that which descends because it is 
focused on this world, on the temporal. This is the fundamental problem for human creatures and 
the fatal flaw of all Greek philosophy. Augustine does not believe that man can ascend the ladder 
of righteous on his own accord. Yes, man seeks the Good so that his soul may find its proper 
end, but sin causes the fallen creature to always pursue the wrong end, to worship the wrong 
thing as god. The fallen creature’s conception of what is, in actuality, the Good perpetually 
remains turned or curved downward towards the finite and contingent realms.479 Man will always 
seek the Good but what is conceived of as the Good will never be that chief end for which he 
was created. Eros, the soul’s search for that which befits it, must be supplemented from without. 
Augustine purports this is where the agapē love of God is needed. Only through an act of grace 
whereby the divine descends to the creature and empowers him/her through the work of the 
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Spirit can one be directed towards the proper telos.480 Only once the Spirit illumines the heart 
may man’s ultimate aims be properly aimed towards God and it is this illumination which 
empowers the ascent. 
Augustine believes that erōs and agapē are synthesized in the life of the believer. What 
he finds true and profitable in Neo-Platonism must be supplemented by the Christian conception 
of agapē. The issue that remains however is this, does Augustine properly synthesize erōs and 
agapē? Moreover, are the two types of love even synthesizable or are they, at their core, 
mutually exclusive; the former being fundamentally egocentric and the latter theocentric? Martin 
Luther vehemently rejected this synthesis and attempted to dismantle the relationship between 
the two. For him there were at least two glaring issues with the synthesis. The first is the 
implications related to merit, salvation and the will. If it is the case that the Spirit must act first, 
independent of the person’s will, in order for man to assume the proper telos in erōs, what sort of 
causality is taking place and what are the implications of that act. When the Spirit acts and 
imbues supernatural ability to man does then man’s will take over as he begins the ascent – to 
love with agapē toward God and neighbor – or is it the case the Spirit continues to act and direct 
the will in agapē action? The former brought a measure of pause for Luther due to the seeming 
implication that man had the capacity to earn merit in his own salvation and subsequently 
sanctification. This was inherently problematic for it suggested that man had a mechanism within 
his own nature which could work towards salvation. In this sense, agapē love was the act of 
properly calibrating the mechanism which, when pointed in the right direction, could follow the 
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desire of the soul in proper pursuit of God. It would seem this reduces the Spirit to a divine spark 
needed, merely the cause, albeit a necessary one, to put the sojourner on the right course. 
Second, Luther consider erōs to be inherently antithetical to Christian love because it was 
fundamentally egocentric. In the Heidelberg Disputation of 1518 we see Luther’s separation and 
rejection of the erōs paradigm even though he does not mention it by name; he writes, “The love 
of God does not find, but creates, that which is pleasing to it. The love of man comes into being 
through that which is pleasing to it.”481 Like Augustine’s curvatus (or curve downward), Luther 
also believes that man has a natural bent. While Augustine’s curve emphasizes the object of 
one’s love, Luther’s is transfixed on the lover, on erōs itself. Luther believes that man’s 
corruption is inherent to the very kind of erōs love that is symptomatic of the sinful creature. 
This love is turned inward and is at its core selfish and self-seeking and antithetical to agapē. But 
in eradicating the synthesis perhaps Luther goes too far to the other end of the spectrum. Wishing 
to remove any form of human involvement, the other option placed causality of all 
manifestations of agapē, beyond simple calibration, in the work of the Spirit. But this move also 
seems problematic due to the nature of love and relationality. The assumption here being that 
love, if it is to be called genuine agapē love, must be freely given and freely received. In this 
formula however, love is freely received by the human being but not freely given for it is the 
work of the Spirit and not man in the love of both God and others. Who is doing the loving and 
who is loving who? If love is genuine then it needs to truly involve the will of another. In this 
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formula it seems as if the human being is merely a conduit for the Spirit to act, the personal 
agency of the human overridden. 
 In light of this discussion there are a few assertions that I wish to call into question. First, 
are erōs and agapē inherently antithetical to one another? It doesn’t seem that the answer is 
necessarily affirmative at least not in the sense that there is a logical contradiction. Irving Singer 
agrees and states, “There is no contradiction in thinking that man’s love is the created effect of 
God’s love, which both compliments and causes it, leading it to spiritual union after all other 
inclinations have been renounced.”482 One argument for the rejection of the synthesis was it 
made God, as the summum bonum, into merely a means whereby one could achieve their selfish 
end of happiness. But I think Augustine is aware of this and safeguards this assertion by 
introducing the idea of enjoyment or frui towards and object within the framework of caritas.483 
On the relation to objects (or persons), Augustine makes the distinction between enjoyment (frui) 
and use (uti). The former is the end whereas the latter is the means to achieve that end. 
Concerning enjoyment, he writes, “for to enjoy a thing is to rest with satisfaction in it for its own 
sake.”484 Augustine asserts that the Trinity alone is the true object of enjoyment and, not a means 
to achieve another end, but to be enjoyed for its own sake. 
 Second, over the course of criticism has agapē become too vacuous? Nygren, who is 
himself Lutheran, defines agapē as “spontaneous and unmotivated,” “indifferent to value,” 
                                                      
 482 Irving Singer, The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther (Part 1), (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009), 
341. Singer also points out he believes that the cause for disagreement is not in the two notions of love but more 
fundament Christian attitudes between Catholics and Protestants, namely, the nature and goodness of man and 
whether or not there is any good in man or anything there worth love. 
 483 St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2, trans. by J. F. Shaw, 
ed. by Philip Schaff, (Edinburgh, Scotland: T&T Clark, 1997), 523, 527-28 (I.3-5, 22). 
 484 Ibid., 523 (I.4). 
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“creative” and “the initiator of fellowship with God.”485 Because of its origin from God, it is 
understandable why one would conceptualize agapē as unmotivated so as to protect the 
immutability of God. But when applied to God’s love for man, does it become too vacuous? 
Consider Nygren’s statement on agapē:  
Love towards God does not seek to gain anything. It most certainly does not seek 
to gain anything other than God. But neither does it seek to gain even God 
Himself or His love. The very thought of gaining God’s love, is fundamentally 
alien to it. It is the free – and in that sense spontaneous – surrender of the heart to 
God. When God gives His love freely and for nothing, there remains nothing for 
man to gain by loving God. His love for God loses the character of a deserving 
achievement and becomes pure and unfeigned.486 
His application here is quite brazen and honestly describes a love that is seemingly less-than 
personal, lacking any measure of affection or desire. I propose that if you try and reduce agapē 
to pure choice of another over oneself then you are no longer talking about love but a 
supererogatory act that is seemingly arbitrary and vacuous. Yes, there are very few explanations 
that can be given for God’s initial act of creation but they are all rooted in his nature. What is 
also part of his nature is personhood, and as we have seen the personhood of God does not need 
to be thought of in a static, immutable sense but in a dynamic way, of a mutual love between 
persons that both gives and receives freely but also enjoys the other.487 
 Third, what of the erōs paradigm altogether? For Augustine, erōs was clearly a paradigm 
he thought compatible with Scripture, but it is interesting to note that that Greek word is not used 
in the Bible. I believe Augustine is correct in the opening pages of his Confessions, that we are 
                                                      
 485 Nygren, Agape and Eros, 75-81. Nygren also asks the question of whether or not Luther contributes a 
positive definition of erōs or merely use it as a platform of negative theology to critique the caritas synthesis. On 
whether or not Luther succeeded, according to Nygren, see Ibid., 722-737. 
 486 Ibid., 94. 
487 For more on the immutability of God see W. Norris Clark, S.J., “A New Look at the Immutability of 
God,” in God Knowable and Unknowable, ed. by Robert J. Roth, S.J., (New York: Fordham University Press, 
1973), 43-72 (especially the conclusion, 66-70). 
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made for God and we are restless till we find rest in Him. This notion is similar to the popular C. 
S. Lewis quotes which states, “If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can 
satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world.”488 But perhaps 
Augustine would have fared far better if he had simply left the erōs paradigm behind when 
conceptualizing man’s love for God. The Bible does not seem to complicate the paradigm of 
love. In the Scriptures we see both an invitation and command. The invitation is to come and 
enjoy God, just as the Psalmist states, “I sought the LORD, and he answered me…Oh, taste and 
see that the LORD is good!”489 Elsewhere the command, “Love the Lord your God with all your 
heart, soul, mind and strength.”490 Here the command to love includes the whole person, the 
heart (affection/desire) as well as will and mind. But more importantly the love between God and 
man is a love between persons, a love with personal affections. The goodness God sees in us 
only come from Him, from the Christ-life that has transformed human persons into the persons 
they were meant to be. In closing these words of Lewis are fitting: “He [man] does not think God 
will love us because we are good, but that God will make us good because He loves us; just as 
the roof of a greenhouse does not attract the sun because it is bright, but becomes bright because 
the sun shines on it.”491 
Conclusion 
 Much ground has been covered in this chapter but throughout each topic – heaven, 
knowledge of God, God’s love for man, man’s love for God – there have been underlying themes 
of love and relationality, knowability and mystery. In the section on heaven we saw that a 
                                                      
 488 Lewis, Mere Christianity, 114. 
 489 Ps. 34:4a, 8. 
 490 Deut. 6:5; Matt. 22:37; Luke 10:27. 
 491 Lewis, Mere Christianity, 59. 
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Biblical depiction of heaven is one where heaven and earth come together, where God is seated 
on the throne and human beings enjoy him and his creation. On the section concerning the 
mystery of God, a taxonomy of mystery was provided detailing that revelational mystery rests in 
the tension of both revealing and hiddenness. Such is the nature of God, he is both 
communicable yet beyond being communicated. Any knowledge that we do have of God is due 
to the kind of being he created us to be, namely personal creatures that share in some compacity, 
through the imago Dei, with the divine Tri-unity of persons. In the section on God’s love for 
man, Kierkegaard’s work concerning equative love was unpacked, an imaginative yet 
illuminative excursion into the lengths God went to realize his end of love and relationship 
between the infinite and the finite. It was suggested that a revelation through condescension, in 
the Incarnation of the Christ, was the necessary means for a love that would not ultimately be 
frustrated through inequality. Lastly, and in light of the lengths God went to procure such a 
relationship, man’s love for God was considered. Augustine stands as a pivotal figure in the 
doctrine of Christian love. His synthesis of erōs and agapē into what he called caritas has been a 
Catholic staple ever since. It was not until the Reformation when Luther challenged this 
synthesis and tried to dismantle any association of agapē to erōs. But like all pendulum swings, 
perhaps Luther goes too far in trying to protect agapē. It was suggested that Augustine’s notion 
of longing and desire in human beings for God is accurate but that distancing oneself from the 
Greek notion of erōs might be beneficial as well. In the end we returned to the concept of 
personhood and suggested that a robust picture of Biblical love is one that includes the whole 
person which would entail both will and affection. Yes, God’s agapē love is the starting point of 
all things Christian, but perhaps there is more to Biblical love than mere unmotivated action. In 
my mind’s eye, I imagine the persons of the Trinity enjoying each other from all eternity. The act 
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of creation, then, is the instantiation of a loving invitation to join in and partake of the divine 
love, enjoyment, and unity which forms the fundamental foundation of all reality. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 The study began with a quote from the British philosopher Bernard Williams raising the 
question of the goodness of eternity. The afterlife, as Williams suggests, must be a place which 
renders boredom unthinkable. Eternity brings out all possibilities and by extrapolating out into 
eternal duration, it would seem if one could become bored in the afterlife he/she inevitably 
would. It would not matter when it happened either for there would still remain an eternal 
existence following the event. At that moment of singularity, when a specific pleasure brought 
on the first intimations of boredom, however minute, the quality of the afterlife would have 
crossed over a point of no return. These thoughts have caused theologians and philosophers to 
wrestle with the concept of eternal existence and question whether or not it is something to be 
desired. Both Islamic and Christian orthodoxy affirm that human creatures are intended to live 
forever in a realm of unending pleasure and bliss. Moreover, these respective versions of the 
afterlife – Paradise and Heaven – have been designed by the Deity to meet the needs of the finite 
human creatures who inhabit these realms. Thus, the comparative study ensued, seeking to 
discover if one theological system provides a better account of the afterlife over the other. Is it 
the experience of God as Tawḥīd or Trinity that better meets the demand of eternity? 
 Three essential themes emerged in the study – knowledge, love and the afterlife. The 
afterlife, it was assumed, had to contain some measure of proximity to the Divine if it was to 
meet the demands of eternity (QGP). Following that assumption, the other two themes – 
knowledge and love – became of paramount import. Love between persons seems to be a 
fundamental good within human existence and thus would be necessary for human flourishing. 
But before love can be had, there must first be knowledge for that which is not known cannot be 
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loved. This seems true also if man is to love God and God is in some way to love man. Thus, 
these themes became the main points of comparison between Christianity and Islam. 
 Within the Islamic tradition, al-Ghazālī was chosen as the specific dialogue partner for a 
number of key reasons. First, al-Ghazālī has been called “the Proof of Islam” and it seemed that 
if one were to question the truthfulness of Islam, then he/she would need to interact with such a 
distinguished figure. Second, al-Ghazālī was very concerned with the religious practices of his 
time and felt that the Islam community at large had abandoned their pursuit of the afterlife. In 
response, he wrote the Revival of the Religious Sciences, a series of 40 books which had the 
purpose of reorienting the Muslim believer towards attaining Paradise. Third, al-Ghazālī also 
emphasized that Allah is the ultimate good and it is the Beatific Vision (i.e. the closest proximity 
to Allah in Paradise) which is the highest state of bliss. His conviction is shared as it seems that 
if the QGP is met in the afterlife it will be linked to human experience of and proximity to the 
divine for Allah represents the ultimate good. 
 The second chapter was dedicated to creating a particular depiction of Islamic Paradise. 
Due to the nature of tawḥīd, connection to Allah is limited and any access to him in Paradise is 
indirect. Because of this, it has been purported that the sensual pleasures and general bliss of 
Paradise are instances in which Allah is experienced albeit indirectly. Some mystical Islamic 
thinkers have suggested that Paradise itself is a theophany of Allah which radically transforms 
the way Paradise is imagined. At the very least, the blessings of Paradise are said to be a direct 
result of Allah’s good intentions. The more one experiences this bestowal of bliss, the more one 
is compelled to give praise to Allah. But these same pleasures, as some have suggested, are 
locations wherein a deeper metaphysical experience is had. Allah’s presence being mystically 
mediated through these blessings and rewards. Lastly, the highest level of reward was discussed. 
   
 
 
197
The Qur’ān teaches there are gradations to Paradise and the highest level of reward resides in 
Firdaws where the faithful few experience the Beatific Vision of Allah. It is this final reality 
which al-Ghazālī sought to attain. 
 The third chapter discussed the themes of knowledge and love within the context of 
Islam. More specifically, knowledge and love were examined within the context of al-Ghazālī’s 
works. His intellectual story begins with a disillusionment towards his intellectual past and this 
led him into a personal journey through the various disciplines of Islam in order to discover what 
is the proper path to the afterlife. For nearly ten years al-Ghazālī lived a hermetic and ascetic life 
and emerged from the journey convinced he had found the true way. But this path was not 
wholly synonymous with what had come before. It was shown that al-Ghazālī’s refined view was 
a new synthesis of both mystical and philosophical traditions. Al-Ghazālī saw both the strengths 
and weakness of each and developed from them his own system for attaining Paradise. This 
system begins logically with knowledge and for al-Ghazālī this was the starting point of a 
fundamental aspect of spiritual progress – polishing the heart. Knowledge of Allah is knowledge 
of his attributes. For Muslims, these attributes are the model from which one should form his/her 
character. Al-Ghazālī described this process as polishing one’s heart so that the human will fades 
away and the heart reflects Allah’s attributes. Knowledge of Allah also lead to a love for him. 
Love for Allah is manifested through the acquiring of His attributes. It is in these moments of 
polishing wherein love for Allah is reciprocated. According to al-Ghazālī, when Allah sees 
himself reflected in the mirror, he then reciprocates the love of that individual. 
 The fourth chapter centers on the Christian tradition and combined the three themes of 
afterlife, knowledge and love into one chapter. Beginning with the characteristics of Heaven, it 
was suggested that faithful conceptions of heaven must include a dynamic embodied state. The 
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Medieval Scholastics, especially Aquinas, had become too influenced by Greek conceptions of 
the afterlife and as a result, their teachings of heaven were quite static and disembodied.492 There 
is a growing shift in modern evangelicalism which considers Heaven as not being something that 
Christians go to and leave the earth behind. Rather, the final scene of the eschaton entails heaven 
and earth coming together. Heaven is where God is and thus heaven will be on earth as God rules 
and reigns with the saints and the angels into eternity. The remaining two themes are quite 
important at this point. The potential for knowledge and love in Christianity are quite different 
than in Islam. The Triune God of Christianity is a god who reveals and communicates. But the 
Triune God does more than reveal and communicate in an indirect way, he does so by entering 
into space and time and revealing himself through the second person of the Trinity, the Word-
made-flesh – Jesus Christ. It was in the life and actions of Jesus wherein the love of God was put 
on full display. We see the triune God loving humanity first at a time when humanity was an 
enemy to God. Furthermore, this love is relational. Not only did God demonstrate his love 
through creation, he did so in a way that invites human creatures to know and be known. One 
fundamental distinction here which makes this a possibility is the fact that the triune God is a 
plurality of persons yet singular in essence and being. The Father, Son and Holy Spirit are the 
premier persons and have shared in a dynamic, communicative, self-giving and other focused 
reciprocating relationship. And, when God created man, he endowed human creatures with 
personhood as well. The Godhead is unified yet dynamic and communicative. It is because of 
these distinctions that true knowledge and love of God can be obtained and shared by humanity. 
                                                      
492 If not ontologically disembodied, it was a practical disembodiment. There was no space for the physical 
nature of heaven. 
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 This has been a brief summary of the study thus far. What follows are the comparative 
analysis and apologetic responses to Islam from the Christian perspective. We begin first with 
the application of the Inside/Out Approach. 
The Inside/Out Approach 
 The Inside/Out approach is an apologetic methodology intended to generate healthy and 
meaningful dialogue between two opposing views. The process begins with the Christian 
attempting to go inside of the Muslim’s worldview, to try and understand their theological 
perspective. Within this space there is room for agreement and affirmation. At the same time, 
however, there is also room for disagreement and critique. The Inside portion of the method 
seeks areas in which the worldview can be affirmed but also critiques the inherent limitations of 
the view’s logical conclusions. Once that is done, the conversation moves Outside of the 
worldview under examination and the Christian begins to explain how Christianity better 
explains/accounts for those affirmation made at the beginning. Throughout the study there have 
been two main themes as it relates to the divine/human relationship within the respective 
religions – knowledge and love. The next two sections will apply the Inside/Out method to these 
two fundamental themes. 
Transcendence and Knowability 
INSIDE 
 The transcendence of God is one of the positive attributes both Christians and Muslims 
affirm. God or Allah is unlike any other being in the universe. Anselm of Canterbury’s infamous 
pronouncement “God is that which nothing greater can be conceived” is a stalwart example of 
rightly capturing the transcendence that is due God in these two traditions. Nothing compares to 
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God’s greatness and majesty and this is seen reflected in both Islamic and Christian Scriptures.493 
From such passages the doctrine of transcendence is rightly applied to God for he is above all 
else. This should be welcomed in both Islam and Christianity. At the same time, however, the 
respective Scriptures also name God. They describe what God is like.494 These two statements – 
God is utterly transcendent and God is knowable – confront each religion at a crossroads. Both 
Christianity and Islam affirm that their respective revelations are from the Triune God or Allah 
and are therefore true and trustworthy. But in this case, what does it mean for the revelatory 
content to be true? How can God be both transcendent and known? There is a seeming 
contradiction in those two affirmations.495 The problem though is not on the part of the divine 
being and what he knows about himself; rather it is the capacity of finite human creatures. 
Human creatures are limited by language and mental capacity to know and explain that which is 
above all naming. It is thus posited that any human attempt to bring God down to our level, to 
describe him in human language, delimits the divine and creates a god in our own image. At the 
                                                      
 493 From the Bible: “No one is like you, O LORD; you are great, and your name is great in might.” (Jer. 
10:6) “There is none like you among the gods, O Lord, nor are there any works like yours.” (Ps. 86:8) “There is no 
one holy like the LORD, Indeed, there is no one besides You, nor is there any rock like our God.” (1 Sam. 2:2) From 
the Qur’ān: “There is nothing like Him…” (Q 42:11) “Say, ‘He is God the One, God the Eternal. He begot no one 
nor was He begotten. No one is comparable to Him.’” (Q 112:1-4) 
 494 From the Bible: “…for he is a God of justice.” (Ps. 50:6) “Our God is a God who saves…” (Ps. 68:19-
20) “…God is light, in him there is no darkness at all.” (1 John 1:5) “God is spirit, and his worshippers must 
worship in the Spirit and in truth.” (John 4:24) “…because God is love.” (1 John 4:8) From the Qur’ān: “The Most 
Excellent Names belong to God: use them to call on Him” (Q 7:180) “Say [to them], ‘Call on God, or on the Lord of 
Mercy – whatever names you call Him, the best names belong to Him.” (Q 17:110) In Q 59:22-24, Allah is called 
“Lord of Mercy,” “Giver of Mercy,” “the Controller,” “the Holy One,” “Source of Peace,” “Granter of Security,” 
“Guardian over all,” “the Almighty,” “the Compeller,” “the Truly Great,” “God is above anything they consider to 
be His partner.” 
495 Cragg rightly notes, “The problem of meaning in language exists for all religions and is not unique to 
Islam.” It is true that the problem of meaning applies to all religions. As we will see, Islam has much more difficulty 
addressing this problem than does Christianity. Cragg’s thoughts on this will be significant in the Outside portion of 
this section. Kenneth Cragg, The Call of the Minaret, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1956), 55. Tennent’s 
chapter on God and Islam (ch. 6) in Christianity at the Religious Roundtable is a fantastic source for understanding 
the challenge of transcendence and knowability. Furthermore, it is a fantastic example of healthy dialogue between 
interlocutors who fundamentally disagree on the nature of ultimate reality. 
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same time, revelation in the respective holy texts are believed to be just that, a revelation of the 
divine being. So, do we possess knowledge about God or do we not? The philosopher David 
Hume, through the empirical interlocutor Cleanthes, poses an interesting perspective on 
knowledge of God that highlights the challenge at hand. He writes: 
I can readily allow, said Cleanthes, that those who maintain the perfect simplicity 
of the Supreme Being, to the extent in which you have explained it, are complete 
Mystics, and chargeable with all the consequences which I have drawn from their 
opinion. They are, in a word, Atheists, without knowing it. For though it be 
allowed, that the Deity possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension; 
yet ought we never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely 
incompatible with that intelligent nature.496 
Hume’s observation suggests that emphasizing perfect simplicity in the nature of God is 
synonymous with saying that god does not exist. It would not necessarily be an ontological 
atheism but an atheism in practicality and epistemology. One may still adhere to a belief in 
God’s existence but practically speaking, nothing may be known about it. 
 The attribution of divine simplicity is one of the fundamental tenets of tawḥīd. Along 
with simplicity, it is also affirmed that Allah is utterly unique and unknowable (mukhālafah). A 
warranted question thus arises from these positive attributions, can one truly know what Allah is 
like? Furthermore, what does it mean for a name to belong to Allah in this context? Muslims 
affirm that the revelation of Allah is true but true in what sense? By true does it mean that this 
statement is an accurate proposition of whom the referent is Allah? Or by true is it meant that 
this statement is profitable for religious living and thus true practically? These language 
questions are long outstanding questions for the Muslim community that were a source of 
argument and disagreement since the early inception of Islam.497 
                                                      
 496 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part IV, 39. 
 497 This discussion highlights the relationship between Allah’s essence and his attributes. The traditional 
distinctions in this discussion are between two groups – the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites. Across the spectrum are 
two extreme poles – tashbīh and taʿṭīl. The first term – tashbīh – refers to comparison of attributes. In this reading of 
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 It may be suggested that the mystic is in some way able to overcome the language 
impasse through an immediacy of direct revelation. This is perhaps the case with some Sufi 
orders but not so with al-Ghazālī. In fact, it was the very same Sufi premise which al-Ghazālī 
sought to avoid in his methodology. For al-Ghazālī, mysticism is not an independent source of 
revelation about Allah. Instead, it is a moment of epistemological affirmation and internalization. 
Recall the three levels of tawḥīd – professing, internalization, tasting or naql, ʿaql, dhawq.498 The 
mystical experience is not one of new revelational content separate from that which is revealed 
in the Qur’an. Shehadi suggests the term mystical revelation is a bit misleading and a better way 
to describe the experience, and a more accurate description of al-Ghazālī’s view, is “mystical 
disclosure.”499 In this mystical experience, the truth of Islam, and more specifically the truth of 
tawḥīd, is presented immediately to believer. This apprehension of truth is non-inferential nor is 
                                                      
the relevant Qur’ānic texts, the attributes of Allah are either anthropomorphized or compared to created things. 
Obviously, this is shirk and unacceptable in classical Islam. The second term – taʿṭīl – refers to the emptying of all 
attributes. In this reading, Allah’s attributes are subsumed into his essence and thus he is divested of all attribution. 
On taʿṭīl, the Oxford Dictionary of World Religions notes, “they [Allah’s attributes] cannot belong literally to his 
own nature or being, and simply reflect our perception of his dealings with us.” John Bowker, ed., “Tashbīh,” in The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), (Accessed June 6, 
2018), http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780192800947.001.0001/acref-
9780192800947-e-7248. The Muʿtazilites affirmed tashbīh which made knowledge of Allah virtually impossible. 
Al-Ashʿarī, for whom the Ashʿarites are named, rejected tashbīh and instead affirmed tanzīh. The practice of tanzīh 
which sought to keep God pure and transcendent while at the same not divesting Islam of any meaningful language 
about Allah. Al-Ashʿarī rejected any anthropomorphisms relating to Allah by affirming tanzīh but also maintained 
an “agnostic acceptance of the language bilā kayf, without knowing how it is to be taken” (“Tashbīh”). Al-Ashʿarī 
purported that God’s words about God, his own revelation in the Qur’ān, “set up the directives by virtue of which 
reasoned judgments about the essence—attributes question are to be measured.” Nader El-Bizri, “God: Essence and 
Attributes,” in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, ed. by Tim Winter, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 128. https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521780582.007. (Accessed June 6, 
2018) In other words, the fact there is language about Allah in the Qur’ān revealed by Allah himself, there must be a 
way forward to speak meaningfully about Him while at the same time avoiding any form of idolatry. Al-Ash‘arī 
advocated for the distinction between Allah as he is in his essence versus as he is in his acts. He purported that Allah 
can be known through his actions. For example, the Qur’ān states that Allah will forgive those who believe. From 
that action it can be inferred that Allah is forgiving. While the attribute doesn’t reach Allah’s essence, from a 
creaturely perspective, Allah is forgiving, is a valid statement about Allah. The difficulty with this position is that it 
still precludes any analogous statement truly referring to Allah. There is no comparison. So, the question of whether 
or not this tension can be overcome will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 498 Shehadi provides the Arabic terms here. Shehadi, Unique and Unknowable, 68. 
 499 Ibid., 68.  
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it mediated in any way. But the content is not new, only the relation of the knower to the content 
has changed. This is the highest level of tawḥīd wherein the subject knows that there is none 
truly Real save Allah. 
 The distinction here concerning mystical revelation and disclosure is significant but at the 
same time the knowledge/attribute problem is still present. Al-Ghazālī’s mystical experience is 
not a bypass of revelatory content; rather, it is a direct and unmediated internalization of said 
content. The Qur’ān is the final authority but the problem of knowability remains. If Al-Ghazālī 
is correct in his description of this experience, the Muslim becomes certain that truth has been 
affirmed but again we may ask who or what is the supposed truth really referring to? Even if this 
disclosure is a direct act of Allah, the content which is affirmed does not correspond to Him. 
This is problematic because al-Ghazālī has stated that closeness to Allah “lies in attribute rather 
than in physical location.”500 Moreover, conceptual longing for Allah is a quintessential function 
of Islamic religious life, especially in Paradise. But again, we must ask, what is the thing which 
Muslims must long for if language does not attain Him? 
If conceptual longing reaches its climactic level in Paradise, being sustained at that level 
by the never-ending self-disclosure of Allah, would it not then be problematic if that which is 
being conceived is not analogous to who Allah truly is? According to classical Ashʿarite 
theology, human language and human conceptions about Allah are subjective conceptions that 
do not objectively correspond to Allah. Though he is given divine names, Mercy never reaches 
Him, Benevolence never reaches Him, Justice never reaches Him, Love never reaches Him.501 
                                                      
 500 Al-Ghazālī, Love, 103. 
 501 These attributes were capitalized for rhetorical force. They are some of the 99 names of Allah. By 
capitalizing the attributes it demonstrates that the very names of Allah are not names about Him directly. They do 
not reach him. 
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All such attributes are merely equivocations between human conceptions and Allah’s true 
character. Consequently, the human perception of what is disclosed in Paradise, the Vision of 
Allah, which is to be the source of unending bliss, is to some degree illusory. Furthermore, it is 
curious that what is bringing them bliss is what has rightly been identified as virtues. Love of 
God really seems to be love of the virtues. These virtues are the ones Allah has revealed about 
himself to Muslims in the Qur’ān. But again, if Allah is unique and unknowable, the virtues 
themselves, however good and noble, do not reach Him. Therefore, I would submit that what 
Muslims actually love are abstract objects, or various conceptual virtues, which then form a 
purely subjective image of Allah in each individual Muslim believer. But this is extremely 
disconcerting for orthodox Islam because what is being set up by this religious language is an 
image other than Allah. Loving something other than Allah is shirk. It would seem that all 
religious language about Allah is necessarily guilty of it, that is, guilty of some form of idolatry. 
 Al-Ghazālī was a theologian within the tradition of al-Ashʿarī and so therefore affirmed 
that Allah was unique and unknowable but at the same time, religious language was still 
meaningful in some sense. From the onset, Al-Ghazālī appears to be locked in a logical-
epistemic tension with a razor thin margin much akin to the eschatological bridge (as-sirāt) that 
all people are fated to cross. That Allah is truly unique and unknowable seems to contradict any 
positive-attribute statement made of Allah. Either Allah is truly unknowable in any sense or He 
can be known and thus compromises tawḥīd.502 Al-Ghazālī appears to have anticipated this 
problem and purports that “disclosure of that which cannot be disclosed in this world will 
                                                      
502 As Scalise points out, it would seem that even saying that Allah is one, a simple affirmation of tawḥīd is 
problematic because it said with creaturely language and creaturely conceptions. He writes, “[human language] 
infringe[s] upon tawḥīd itself for how else would a Muslim understand a radical oneness apart from creaturely 
analogy.” Scalise, “Tawḥīdic Allah,” 6. 
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actually be possible [in that world].”503 But why think that is the case? This assertion contradicts 
the already established notion that Allah is unique and unknowable. Al-Ghazālī cites Surah 66:8 
as a proof text for disclosure in the life to come: “Their light will shine in front of them and on 
their right, and they will say: ‘Lord, perfect our light for you and forgive us’.” This was the 
Ashʿarite position also supported by a hadith which states “a veil shall be lifted, and the believers 
shall gaze upon the face of God.”504 For al-Ghazālī, the beatific vision was the full disclosure in 
the life to come, the completion of what can be experienced to a limited degree in this life. 
 The link between knowledge and the beatific vision highlights the importance of the 
revelatory content in the Qur’ān. While al-Ghazālī affirmed that revelation was authoritative and 
necessary for knowledge about Allah, there still is the seeming contradiction between these two 
statements: Allah is utterly unique and unknowable and positive-attribute statements about Allah, 
both of which are found in the Qur’ān.505 Al-Ghazālī posits that what can be known can only 
come from that which is familiar. Since Allah is unfamiliar to anything experienced in this life, 
creaturely characterization cannot reach Him. Fadlou Shehadi sees the difficulty in these 
statements and works through al-Ghazālī’s thought to see if there is a true contradiction, an 
aporia, or if the two statements can be reconciled. In Shehadi’s analysis of al-Ghazālī’s thought, 
he concludes there is no inconsistency between these two statements. It is true that al-Ghazālī 
                                                      
 503 Ibid. 91. 
504 Sahih Muslim 181a, Book 1, Hadith 356. Found in Marcia Hermansen, “Eschatology,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, ed. by Tim Winter, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 320. https://www-cambridge-org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/core/services/aop-cambridge-
core/content/view/9391919C2854766CDF175CA21062454A/9781139001816c15_p308-
324_CBO.pdf/eschatology.pdf (accessed March 31, 2018). 
505 Al-Ghazālī writes that God Most High is “completely free from characterization in terms of man’s 
perfection, even as He is free from characterization in terms of man’s imperfections. God Most High is free from 
and exalted above every attribute that one could possibly ascribe to man, and above everything resembling them.” 
Al-Ghazālī, The Ninety-Nine Names of Allah (al-Maqsad al-Ansa), trans. by Robert Charles Stade, (Ibadan, Nigeria: 
Daystar Press, 1970), 21. https://archive.org/details/99NamesOfAllahalMaqsadAlAsnaByGhazali_201711 
(Accessed Jan. 24, 2019) 
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affirms a knowable aspect of Allah through his acts in creation but at the same time he also 
affirms that this knowledge is inadequate since those attributes are understood in creaturely 
terms and Allah is utterly unlike that which is known to human beings.506 Shehadi summarizes it 
this way, “Thus to know God amounts to understanding the authoritative language about God 
which is expressed in human terms.”507 Creaturely language used to describe God is 
authoritatively given because it comes from the Qur’ān but insofar as said language refers to 
Allah as a positive-attribute statement, that statement is descriptively false. According to 
Shehadi, however, this does not mean that the contradiction persists.508 There apparently is value 
in these creedal statements for they are what Allah has chosen to say about himself and their 
application to one’s life adds value. The religious language purportedly adds practical religious 
value by providing virtues for all people to emulate. But in the end, the positive attribute 
statement Allah is X, does not reveal Allah as He is in Himself, this point must not be forgotten. 
 Both al-Ghazālī’s reasoning and Shehadi’s analysis are unsatisfying responses to the 
problem of knowability in Islam. It is troublesome to consider that for al-Ghazālī, the unending 
bliss of Paradise, the highest level one can attain, consists of the full-disclosure of Allah. What is 
actually being disclosed for the veil itself cannot be lifted. What is it then that will satisfy human 
creatures for all of eternity if God cannot be disclosed? The matter becomes even more puzzling 
when we consider al-Ghazālī’s mirror analogy and the impetus for God’s love. Recall back to al-
Ghazālī’s thoughts on the heart and how Muslims are to become like polished mirrors which 
reflect the attributes of God. God’s love for man it was argued is merely God’s love for himself 
                                                      
506 Al-Ghazālī writes, “…Or, consider, how in the world of sense, which is the highest to which your 
knowledge can rise,” Mishkāt al-Anwar, 121 
507 Shehadi, Al-Ghazālī’s Unique and Unknowable God, 75. 
508 On the apparent contradiction Shehadi writes, “We have seen that the first inconsistency is unreal, for 
what God reveals is a guide for man and not, strictly speaking, a self-description.” Ibid., 121. 
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as he sees himself in the mirror. But if that which man emulates is descriptively false then that 
which is reflected in the mirror is descriptively false. What then does Allah see in the mirror and 
why, if it is descriptively false, does he love what he sees? There are at least two possible 
responses to this question. First, perhaps Allah loves the virtues he sees reflected in the mirrors. 
But right away this option will not do because if Allah loves that which is descriptively false, 
then these virtues are not part of the divine self and thus Allah would be loving something other 
than Himself which he does not do. Second, if he does not love what he sees in relation to the 
content reflected, perhaps he loves the human effort to love Him. This is possible but at the same 
time it seems to defeat the purpose of even becoming a mirror in the first place. Reflecting Allah, 
or at least the subjective conception of Allah, thus seems trivial because these attributes do not 
even describe him. He cannot love what is reflected in the mirror only that there were human 
attempts to reflect the divine Image. 
 The divine knowledge/human language impasse is problematic for Islam. Not only is 
language cut off from the Divine but so too is knowledge and subsequently any meaningful 
experience or relationality. No matter how creative or valiant the effort, the affirmation that God 
is utterly unique and unknowable means there is an incomprehensible chasm between the human 
creature and Allah. Instead of being able to affirm that God is like X with a humble confidence, 
Muslims are forced into a voluntarist corner. Islamic theologians are compelled to affirm that 
creedal statements concerning Allah must have religious value and religious significance but that 
assertion rests on a faith that is not really based in evidence but through sheer sustenance of the 
will. 
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The transcendent chasm cannot be crossed by human effort and interestingly it cannot be 
crossed by Allah either.509 In some respects, Allah is a prisoner to his own transcendence. It is 
something he cannot overcome. Furthermore, the reality of this impasse, has a profoundly 
negative impact on Paradise. If Allah is the highest Good, and if Muslims are to enjoy unending 
bliss in Paradise as they are in proximity to Allah, then what is there to truly hope for? Religious 
language is cut off from Allah which seriously delimits its objective spiritual value. The attempt 
to explain a theological union has fallen short. For Muslims, there does appear to be much space 
for hope in terms of union with the Divine. As a result, the goodness of Paradise appears 
compromised. 
OUTSIDE 
Christianity likewise affirms that God is transcendent and is a doctrine both Christians 
and Muslim can agree upon. Like Islam, there is a mystical tradition within Christianity which 
emphasizes the transcendence and hiddenness of God. Meister Eckhart, a medieval mystic and 
theologian, once wrote in a sermon, “let us pray to God to be free of God.”510 This prayer may 
initially seem puzzling, but the concern in Eckhart’s petition demonstrates a healthy caution 
when thinking about God. It may seem that he is praying to be free from God in a relational or 
experiential way, he is not and does not wish to distance himself from the divine. Rather, his 
prayer focuses on the knower, on himself personally, and the petition aims at ridding the subject 
of all mental conceptions about God that are not-God. Perhaps the prayer would have more 
clarity if the subsequent clause was included: “…that we may gain the truth and enjoy it 
                                                      
 509 Or, at least, is not crossed by Allah. If he had the capacity to cross the impasse and meaningfully reveal 
himself and relate to creation in a personal way but chose not to, that would say something not only about his love 
but the goodness of his character as well. 
 510 Meister Eckhart, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, trans. and ed. by Maurice O’C. 
Walshe, (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2009), 422.  
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eternally.” Eckhart’s prayer is made clearer when re-worded this way, “let us pray to God that 
He will help to illuminate within us those areas in which our thinking about God is incorrect and 
has become idolatrous.” Eckhart highlights the challenge human creatures face when speaking of 
and theorizing about God. We can quickly and all to easily create in our minds a mental image of 
God that is not-God, an image that has become muddled by our selfish will and desires. The 
caution is warranted and welcomed.511 
Michael Sells suggests that Eckhart’s prayer invites us to “reconsider the conventions, the 
logic, and the paradoxes of the distinctive mode of discourse it embodies.”512 The mode of 
discourse Sells is referring to relates to the “dilemma of transcendence” as he calls it.513 The 
dilemma begins with the phrase “God is beyond all names” for in doing so God has been named 
as that which is beyond all naming. That which is above naming receives a name and, just as it 
was with Islam, an aporia forms.514 I would submit that Sells is correct to some extent. 
Christianity is not automatically free from the implications of transcendence and the need for 
theological development regarding language about God persists. However, within Christianity, is 
an aporia truly present and warranted? No, it is not. 
We have seen that religious language about God has the possibility of being an 
equivocation of terms. In this manner, words do not reach their referent, although it is argued by 
                                                      
511 While Eckhart’s words are a helpful reminder here, I am not affirming his mystical methodology which 
is further spelled out in this homily. It is interesting to note, however, that much of what Eckhart advocates is very 
much in line with the mystical traditions in Islam. There appears to be a mutual consensus in the mystical traditions 
– both Islamic and Christian – on the need for emptying the self, especially of its will and desires. It is only when 
one becomes poor in spirit (i.e. emptied) that an ‘at-oneness’ with God may be achieved. 
512 Michael A. Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 2. 
513 Ibid. 
514 Sells does not work around through the aporia but rather develops the ideas of mystical language that 
have emerged from the apparent dilemma. He states that there are traditionally three options when faced with the 
dilemma of naming: silence, distinguish between God-as-he-is-in-himself and God-as-he-is-in-creatures 
(communicable vs. incommunicable attributes), and finally, embracing the aporia but instead of it leading to silence 
a new mode of discourse is introduce – negative theology. Ibid., 2-3. 
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Muslim mystics they do so in in some mystical and indirect manner.515 Another possibility with 
religious language is the suggestion that the phrase “God is love” is univocal, the human 
conception of the love of God capturing the essence of divine love in its entirety. This option is 
rightly rejected by both orthodox Christianity and orthodox Islam, and for good reason. Human 
beings are finite creatures and neither our mental capacities nor our language has the potential of 
fully grasping the divine. This is not a negative affirmation, we should not expect to be able to 
fully grasp the divine, nor should we want to be able to do so. If human beings could fully 
comprehend God, if creaturely language could capture the divine, then God would not be God 
and definitely not an object worthy of worship. The fact that human creatures cannot 
comprehend God fully was cause for thankfulness for St. Augustine, he writes, “Well, God be 
thanked that He said, ‘If you believe not,’ and did not say, ‘If you comprehend not.’ For who can 
comprehend this?”516 The God of the Christian tradition does not say come and comprehend 
fully but he does invite humanity to come and know. 
This leads to a third option for religious language – analogical predication. Although 
Scripture affirms human beings “see through a glass dimly,” it is implied we still can see.517 I 
would submit that human language about God, the positive attribute statements derived from 
Scripture, are not an equivocation or univocation of terms. Instead, they are an analogical 
                                                      
 515 Obviously, Muslim mystics are not the only mystical tradition within these two monotheistic faiths. 
There is, as was mentioned, a mystical tradition within Christianity. This tradition also affirms that language about 
God is fundamentally limited and is thus committed to understanding religious language through metaphor and 
symbolism. Like the Muslim mystics, these Christian mystics affirm that religious language is not meaningless and 
has spiritual significance. For more on the nature of religious symbolism (which includes metaphor) see W. T. Stace, 
Time and Eternity: An Essay in the Philosophy of Religion, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), esp. 62-65. 
516 St. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 7. 
Translated by John Gibb Edited by Philip Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1888.), 38.10. 
Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1701038.htm (Accessed 
Jan. 24, 2019) 
517 1 Cor. 13:12 
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predication. According to Baggett and Walls, analogical predication is a long-standing Christian 
tradition, “according to which God’s goodness, though recognizable as such, is nonetheless 
infinitely greater than human goodness.”518 Analogical predication avoids the pitfalls of both 
equivocation and univocation for it suggest that we do know something of God’s nature yet it is 
not fully comprehend. Consider this analogy from C. S. Lewis which helps to capture this idea: 
“The Divine ‘goodness’ differs from ours, but it is not sheerly different: it differs from ours not 
as white from black but as a perfect circle from a child’s first attempt to draw a wheel. But when 
the child has learned to draw, it will know that the circle it then makes is what it was trying to 
make form the very beginning.”519 This analogy demonstrates the relation between human 
knowledge of divine attributes as they relate to the divine itself. The knowledge is best 
understood not in terms of contrast (equivocation) but as correspondence. 
Perhaps more significant than the language correspondence is the human capacity for 
knowledge and rationality. Kenneth Cragg has rightly pointed out that the problem of language is 
a problem for all religions but then suggested: “It can only be solved within the conviction that 
the Divine and the human are truly meaningful to each other: only in the confidence that the 
relationships God has with man are really indicative of His Nature.520 When Christians affirm 
that “God is love” there is a level of confidence and this affirmation is warranted for a few 
reasons. First, there is some a priori reason that God’s intentions will correspond to reality. It is 
reasonable to believe that if God wills our well-being (our salvation) and He is the source of that 
                                                      
 518 David Baggett, and Jerry L. Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 48. Kindle Edition 
 519 C. S. Lewis, Problem of Pain in The Complete C. S. Lewis Signature Classics, (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2002), 568. 
520 He further states, “We only put these convictions more shortly – and sublimely – when we say: ‘God is 
Love’. Islam has never felt able to say that. The pressure of these problems is the measure of its reluctance.” 
Kenneth Cragg, The Call of the Minaret, 55-6. 
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well-being – in both this life and the life to come – then access to God would be possible. 521 
Second, the Triune God of Christianity is inherently personal and relational. Furthermore, a 
fundament anthropological doctrine within Christianity is that human beings have been created 
in the image of God and that part the image entails possessing personhood. The God of 
Christianity is not an abstract “it” but a personal “Thou” who reveals Himself through the Word 
and the Scriptures. This leads to the third reason, that is, the revelation of God Himself in the 
second person of the trinity, the “word made flesh,” Jesus Christ.522 The second person of the 
Trinity, left heaven and became incarnated, taking on human flesh, becoming fully human while 
remaining fully God. Jesus taught that he was and is the full revelation of the Father.523 
Examining the life and teachings of Jesus reveals what God is like. Through Jesus’s teaching and 
demonstration we see that the nature of God is loving, caring and relational. One can see that the 
God of Christianity deeply cares for creation to the extent that one of the persons of Trinity was 
willing to sacrifice His life so that all of humanity might live. Humanity is extremely valuable to 
God, and it is with this conviction Christians can affirm that God has made himself known. 
Furthermore, Christians can rest assured that when Jesus stated eternal life was knowing God, 
not only are they able to truly know this good God but that He is good, personal and loving.524 
                                                      
 521 Richard Swinburne writes: “IF there is a God who wills men’s eternal well-being and chooses to allow 
men the choice of whether to seek it or not, there is reason to expect that he will take steps to ensure that they 
acquire information as to how to attain that well-being.” Furthermore, “So there is a priori reason to suppose that 
God will reveal to us those things needed for our salvation.” Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to 
Analogy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 72, 74. Walls also presents a similar conviction: “If we desire 
a meaningful life for ourselves and others, and if this is at the heart of our ethical convictions, then is it not 
reasonable to believe the God who is ultimately responsible for our consciousness and moral reflection shares these 
concerns? And if he shares these concerns, is it not reasonable to believe he supports them in substantive ways? 
Indeed, to know God himself and to be rightly related to him, can be met?” Walls, Heaven, 30-31. 
 522 John 1:1 and especially John 1:14. 
 523 John 14:9 
 524 John 17:2-4 
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The beatific vision of heaven is the reality of heaven and earth, God and man coming together in 
a loving relational union where all persons will know and be known by their Maker. 
Love and Relationality 
INSIDE 
 This section considers the second of the two important stations of the path – love.525 One 
of the Ninety-nine names of Allah is al-Wadūd or the “objectively loving One.”526 As such, love 
forms an integral part of the divine attributes of Allah. Nasr has argued that non-Muslim sources 
have a skewed perception of Divine love in Islam. To support his argument that Allah is 
fundamentally loving he cites a well-known hadith which states “On the Throne of God is 
written, “Verily My Mercy and Compassion precede my Wrath.”527 Allah has wrath, indeed, but 
this is preceded by his love and Nasr calls for a healthy balance when considering the attributes 
of Allah. Nasr emphasizes the correlation between Allah’s compassion and the act of creation. 
He purports that Allah’s compassion and mercy form the ethical causality of creation. Allah 
loved to be known and because of this the world is permeated with the divine attributes. Thus, 
from the observation of creation, the divine names are manifested and revealed. According to 
Nasr, these names reveal “the inner dimension of the Divine Reality,” and as such, they “take 
precedence when it comes to the inner life of the soul of the Muslim.”528 As created beings, the 
                                                      
 525 Schimmel begins this section affirming that love and gnosis are the last stations of the mystical path. 
The two are complimentary to one another but fluctuation exists in which is considered superior. This section 
however focuses on the mystical currents of which love is the highest state. Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of 
Islam, 132 ff. 
526 Al-Ghazālī, Ninety-Nine Names, 91.  
 527 Nasr admits Allah has divine wrath related to his divine majesty but that this is no different than 
Christian or Jewish theology. Preceding Allah’s Wrath, however, is His Mercy and Compassion from which forms 
the ethical causality of creation. This necessary cause of creation is reflected in creation itself as it manifests and 
reveals Allah’s Divine Names. Nasr, The Heart of Islam, 203. 
 528 Ibid., 203. 
   
 
 
214
substance and root of human existence entails the essence of Allah’s compassion, love, peace, 
and beauty. Love for Allah is found and understood as reflected in the love between Himself and 
the Prophet. The Prophet loved Allah’s attributes and pursued the absolute adherence and 
reflection of them. Love for God is displayed then in the love of His attributes. 
 Islam is not monolithic concerning the expressions of love and it remains a topic of 
divergence. Orthodox Muslims have tended to understand love as obedience but as Schimmel 
points out, for Sufis the term was too complex to be bound into one conception. For Sufis, love 
was a personal and existential commitment, an experience of the divine that began with 
obedience but also transcended it.529 Love is a process of purification where in the self is 
completely submersed in the divine attributes. Love for Allah is a process of purification wherein 
the self is completely submersed in the divine attributes. As one plunges the depths of the divine, 
s/he becomes more enraptured with Allah and experiences intimacy, proximity, longing, and 
desire.530 It is in this state that the self is slowly annihilated as all creaturely distinctions fade out 
of view and only the divine attributes remain. In relation to the afterlife, love reaches its 
culmination in the Beatific Vision. 
 From a Christian perspective, attributing love to Allah is a positive attribute statement to 
be welcomed. It would seem that having the option to worship a deity that is either loving or not 
loving, one would be warranted to desire the former. And not only is it warranted; it also seems a 
rational proposition to believe if this deity is to be called Good. Both Christians and Muslims can 
agree that God or Allah being loving is good. Perhaps Nasr is correct in pointing out that non-
Muslims have tended to emphasize Allah’s wrath and judgment over and against his compassion 
                                                      
529 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 138-9. 
530 Ibid., 132ff. 
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and mercy. Miroslav Volf has tried to mend the gap of understanding concerning love but from 
within the Christian tradition. Like Nasr, he highlights divine love within Islam and points out 
that both Muslims and Christians share similar convictions: “God loves, God is Just, God’s love 
encompasses God’s justice and human beings should love their neighbors as themselves.”531 
Furthermore, Volf notes that both faiths agree that God loves in a compassion, giving manner. 
Creation, especially of human creatures, is an instance of this mutual affirmation of compassion. 
But Volf also rightly notes there is theological distinction in the respective conceptions of the 
Divine. Christianity is fundamentally trinitarian while Islam emphasizes tawḥīd. Applying the 
propositional statement God is love within Christianity and Islam respectively, is, as we have 
seen, fundamentally different. Volf is correct that we have a comparison of loves – self-love 
within Islam and love for the other in Christianity.532 Furthermore, the implications of these 
loves are profound as they extend even to the very foundational fabric of reality. As we will see 
below the implications of tawḥīd and love have a profound impact on otherness and distinction.  
 Further agreement can be found towards orthodox Islam as well. With orthodox Muslims, 
Christians can affirm that part of what it means to love God entails keeping his commandments. 
Jesus explicitly stated that if a person loves God then that person will also keep God’s 
commandments.533 Saying that one loves either Allah or God without also demonstrating that 
love through obedience is a demonstration of mere lip-service. The words without corresponding 
action become vacuous. Common ground can also be found with the Sufis as well – and 
specifically al-Ghazālī. Christian conceptions of love are more than mere obedience to God’s 
commands. While love for God is certainly not less than obedience, there is a more robust 
                                                      
 531 Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 11-13. 
 532 Ibid., 158-9. 
 533 John 14:15 
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understanding of the nature of love. As the robustness is explored however, the differences 
between the two traditions emerges and the divergence is revealed. Schimmel’s analysis of love 
within Sufism shows that its philosophical thought is highly subjective. Focused is placed on the 
experience of the believer in connection to Allah. Not much is said of Allah’s love for man 
beyond his merciful bounty and the removing of the veil. This limited amount of information is 
also seen in al-Ghazālī’s work as well. In reality though there is not much that can be said. Allah 
is self-contained unity and as such the Sufi believer experiences Allah in some mystical, 
existential yet impersonal way in both this life and in Paradise. But without a strong foundation 
of mutual personhood coupled with there being no internal distinction in Allah, mystical love 
finds its culmination in singularity and annihilation. As the subjective self loves and pursues the 
Divine Singularity, less and less of that individual self remains. I champion Volf’s efforts here 
both in his intention and content, there is much need for greater understanding by people of both 
religions. However, as well will continue to see, the fundamental fabrics of divine reality are 
entirely distinct and, unlike Volf’s assertion, deeper than many people think. We will now look a 
little more in-depth at the culmination of love in Islam and the negative consequences of the 
Beatific Vision. 
 The Niche of Lights is an esoteric commentary written by al-Ghazālī about the esoteric 
and mystical verse of light in the Qur’ān.534 In the commentary, al-Ghazālī discusses the levels 
of Paradise and how this verse translates to each corresponding level. For al-Ghazālī, those who 
attain to the highest levels of Paradise are divided into two groups. The first group of those who 
are brought near, their reward is eternal contemplation of the Divine.535 For these faithful few, al-
                                                      
 534 Q 24:35 
 535 I have set the problem of knowledge and transcendence aside for a moment and instead intend on 
focusing on another perceived difficultly for Islam. This does not mean that the problem of knowledge does not 
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Ghazālī writes, “Everything the sight of one group perceives is burned up, effaced, and 
annihilated.”536 It seems that body and all of its wants or desires are done away with for they 
naturally cloud one’s perception, detracting from the perception of Allah. What remains of the 
person is the soul, left to contemplate, as al-Ghazālī states, “the absolute Beauty and Holiness,” 
as well as reflect on the beauty which is conferred on the soul by the divine presence.537 All that 
is not-Allah is done away with save the soul, that which has the ability to perceive and reflect on 
the divine countenance remains.538 
 The second group, those who according to al-Ghazālī are the “Few of the Few,” enjoy an 
even a closer proximity to Allah. This is the highest level of attainment and their reward is 
annihilation. Al-Ghazālī writes that the “august glories of His face burn them up, and the ruling 
authority of majesty overcomes them. In their essences they are effaced and annihilated.”539 This 
level of annihilation is beyond the previous group for whom contemplation still remained. Here 
the proximity is all-consuming, there is no more contemplation because there is nothing more to 
do with the individual self. Al-Ghazālī cites the passage from Surah 28:88 which states, “All 
                                                      
remain, it does. But for the sake of the argument I want to look at the quality of Allah’s love assuming that that 
proposition attains. 
536 Al-Ghazālī, The Niche of Lights, trans. by David Buchman, (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University 
Press, 1998), 52. 
 537 Ibid. 
 538 It is unclear if al-Ghazālī is speaking of bodily obliteration in a literal or metaphorical sense. In the 
Incoherence of the Philosophers, al-Ghazālī is clear that he considers it unorthodox of unbelief (kufr) to deny a 
bodily resurrection and embodied afterlife. It is one of the final three things he affirms in that treatise. Al-Ghazālī, 
Incoherence, 226. However, as Madelung suggests, this is the view of the early al-Ghazālī, much in line with the 
traditional Ashʿarite position and his mentor al-Juwaynī. Madelung further suggests however that his view ends up 
changing later in life and becomes more in-line with the disembodied perspective of the philosophers, especially Ibn 
Sīnā. Madelung writes, “Al-Ghazālī was thus compelled to abandon the Quranic description of the resurrection and 
its circumstances and seek an interpretation of them consistent with the cosmology of the philosophers.” Wilfred 
Madelung, “Al-Ghazālī on Resurrection and the Road to Paradise,” in Roads to Paradise: Eschatology and 
Concepts of the Hereafter in Islam, ed. by Sebastian Günther and Todd Lawson, vol. 1, (Boston, MA: Brill, 2017), 
422. This latter view suggested by Madelung is consistent with the esoteric reading of the Niche of Lights, especially 
the descriptions of those who are brought near. 
 539 Al-Ghazālī, Niche, 52. 
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perishes save His Countenance,” from which he purports that all will fade away – even the soul – 
and be consumed by Allah. Such an event mirrors the earthly gradations of tawḥīd in which the 
highest state is the direct and unmediated assurance of tawḥīd. Here in Paradise, the human 
subject is once again caught up into tawḥīd but in this instance, the beatific vision is all-
consuming. The individual self is infinitely overwhelmed and eternally overcome by the Divine 
countenance that there is no space remaining for the self, there is only the Real, only Allah. 
 From the Unity, which was the reality in the beginning sans creation, the external created 
distinctions now return. The climax of history is the return to Unity. This level of Paradise is the 
highest goal one can attain and that which al-Ghazālī strove to achieve. Annemarie Schimmel 
provides further insight into this final station on the spiritual path. In order to understand the 
nuances of this final station two key terms must be explained – fanā and baqā. Schimmel notes 
that the true meaning of fanā has been a controversial topic in the study of Sufism. Annihilation 
of the self in Allah is a common understanding of fanā and this begins to capture the experience 
of the self in which man takes on God’s attributes.540 This process culminates in the immersion 
in the wujūd or the “existence of God or, rather, the finding of God.”541 But the idea of 
annihilation and immersion need further development for the self is not annihilated entirely nor 
is the immersion an absorption or union. Schimmel purports that the best interpretation of fanā 
and the following stage baqā comes from Toshihiko Izutsu: “the total nullification of the ego-
consciousness, where there remains only the absolute Unity of Reality in its purity as an absolute 
Awareness prior to its bifurcation into subject and object’ – the state the Sufis would call jamʿ, 
                                                      
 540 Concerning fanā Schimmel notes, “It is the place of the alleged ḥadīth takhallaqū bi-akhlāq Allāh, 
‘qualify yourself with the qualities of God,’ i.e., through constant mental struggle exchange your own base qualities 
for the praiseworthy qualities by which God has described Himself in Koranic revelation.” Schimmel, Mystical 
Dimensions, 142. 
 541 Ibid. 
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‘unification, collectedness.’”542 In the occurrence of fanā the self or ego-consciousness is not 
annihilated as in destroyed; rather its practically annihilation or, as Izutsu suggests, nullified. The 
creaturely will has, for all intents and purposes, been done away with and the Divine Will is all 
that remains. This is the stage of baqā. There are no longer self-determinations, for the self does 
not remain. 
 Attaining to that final stage of Paradise is what supposedly brings the utmost bliss. This is 
the pursuit of Muslim mystics and it was the pursuit of al-Ghazālī as well. But what of its 
qualitative nature for human creatures? Upon personal reflection, is practical self-annihilation 
something to be desired above all else? Islamic philosophers and mystics who have arrived at 
this conclusion are not at fault here. Their conclusions, and the conclusion of al-Ghazālī 
specifically, are merely the logical outworking of a faithful adherence to tawḥīd. William Keepin 
offers sound insight here; he notes, “Taking refuge in tawḥīd is the very realization of the 
supreme oneness – the one God that is the sole Reality,” therefore, he can logically conclude, 
“Taking refuge in this Reality entails renouncing the illusion of separate selfhood.”543 The stage 
of baqā answers the question of how finite creatures are supposed to relate and find enjoyment in 
a being that is utterly unique and unknowable in whom there is extreme unicity and no 
distinction. There is no relation between Allah and the human creature as one human person 
relates to another human person. Furthermore, there can be no more human-to-human 
relationship because individual selves are nullified. Thus, eternal life is an entirely static reality 
for the third level of believers al-Ghazālī mentions in the Niche of Lights. For the lesser of this 
                                                      
 542 Toshihiko Izutsu, “The Basic Structure of Metaphysical Thinking in Islam,” in Collected Papers on 
Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. Mehdi Mohaghegh and Hermann Landolt (Tehran, 1971), p. 39f., as cited by 
Schimmel, Ibid. 143. 
 543 William Keepin, Belonging to God: Spirituality, Science & a Universal Path to God, (Woodstock, VT: 
SkyLight Paths Publishing, 2016), 74. 
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group there is still some semblance of personhood remaining. For those closer to Allah in this 
group all that is not-Real is annihilated and the Real (i.e., Allah) overwhelms and obliterates the 
human self. 
Commitment to the thesis that Allah is the ultimate Good leads to the highest stages of 
bliss in Paradise resulting in the annihilation of the individual. This is what the highest love for 
Allah achieves. As human creatures advance in proximity to Allah the more all else fades away 
save the divine. I would submit that the question naturally arises of whether or not this is good 
and worthy of an entire life’s pursuit. According to al-Ghazālī every human creature should 
strive their entire life so that they can be eternally obliterated by the divine presence. Is bliss 
even possible at that point? It would seem that an individual self would need to remain in order 
to experience the euphoria of such proximity to Allah. The goodness of this quasi-annihilation is 
something entirely foreign to the human experience of goodness in this life. Human beings are 
inherently relational and have experiences of a certain kind of love that is a fundamental part of 
our existence. It is a qualitative love akin to agapē which goes beyond the self and seeks to 
elevate the other. But more than just elevating the other, it loves the other without seeking 
anything in return. Mothers have agapē love for their children. A mother’s love is instinctual and 
is given without the need for reciprocation. It is not contingent upon the child loving her first. 
Contrast that kind with the love of Allah. How does the love of Allah manifest? There are 
numerous passages throughout the Qur’ān which state that Allah’s love is contingently given. He 
loves those who love Him first. But as we have seen, what is called love for the other is merely 
love of the Self with an odd quasi-extension of supposed compassion. In reality, Allah continues 
to only love Himself, for he is the only true Real. The love of Allah is a radical self-love which 
eternally turns in upon itself in an egoistic self-reciprocating action. Human creatures do not 
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truly matter, there is no space for them to meaningfully matter for there is no distinction in 
Allah’s self-love. For those who have been brought near, eternal life is an eternally static 
existence. Proximity to Allah entails singularity and it is here that Muslim theologians are 
expressing the highest levels of consistency in both their theology and eschatology. 
Reciprocal love between Allah and mankind simply does not exist. But human beings 
crave that kind of love and flourish when they encounter it. Love such as this is powerful and 
transcends time, distance, separation, etc. Now, if this type of love exists, and one would be 
justified in affirming its existence, then it must have a source and causal explanation. We are 
operating under the assumption in this study that this is a theistic world. Both Islam and 
Christianity are monotheistic religions and as such they claim that God exists, that he is one in 
being, and that he is the creator of all there is. If God is the creator of all things good, and love of 
this kind is a good, then it must be God to whom we attribute love’s existence. What then would 
be the implications if the existence of this love cannot be attributed to him? This love between 
two persons is a good that the divine does not and, assumedly, cannot possess. Nor is it a good 
which seemingly originates either in or from Him. 
Muslims finds themselves in a bit of a dilemma because Allah is ultimate unity and there 
is nothing lacking in his nature. Because this kind of relational love requires the existence of the 
other, then it could not have been manifested prior to creation nor could this love been part of the 
purview of love in God’s essential nature. Allah’s love was not lacking prior to creation. The 
expression of His love must then be perfect goodness. Does it become problematic for Muslims 
when this existential reality is present – relational love – but their God is perhaps not the source 
of it? In light of this consideration, Walls’s words are helpful; he writes, “The question of 
whether we believe in God is another form of the question of whether the fleeting glimpses of 
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joy we experience in this life are intimations of a deeper wellspring of happiness, or whether 
they are tantalizing illusions, shadowy hints of a satisfaction that does not really exist.”544 
Although Walls writes within the Christian tradition, he words equally apply within an Islamic 
context. Applying Walls’s questions to Islam, let us consider the human experiences of love and 
relationality, truly knowing and being known by another self. Is this experience an intimation of 
a deeper “wellspring of happiness” or is a “tantalizing illusion?” It seems that Muslims are 
caught in a dilemma. For, on the one hand, if they maintain that love is an intimation of love to 
come in the afterlife, a good worth retaining, then what is the source of the experience of the 
good in Paradise. The source is not Allah for he only loves himself. Muslims can suggest that 
Allah is loving but it has been shown in the tradition of al-Ghazālī that Allah’s love for man is an 
extension of loving himself alone. This love is a tangential, impersonal extension so that Allah 
can see himself reflected in human creatures and continue to love himself. That kind of love is in 
no way analogous to the kind in question and one can reasonably ask if Allah can be the source 
of the love experienced between human beings. Thus, if relational love is a good and worth 
retaining, then what is the source of that love in Paradise? One can suggest that human beings 
will continue to love each other in the manner they do now, an even more refined and robust love 
because their moral character will be perfected. Perhaps this is the case, but this assumption 
seems problematic for at least two reasons: first, it suggests that there is a finite, external 
mechanism designed to satisfy for an eternity. Can the love shared between finite creatures, even 
in an enhanced moral state, satisfy eternally? Perhaps, but it does seem interesting to assume that 
this problem was felt by Muslim philosopher and theologians and it led to the developing 
tradition of a myriad multiplication of the virgins of paradise. Love, or at least a certain 
                                                      
544 Walls, Heaven, 197. 
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manifestation of it, must be spread out so that it does not become exhausted on the plane of 
eternity. Second, and deriving from the implication of the first point, it seems then that there is a 
good which exists external to Allah since it does not derive from him. In this sense, Allah can be 
said to be a great Good but he cannot be the ultimate Good for there is something good outside 
of and external to his nature from which humans derive a measure happiness and satisfaction of 
which there is nothing analogous in the divine essence. 
 On the other hand, it can be suggested that love, as it is shared by human creatures in this 
life, is a tantalizing illusion.545 This would seem to necessarily follow from the line of 
theologizing present in the previous point. If Allah is to be maintained as the ultimate Good, the 
source from which all satisfaction derives, then the experiential and conceptual goodness that 
human beings now possess in relational love is ultimately not real. The foundation of the family, 
the love between spouses, the love of parents for children, all of it is merely an illusion. This 
undoubtedly poses an existential problem for the love between human creatures is so palpable 
and fundamental to existence. What sort of qualitative Creation would this reality be, if it were 
all a mere illusion? What other sorts of experiences could we no longer trust? A radical 
skepticism would no doubt begin to set in among human beings who were told this manner of 
love was not real. 
 Existential considerations aside, the question of origination persists even if it is an 
illusion. How would such an idea, that relational love between individuals, arise in the first 
place. If one suggests that the illusion is from God, that seems problematic for a couple of 
                                                      
 545 Nasr has asked this question, “Men and women experience all kinds of love and behold many beautiful 
objects in this life here below, but most do not reach the Garden of Truth through such experiences. We must 
therefore ask ourselves what love and beauty are in the context of Sufism”.545 Of course the path to the Garden of 
Truth is characterized by a love for Allah but within the Sufi context, the love shared and experienced by men and 
women are illusory goods. 
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reasons: first, it suggests that a fundamental aspect of human existence and experience is false 
which is extremely deceptive and cruel. Second, and perhaps more problematic is the logical 
consistency of Allah creating such an illusion. Is it even possible for Allah to conceive of loving 
the other as a great good? Remember, the doctrine of tawḥīd is vital for understanding the 
essential nature of Allah. The teachings of tawḥīd are unequivocally emphatic, Allah is an 
undifferentiated unity possessing no distinction within the divine essence. In light of the 
teachings of tawḥīd, can it not then be said that the idea of love for the other could not have 
logically derived from such a unitary mind. Perhaps one could suggest that relational love is the 
product of rational and emotive human beings living in relation to one another. True, 
relationality could have been an evolutionary biproduct-of-sorts arising out of rational creatures, 
but this assumption would come at a theological cost. In order to be consistent, one would have 
to say that not only did Allah not plan this manifestation of love, he could not have even 
conceived of it. This manifestation would have caught him by surprise. Furthermore, it would 
seem that Allah could not even be able to understand this kind of love because he certainly could 
not have experienced it first-hand. 
OUTSIDE 
As the apologetic methodology moves outward, the Christian perspective is again 
considered. Within the Christian perspective there is robust space for the notion of divine love 
and relationality. The doctrine of the trinity affirms that within the God-head there is both unity 
and distinction. There is logical space for other-seeking, self-giving love because of the 
distinction of persons present from all eternity. Divine love within Islam is self-seeking and 
singular. The radical self-love of Allah raises serious ethical concerns regarding the fundamental 
elements of reality. As the eternal form of love, self-love is the highest good and this seems to go 
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against all creaturely moral intuitions. This ethical dilemma does not exist within the Christian 
conception of God’s love. A. E. Taylor argues that there is indeed an ethical nature to the 
doctrine of the Trinity which is foundational to the notion of an agapē, self-giving love. 
Considering the ontological nature of the trinity, he purports that a mere economic distribution of 
the divine life “does not make giving as fully and inwardly characteristic of the divine life as it 
requires to be made.”546 A doctrine of giving, and self-emptying may indeed be a real function of 
the God-head, but if understood as merely an economic function, then this action will remain 
“something external,” as Taylor emphasizes, “an incident arising from the relation of the Creator 
to a creation.”547 The act of self-giving would thus be an accidental property, arising only in 
relation to creation. If this is the case, Taylor suggests that the knowledge of God humans 
possess would not be able to “penetrate the inmost depths of the divine life.”548 We simply 
would not know who or what God is truly like. He could at his core be a self-centered deity. A 
deity who, being the ultimate Good, thus withholds that goodness from creation for it is not 
shared. Or, consistent with the divine nature, the ultimate Good is self-centeredness, in which 
case that which is purported as goodness by human creatures is not the ultimate Good of reality. 
 Taylor further suggests this is the reason that Christian theologians would not rest until 
they had “declared that the ‘personal’ distinctions are eternal, internal, and essential to the divine 
being itself.”549 This commitment is not merely due to the conviction that the divine life must 
have had activity which was from the beginning, prior to creation. The commitment stems rather 
from the relation between God and human creatures, namely, in what can be communicated to 
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finite human creatures. Taylor rightly points out that God can communicate only so much of the 
divine self to humanity without humanity ceasing to be the creatures they are. If God’s 
communicable attributes are depended upon human creatures to be exercised then the “riches of 
the divine nature must remain as good as uncommunicated; in its foundations the divine life must 
be egoistic.”550 This would implicate the nature of divine love for in reality it would be a surface 
attribute of God, not indicative of the inner life of God. The fundamental revelation “God is 
love” would only be fundamental insofar as human creatures know and relate to God. In 
hindsight, what is traditionally viewed as fundamental appears to not be quite so. For God to be 
fundamentally love, fundamentally self-giving, there must be in the divine essence itself the 
capacity for such activity in which said activity is fully and not trivially realized. Taylor’s 
concluding remarks on this thought are worth nothing: 
And since such isolated selfhood is unethical, there is no room for the ethical in 
the inmost life of God, when it is conceived thus. To make room for the ethical 
we have to think of the divine, even apart from its relation to the creatures, as 
having a life in which there is, within the Godhead itself, an object adequate to the 
complete and absolute reception of an activity of giving which extends to the 
whole fullness of the divine nature, so that there is nothing which is not imparted 
and nothing which is not received. Because the mutual love in which each party 
bestows himself freely and completely and is freely and completely received is 
ethically the supreme spiritual activity, the life of God is thought of as involving 
an internal distinction as well as an internal unity, in order that the whole activity 
of the divine life may be one of perfect and unlimited self-bestowal.551 
Taylor’s thoughts are helpful and they direct theological inferences from the perspective of a 
premier ethicist. The ethical implications of the divine life point to the need for internal 
distinction and internal unity. The tri-unity of persons called God may challenge human logic – 
though not illogical itself – but from an ethical perspective, the doctrine of the trinity addresses 
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the relational concerns which would arise from a divine being within whom there is utterly no 
distinction (i.e., tawḥīdic Allah). 
 Trinitarian love is the fundamental fabric of God’s nature. Instead of this love remaining 
an abstraction, unknowable through human perception, the triune God acted in human history 
manifesting the quality of divine love in full display. Contrary to Allah’s contingently given 
love, the love of the triune is given without condition. While humanity remained enemies to God 
and hostile to his lordship, the Word-made-flesh descended into creation to save and redeem all 
things.552 Through Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross, the quality of God’s immense love was 
demonstrated. In that moment, humanity was given a glimpse of the quality of love that has 
existed within the Godhead from eternity past. It is this kind of love that Christians identify as 
part of the ultimate Good. And not only is that love freely given, it made a way for humanity to 
experience true relationship with God. To know and be known, to love and be loved. The triune 
God’s love for man is a non-mystical reality, grounded in the very nature of the Godhead. 
Christians love God because, in a very real and direct expression, God first love us!553 Humanity 
can embrace those good aspirations of love and relationality both because it is how God created 
human beings to be and because the God of Christianity has demonstrated it to the world in 
human history. 
 
 
                                                      
552 Rom. 5:8-10. Moreover, when the love of Christ was demonstrated on the cross, Christianity teaches 
that no greater manifestation of love exists (John 15:13). But this is true for human beings and while Jesus was 
indeed fully human his demonstration of love was of a quality beyond personal human sacrifice. His manifestation 
of love is qualitatively superior because he was truly innocent. This is something no human person apart from Christ 
could have done for no other human person was or is perfect. At the cross we see the purest manifestation of God’s 
love for man, a love that can be understood as such but at the same time its quality extends far beyond human 
capacity to fathom and comprehend. 
553 1 John 4:19 
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Abductive Considerations 
 Alongside the apologetic nature of the study, the other stated purpose was to make a 
comparative judgment of the two monotheistic traditions. In order to make this final assessment, 
let us return to the two problems which were labeled the Qualitative Gap Problem (QGP) and the 
Teleological Gap Problem (TGP). The QGP stressed the importance of the quality of the afterlife 
and the need to meet the demands of eternal duration. The QGP was then linked to the TGP 
which considered the multi-dimensionality of human creatures. If the demand of the QGP is to 
be objectively met, then the quality of the afterlife will meet and surpass the evident ends (i.e. 
TGP) of the human subject thus leading to everlasting human flourishing. Both faith traditions 
believe their doctrines of heaven meets those demands and there are no real intimations of 
trouble with the afterlife so conceived. Assurance that heaven will be eternally satisfying stems 
from the teachings that the respective deities of Christianity and Islam have prepared Heaven and 
Paradise for human creatures to enjoy. But, is one tradition more desirable than the other? I 
would submit yes. 
In making an abductive inference, the best explanation will be that which meets a number 
of criteria. Three criteria will be used to make the qualitative judgment: explanatory scope, 
explanatory depth and simplicity. Furthermore, let us reconsider the three facts of the TGP which 
highlighted and emphasized the multi-dimensionality of human creatures: 
1. Human beings have a physical dimension. 
2. Human beings have a mental/spiritual dimension. 
3. Human beings have a social/relational dimension. 
These are the teleological facts which are in need of explanation. If the mystic’s Paradise or the 
revised Heaven is to be desired over the other, it will be because these subjective dimensions, 
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which form our fundamental longings and aspirations, are met. Let us now consider each of these 
dimensions in relation to the abductive criteria. First, human beings have a physical dimension. 
The depiction of the Christian heaven which was presented entailed an embodied existence in a 
physical reality. It is a scene where heaven and earth come together in a glorious harmony of the 
physical and the spiritual. The highest stages of Paradise according to al-Ghazālī are for all 
intents and purposes disembodied. His view on an embodied afterlife, while initially consistent 
with orthodox Islam seems to have become consistent with the cosmology of the philosophers – 
disembodied and static.554 At the very least, there is no practical space for a physical existence as 
flourishing and bliss are not linked to the body. 
 Second, human beings have a spiritual/mental dimension. Heaven is reality wherein the 
human person persists and remains. Christian theology is replete with doctrine affirming that the 
individual will be resurrected into a renewed spiritual body. This entails that our personhood is 
retained as well for Christian anthropology suggests human creatures are embodied souls. 
Moreover, glimpses of the afterlife suggest that human creatures will be in relation with not only 
other humans but with the Godhead as well. This implies human agency will remain intact. For 
Al-Ghazālī, the highest levels of Paradise, leave no space for human agency or will. The 
penultimate experience in the gradation of the Beatific Vision entails a practical agency for the 
sole purpose of contemplating Allah. The ultimate level, the one in which unending bliss ensues, 
the individual self is overcome and annihilated so that none but Allah, the True Real, remains. 
All that is other-than Allah, fades away (including individual human agency and will). 
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Resurrection and the Road to Paradise,” pp. 420-27. 
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 Third, human beings have a social/relational dimension. Again, Christianity teaches that 
human creatures will be in relationship in heaven. These relationships are with other human 
beings who are there, but it also entails being in direct relationship with God.555 Moreover, this 
relationship is mediated in a very direct way through the person of Jesus Christ. Scripture teaches 
that Jesus Christ was resurrected with a spiritual body and ascended into heaven with the same 
body. This suggests that Jesus remains in this body even today. The incarnation was a permanent 
putting-on of humanity. Jesus Christ is not only the salvific bridge to God but in some very real 
way, he is also the relational bridge to God. The inhabitants of heaven will enjoy personal 
relationship with the very God who created them. Contrast this depiction with al-Ghazālī’s view. 
Again, the highest levels of Paradise do not include human agency and so they definitely do not 
include a social dimension either. In fact, because Allah is the only True Real, and there is no 
distinction within him, it should not be expected that relationship exists the closer one gets to 
Ultimate Reality. 
 The Christian view of Heaven presented here coupled with the nature of the Triune God 
is a more desired reality. This assessment is based on the three abductive criteria. The Christian 
view has the greater explanatory scope of the three facts of the TGP. The teleology of heaven 
better accounts for and meets the needs of the multi-dimensionality of human beings. Each of the 
components of the subjective experience in this life are fundamental aspects of the life to come. 
The Christian view also has greater explanatory depth. Within each human dimension is vast 
                                                      
555 The atheist philosopher Luc Ferry writes on this component of Christian afterlife and suggests it was a 
very strong motivation for people to believe Christianity was true. Ferry rightly notes that as relational creatures, we 
do very much want to be reunited with our loved ones after death. He writes, “Stoicism tries valiantly to relieve us 
of the fears linked to death, but at the cost of obliterating our individual identity. What we would like above all is to 
be reunited with our loved ones, and, if possible, with their voices, their faces – not in the form of undifferentiated 
cosmic fragments, such as pebbles or vegetables. In this arena, Christianity might be said to have used its big guns. 
It promises us no less than everything we would wish for: personal immortality and the salvation of our loved ones.” 
Luc Ferry, A Brief History of Thought, 52-3. 
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theological richness wherein the nature of the triune God of Christianity is present as the 
coherent grounding for each component. Lastly, the Christian view is also the simpler 
hypothesis. Simplicity in abduction refers to the one that is more natural and that which instinct 
suggests.556 Human creatures are, at their core, relational beings who love and are loved. From 
this foundation flows all other goodness. But these aspirations are not random and subjected to 
chance, they are part of God’s design and thus part of his good intentions for humanity. Walls 
agrees and comments on this point: 
The important point here is that fully meaningful life must be one that suits our 
aspirations, one that answers to our deepest longings and desires. I argued…that 
some doctrine of heaven follows from the claim that God is good, for a good God 
would not create us with the aspirations we have and then leaven them frustrated 
and unfulfilled. This argument is only enhanced and enriched by the Christian 
vision of Trinitarian love. A God whose eternal nature is mutual and reciprocal 
gift and reception; could not but deeply love any creatures he made and would 
surely be committed to fulfilling the natures he had given them.557 
Human creatures have the desires and longings that they do because within the Christian 
tradition, that is what they were designed for. The telos of design aligns with the telos of eternity. 
Furthermore, it seems that Islam not only fails to meet these abductive criteria in the way 
Christianity does, but also, the QGP and TGP create an inherent dilemma in Islam. On the one 
hand, if the QGP (the objective problem) is to be met it will entail proximity to Allah. But as we 
have seen, proximity to Allah entails the annihilation of the human subject which doesn’t meet 
the TGP (the subjective problem). On the other hand, if the TGP is to be met, it will entail a 
removed proximity to Allah. In the physical depictions of Paradise, the TGP, the multi-
dimensionality of human creatures, is met. But, at the same time, the QGP is not met because 
any meaningful experience with the divine is removed. 
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Areas for Further Research 
 This study has only begun the comparative conversation concerning the afterlife 
traditions of both Christianity and Islam. Al-Ghazālī was chosen as a dialogue partner because he 
focused his attention on proximity to God in Paradise. It was assumed that the best chance either 
of the faith traditions had at overcoming the QGP would entail experience of the divine. There 
were a few areas for further research that need to be addressed in relation to al-Ghazālī’s view 
specifically and the mystical tradition in general. One such consideration is the dichotomy 
between the few and the many. The esoteric nature of the mystical traditions makes the Beatific 
Vision not attainable by all people. Few people within Islam have both the freedom and capacity 
to attain to the highest levels of paradise. In fact, it would seem that the highest levels are not 
attainable by the masses. Haleem comments on this noting the words of the great Islamic 
philosopher Ibn Rushd (Latinized: Averroes): 
As Ibn Rushd points out, this view is more suitable for the educated since the 
spiritual existence is permanent in the concept of the return of the soul and a new 
body avoids such publications as the objection the worldly body turns into dust, is 
fed upon by plants, which for than eaten by other people, from whose bodies 
come the bodies of their descendants, etc. 
The representation of existence in the afterlife as being also bodily and not merely 
spiritual, explains Ibn Rushd, is more suitable as it makes it more understood and 
more moving for the majority of people; spiritual representation might be suitable 
only for speculative thinkers in their argumentations, but the majority are the 
prime targets of religion.”558 
For those Muslims who do make it to Paradise, only the fewest of the few would actually attain 
to the level of perfect bliss. And, it seems, it would be through no fault of the masses. For their 
simple minds, an embodied existence is more understandable. But it is not problematic that what 
they believe is the best for them in the afterlife does not correspond to reality? For the many, the 
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best they can hope for based on their mental capacities and the lack of time available to devote 
themselves to formal learning and ascetic practices is a lesser Paradise. 
Another area for further study considers the Paradox of Hedonism as it stands in relation 
to the pursuits of Islamic Paradise. I agree with the traditions in Islam which aim towards a 
higher spiritual experience in Paradise rather than a purely sensual one. The Paradox of 
Hedonism becomes relevant when the goal of Paradise is considered. If a literal reading of the 
Qur’an leads to an emphasis on the physicality of Paradise, then can it be said that the highest 
good in Paradise is the pursuit of pleasure or pleasure fulfillment? If so, it would seem that the 
hedonic nature of Paradise falls prey to the Paradox of Hedonism. In The Method of Ethics, 
Henry Sidgwick addresses this tension between one’s aim or pursuits and the objective realities 
necessary for attaining said pleasures. He posits that if we seek pleasure or happiness as our chief 
end, what he calls Egoistic Hedonism, that this egotism might defeat itself. He writes, “There can 
be no doubt, I think, that the danger thus indicated, of Egoism defeating itself, is not imaginary: 
that the concentration of the mind upon pleasure as an object of pursuit tends to diminish the 
fullness and flavor of the pleasures actually experienced.”559 Sedgwick is suggesting that seeking 
pleasure as a first-order aim creates a paradox due to the mind objectifying pleasure instead of 
focusing on external objective realities from which pleasure typically derives. To objectify 
pleasure potentially diminishes the actual pleasure one may gain from external sources. Thus, the 
first-order pursuit of pleasure becomes frustrated and one does not actually achieve the desired 
end. In order to avoid this paradox, Sedgwick posits the general principle of the Paradox of 
Egoistic Hedonism: “that in order to attain the end we must to some extent put it out of sight and 
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not directly aim at it.”560 Sedgwick’s solution to the paradox is to not make the pursuit of 
pleasure a first-order aim but a secondary one. Attaining pleasure should not be the aim; instead 
focus on some other pursuit of interest and pleasure will be achieved.561 
Following his time in a concentration camp, Viktor Frankl affirmed something similar to 
Sedgwick although it was less egoistically motivated. Happiness, he proposed, must come from 
without, an indirect experience achieved when someone looks outside themselves. He writes, 
“success, like happiness, cannot be pursued; it must ensue, and it only does so as the unintended 
side-effect of one’s personal dedication to a cause greater than oneself or as the by-product of 
one’s surrender to a person other than oneself.”562 This perspective of how one achieves genuine 
happiness conforms perfectly to the Christian ethic of love God and love others. I believe the 
same holds true in the heavenly reality. The love of God and others will lead to a lasting and 
eternal happiness. Those who seek their own end of happiness and pleasure will not find it. 
Those who, as Jesus states, “loses his life for my sake will find it.”563 The teaching of Jesus 
confronts the paradox of hedonism and the solution is a paradox of its own. If you wish to find 
happiness, freedom, love, joy, you will not find it in conventional ways. No, one must lose 
his/her life to find it, which is equivalent to saying a person must remove himself from the throne 
and submit to the sovereignty of the true king. Only then will eternal joy ensue. 
                                                      
560 Ibid., 133. 
561 It should be noted that Sidgwick thinks this paradox is more a paradox in the theoretical sense and that 
practically there is not much of a paradox at all. It is not clear though that the paradox can be so easily dismissed. 
Perhaps he is correct in suggesting that from a practical rational egoism, the paradox is seemingly overcome but then 
the question would still remain if the rational egoism itself is to be pursued. I would submit that the inward-seeking 
focus of individual human beings is problematic for a theory of ethics and that pleasure comes from an outward 
focused paradigm. 
 562 Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, trans. by Isle Lasch, (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2006), 16-
17. 
563 Matt. 16:25 
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Closing Thoughts 
If human beings retain their humanity in the Afterlife not only is love central to their 
current state, even more so will love be central in the eternal state. It then follows that eternal 
flourishing will depend on humanities’ ability to love and be loved. The earlier thesis that eternal 
joy requires a maximally great being in order to eternally satisfy, coupled with humanity’s need 
to love and be loved, it stands to reason that the quality of the afterlife significantly depends on 
God’s love for humanity and the ability to of the divine to reveal not only love but aspects of 
itself. The mystical traditions of Islam aim to the final stages of the mystical path – knowledge 
and love – as that which will bring them eternal bliss. This is their solution to the problem of 
eternity but as it has been shown, this view is problematic. For Christianity, the solution is love 
but not in the sense that the Divine be reduced to a mere means by which to experience love; 
rather, the solution is Love in that God is Love. In the life to come, knowledge and love abound 
from God as both the telos of humanity and the means by which they will experience eternal joy. 
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